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My dissertation tackles an important question of democratic transition by addressing 
the apparent lack of political participation, specifically low intensity participation 
(LIP), of women across much of post-communist Europe. Based on available 
statistics, it is only in what once was East Germany, and to a lesser extent the Czech 
Republic, that a low LIP trend is not starkly visible. The regional pattern is contrary 
to past experiences of women in transition, particularly in Latin America, where 
women in authoritarian systems pushed for inclusion when democratic space opened. 
While some research has addressed the issue of high intensity participation (women 
in elected positions), many of the variables thought to be important (e.g. removal of 
quotas, electoral structure and party ideology), do not adequately address low LIP 
among the region’s women. Based on 13 months of fieldwork in Poland, eastern 
Germany, the Czech Republic and Romania I propose that the communist legacy, the 
lack of an institutionalized women’s movement prior to 1989 and gendered job 
displacement after are related explanations for low female LIP in Eastern and Central 
Europe during the initial transition period. The absence or limited intensity of one of 
these variables effects and mediates rates of female LIP, as is the case in eastern 
Germany (existence of a women’s movement) and the Czech Republic (less dramatic 
gendered job displacement). Additionally, I argue that despite the many changes in 
women’s lives since 1989, particularly related to the eastward expansion of the 
European Union and the growth of the NGO sector, these three factors remain 






Chapter I:  
Female Political Participation in Post-Communist Europe 
 
“It was the most important thing that ever happened to me – bigger than getting 
married and bigger than having children.” This was how an older Czech woman 
described the end of communism in her country. She went on to explain, “it was the 
most amazing feeling to wake up one day and realize that I was free.” For six months 
she said, she “awoke completely exuberant” (Interviews 2007-2008). The rather 
unexpected end of communism in Europe was indeed a momentous occurrence. It 
started in Poland, then Hungary and East Germany. Like dominoes, in the final 
months of 1989 the once stalwart communist governments of Eastern and Central 
Europe (ECE) toppled one by one. Building upon the work of underground reform 
efforts and feeling the cracks in the communist systems, hundreds of thousands of 
citizens, men and women, took to the streets of Berlin, Prague, Bucharest, and 
elsewhere successfully demanding change.  
Following the victories of 1989, political space opened resulting in opportunities 
for building and directing both economic and political institutions in the region. 
Despite a significant presence in precipitating events, women were noticeably under-
represented in the politics of transition.1 Twenty years, a generation, later women in 
post-communist Europe remain largely absent from formal, and perhaps more 
significantly informal, political life (Coyne 2010; Gallego 2007; Conway 2005; 
Heinen 1997).  This absence was and remains puzzling.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Political space is a term often used to describe a time of structural or institutional change when old 
institutions disappear and new institutions are about to be built. It also entails the ability to express 




Low levels of female political participation are not unique to the states of post-
communist Europe. However, given the visible position of women under 
communism, there was reason to be optimistic about the role that women would take 
in the post-communist transition (Penn 2005; True 2003; Einhorn 1993; Mickiewicz 
and Bell 1982). Women in communist society had a much different experience than 
women in the West.2 They represented a significant portion of the workforce, they 
were the beneficiaries of extensive social coverage, and they held a number of 
political positions.3 As mentioned, women also played pivotal roles in the uprisings 
and protests that led to the end of communism in the region. From an outside 
perspective, women under communism appeared to be well ahead of women 
struggling for their rights in other parts of the world. Therefore, for the initial 
transition years (1989-1997) the lack of mobilization and female political activity, 
especially at the grassroots, is notable (Heinen 1997; Kaldor 1997; Knezevic 1997; 
Einhorn 1993).  
Given their position under communism, it is rather perplexing that women did not 
“storm the stage” or attempt to fill newly available political space, even as the new 
governments of the early 1990s retrenched once “female friendly” policies. In fact, 
Heinen argues that contrary to expectation, after 1989 women had “fewer 
opportunities to participate in decisions concerning the whole community or their 
interests” than they did during the communist era (1997, 581). In fact, as will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “West” can be a rather unclear word. I use it throughout this dissertation in the same manner as used 
during the Cold War. The “West” refers to Western Europe, the United States and their industrialized 
allies. This was sometimes also called the 1st World. The East was the 2nd World, and included the 
Soviet Union and its allies. The 3rd World tended to refer to those non-industrialized states, primarily 
in the Southern hemisphere, from which the two major powers vied for loyalty.  
3 Such benefits included generous maternity leave, elderly care, employment guarantees, and state 




evident in the next section, those in the ECE region were less likely to participate in 
such activities as petition signing and attending lawful demonstrations in the 1990s 
than those in Western Europe and North America. A notable 58.9% of “Western” 
respondents to the 1999 World Values Survey indicating that they “have” signed a 
petition, yet only 29.9% of the ECE sample answered similarly. In regards to 
attending a demonstration, 32.8% of those from the West compared to 43.7% from 
the ECE region replied that they “would never” take part in such an activity. This 
reveals a regional trend. Likewise, within the region, answers to these questions 
display gender differences. In each case, women were less likely than men to say they 
have participated in such activities and more likely to say that they “would never” do 
so.4  
Additionally mystifying is that despite twenty years of democratic transition and 
the coming of age of a new generation of women, one with few if any memories of 
communism, there appear to be only minor changes in female attitudes regarding 
political activity. Therefore, focusing on low intensity political participation (LIP), 
this project seeks to understand what factors contributed to the low level of female 
participation in the ECE region during the initial transition away from communism. 
It also seeks to assess whether the state of political participation has changed now, a 
generation later.  
In analyzing this puzzle, it is my contention that the influence of the communist 
legacy, the weakness of an institutionalized women’s movement before, and gendered 
job displacement after 1989 provide the greatest explanatory power for understanding 
the level of low intensity participation among women in the early 1990s. I also argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




that despite many changes in the region, specifically the influx of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the European Union’s (EU) eastward expansion, these 
factors continue to be relevant for addressing continuing low, and in some cases 
dropping, levels of female LIP today. What follows are a description of important 
terms utilized throughout this project and a more in-depth discussion of the research 
puzzle. From there, I examine both high intensity participation (HIP) and LIP in the 
region during and after the early transition years. I then provide a review of the 
literature on this topic and address the significance of this work. Following, I 
articulate my dissertation argument. Finally, I provide a road map for the rest of the 
manuscript.  
Terms and Definitions: 
The most important term used in this project is the concept of participation. 
Participation denotes taking part in or being involved in formal or informal 
communal activities such as membership in clubs or various recreational or policy-
oriented organizations. This includes a wide-range of activities. Therefore, it is 
helpful to separate participation into political and social categories. Social 
participation entails belonging to groups that seek joint leisure activity for personal 
enrichment or in the pursuit of a hobby. This often results in positive social 
interaction. For example, joining an indoor soccer league or a book club would be 
forms of social participation (Putnam 1994). On the other hand, political participation 
describes such activities or organizations that serve to inform people about political 
processes or to act in a way so as to influence such processes. Schlozman and her 
colleagues explain that such participation can be, “…formal or informal, mainstream 




influence either directly or indirectly what government does” (Schlozman et al 1994). 
While social participation is desirable and has been shown to be an important 
component in the development of civil society and consequently efficient democracy 
(de Tocqueville 18?; Putnam 1994; Howard 2003), it is political participation that is 
the main focus of this research because it has the most direct link to policy (de 
Tocqueville 2001 [1835]; Howard 2003; Putnam 1994).   
Political participation is broken down into different types based on level of 
commitment necessarily. Literature distinguishes between high and low intensity 
political participation. These differ in regards to the time and energy required. High 
intensity participation, or more formal participation, requires a great deal of time and 
a high level of commitment. This type of political participation includes running for 
or serving in office, or belonging to the leadership of a political party, interest group 
or other type of political organization. Low intensity participation requires less 
commitment and is often associated with more grassroots activities. Voting, petition 
signing and party membership are, therefore, examples of low intensity engagement 
(Leal 1999). Low intensity participation, because it is most accessible to the average 
citizen and because it is voluntary, is of particular interest. Almost anyone, regardless 
of age, education or income can take part in LIP. It is this form of political activity 
that Almond and Verba (1963) and Putnam (1994) claim is critical for civic 
community and a vibrant democracy. Henceforth, when writing about women’s 
political participation, unless otherwise specified, I am referring to low intensity 
participation.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




A final and increasingly popular form of participating is working for non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Tunde defines NGOs as “… private, voluntary 
non-profit organizations independent of any government and funded through 
individual and corporate donations…” (1994, 60). Therefore, Green Peace, Amnesty 
International, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving are NGOs (or INGOs when they 
are international in reach). NGO activity can be political, social or both depending on 
the activities and goals of the organization. Due to its unique nature, however, NGO 
involvement in and of itself, is not considered here as a form of LIP. However, 
activities, such as petition signing or demonstrating that an NGO might organize are 
most definitely included. NGOs as a specific form of participation are especially 
significant when explaining the post-communist landscape during the middle 
transition era and the political situation for women of the region today. This is due to 
the dramatic influx of such organizations during that time and the apparent attraction 
of women toward NGO employment (Kapusta-Pofahl et al 2005; Mendelson and 
Glenn 2002). I address NGOs as a special category of participation in more detail in 
Chapter 7 of this dissertation.    
A term commonly used in conjunction with participation, is efficacy. In fact, 
efficacy is often a sufficient condition for participation.6 The two concepts are 
complementary and reciprocal – the more one feels efficacious the more they 
participate, and hence they feel even more efficacious. Generally speaking, efficacy 
refers to how much an individual thinks their opinions and activities matter. A 
significant amount of political efficacy would indicate that people feel that their 
opinions are important and that those in power will hear them. Diminished or a lack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




of political efficacy is a circumstances where citizens are frustrated and feel that their 
concerns are not important or acknowledged. Scholars sometimes separate efficacy 
into internal and external forms, though these certainly overlap in many instances. 
Internal efficacy refers to one’s feeling that they have the resources and abilities to act 
within the political realm. External efficacy, in slight contrast, refers to an individual's 
feelings that the political system will be responsive to their efforts (Miller, Miller and 
Schneider 1980). In this dissertation efficacy alludes to both forms, often as a 
mechanism for linking female perceptions of political processes and the 
corresponding willingness of women in the ECE region to be politically active.   
Another issue is how to properly label the period after 1989. In this dissertation, I 
often refer to the post-communist transition to describe the turn away from 
communism in 1989 and the political, economic and cultural construction of more 
democratic and capitalist systems. This is commonplace in the literature. However, it 
must be noted that “transition” can be a sticky concept. To begin, although often 
represented as if it indicates a forward moving path from A to B to C, a transition is 
not a linear process – and it certainly has not been in the post-communist region. 
There is a great deal of trial and error, as well as progress and setbacks in any 
transition period. Additionally, it is very difficult to know when a transition ends. In 
the post-communist context, there is no clear consensus on when, or if, the 
democratic transition ended.  
Some scholars (e.g. Stark and Bruszt 1998; Bryant and Mokvzycki 1994) writing 
on the topic, object to the word transition altogether and use the term transformation 




“we see social change not as transition from one order to another, but as 
transformation – rearrangements, reconfigurations and recombinations that yield new 
interweaving of the multiple societal logics that are a modern society” (1998, 7). 
Others talk of a situation where there has been a transition toward something, but that 
there has not yet been a total transformation (Buraway 2001). Finally, many, if not 
most authors, seem to use the terms to denote the same idea – the break with 
communism.  
I would argue that the term transformation no more clearly addresses the issue of 
end-goal determination or articulates the ebbs and flows of the process than the term 
transition. Considering this, I prefer to continue using the word transition, because it 
is more common in the literature and it most accurately captures the notion that the 
countries of post-communist Europe have and continue to move from authoritarian 
toward democratic governance (O’Donnell et al. 1986). In this manuscript, the term 
transition therefore refers to a non-linear process that is not just about the alteration of 
political and economic institutions, but also encompasses the worldviews and 
expectations of the citizenry.  
For temporal clarity, much of this dissertation focuses on the period immediately 
following the breakdown of communist rule in the region. I refer to this as the initial 
transition, which includes the years 1989 through 1997. This time period is of 
particular importance, because the decisions made and the people who were involved 
established the path that the transition would take and the trajectory of the countries 




In regards to my regional categorization, I borrow the definition of post-
communist Europe, from Political Scientist Marc Howard (2003). As he explains, 
“…my use of the category ‘the region of post-communist Europe’ is meant to 
encompass those post-communist countries on the European continent that have 
achieved at least a basic minimum of procedural democracy” (Howard 2003, 2-3). 
This is important, because I need to analyze states where civic engagement and 
female LIP is a genuine possibility. Requiring some level of democratization allows 
me to eliminate regime type (democratic, communist, theocratic) as a conflicting 
variable of explanation. This regional definition provides me a range of about 12 
countries from which to make observations about the participation of women in the 
region as a whole as well as a range of countries from which to select individual case 
countries for further analysis.   
Finally, before delving further into the particulars of this research puzzle, it is 
important that I address the generalization of the region’s women. There is a danger 
in talking about ECE women as if they represent a homogenous group. In truth, the 
millions of women in the region come from rich and diverse cultures, religions, 
ethnicities, economic circumstances and educational backgrounds. It is important to 
remember that these women are individuals, with their own opinions, histories and 
goals for the future. However, despite these many differences, women of the region 
did and in many ways still do share important commonalities, and the economic and 
political structures under which they lived, and currently live, molds their future 
paths. The common experience of communism and now of transition (even if 




varied under communism, but in many regards they all shared the pressures of the 
double (or triple) burden, they all had some access to social risk protection and they 
all lived under the guise of some form of gender equality.7 Explaining her feelings of 
kinship with all women of the post-communist region, Croatian journalist Slovenka 
Drakulic wrote, “I felt that the pattern of our (women’s) lives was identical. We had 
all been forced to endure the same communist system, a system that ground up 
people’s lives in a similar way wherever you lived; then of course, as women, we 
shared a perspective on life that was different from men’s” (1991, xvi). Therefore, to 
understand the influences of said structures, it is necessary to categorize and to 
generalize. 
The Puzzle: Women of Eastern and Central Europe  
During communism women appeared politically, and were clearly economically, 
active. From beyond the “Iron Curtain,” eastern women appeared to have reached a 
degree of female emancipation in the communist system. Given these indicators, 
labor force and political participation, often credited with leading to female 
empowerment during transitions from authoritarianism elsewhere, the apparent 
inactivity of women in the ECE region during the early transition years surprised 
many (Magyari et al 2001; Jaquette and Wolchick 1998; Knezevic 1997; Einhorn 
1993). At least, women could have been the beneficiaries of transition had they 
mobilized for greater inclusion (Magyari et al 2001). The situation became more 
puzzling when early on many of the female friendly policies and social programs that 
protected women, such as nursery care and elderly coverage, retrenched or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The expectation that women worked and raised children was known as the “double burden.” The 
additional expectation that they participate in political life, belong to the Party and State run unions has 




disappeared all together and yet women remained largely politically inactive. Einhorn 
and Sever recalled that, “[t]he mobilization in particular, of those disproportionately 
affected by the social and economic hardship of transition, was keenly anticipated” 
(2003, 163). The transition was challenging for women as a group, but the expected 
mobilization generally did not occur. Even female LIP, the most accessible form of 
political activity, was not as high as one might have expected after the series of 
revolutions “from below” in 1989.    
The lack of participation has had lasting and self-fulfilling effects. With few 
women involved in the politics of transition, issues such as social protection (e.g. 
nursery care), that affect women were not generally addressed favorably, further 
alienating women from LIP activity. Many of the small groups of politically 
motivated women during the early 1990s became frustrated in the early days of 
transition as others overlooked their ideas and concerns. Even though they helped end 
the totalitarian regimes, many of these women were quickly eliminated or 
marginalized from the meetings and decisions that determined state transitions.8 In 
some cases, women initially elected to post-communist parliaments (which saw few 
women to begin with) became so frustrated that they removed themselves from 
politics all together. Other women, who may have engaged in other forms of political 
participation, also chose to disengage during the initial transition and have not 
returned in substantial numbers (True 2003; Regulska 1998; Einhorn 1993). 
Communist Emancipation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It is important to point out that even in these instances, while there were a couple of women in the 
higher rungs of leadership in opposition groups, they were the exception. However, women played a 
major, though often more covert, role mobilizing for the opposition (especially in Poland, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Women printed and disseminated documents arranged 




In a system that did not have a great deal of immigration, initially lower numbers 
of men after World War II and a new Cold War to wage, women’s roles as workers 
and mothers (the “double burden”) were important to communist society (Einhorn 
1993). Female labor force participation was especially high – representing as much as 
90% of available women in some countries (see Chapter 6). Women essentially had a 
guarantee of employment. They were also provided assistance, such as the 
Housework Day (Arbeitstag) in East Germany that required employers to give 
women a day off for them to take care of their domestic “duties.” State “protection,” 
from exceptionally good maternity leave to financial assistance for single mothers, 
helped assure that women carried out both sides of their double burden. This created a 
situation where women in these societies relied on state benevolence to a larger 
degree than men. What resulted was a strong relationship between women and the 
father-like entity of the state (Ashwin 2000, 13). This had a large impact on the role 
that women played in communist society, but also in their perceptions of self. 
Rueschemeyer explains that it left many women with a greater sense of autonomy and 
voice (Rueschemeyer 1998b, 4). The double burden was difficult to maintain, but it 
became the accepted norm. “…the female inhabitants of those countries deeply 
internalized the double burden as something normal and linked to the difference of 
status between the sexes” (Heinen 1997, 580).  
It was not only expected that women work inside and outside of the home, but 
they were “encouraged” to act in the political realm as well – the triple burden. 
Women were heavily encouraged to join parties (the Communist Party as it was), 




themselves or their children; or in many cases, to keep themselves and their families 
from suspicion and police scrutiny (Huland, 2001; Interviews 2007 & 2008).9 As 
Drakulic described it, “[g]rowing up in Eastern Europe you learn very young that 
politics is not an abstract concept, but a powerful force influencing people’s everyday 
lives” (1991, xv). The result was a significant number of women involved in formal 
political activities. For example, women were visibly present in Eastern parliaments. 
In fact, women filled from 1/3 to 1/5 of the seats.10 At the regional level, women 
played an even more significant role and were able to wield significant power. The 
percentages of women who were active in regional and local offices, where more 
immediate power could lie, were higher than in many democratic states (Regulska 
1998; Shaul 1982).  
Despite what appeared from the outside to be remarkable strides for female 
equality in the economic and political realms, life for women in communist Europe 
was difficult. As True points out, “[p]eople can be simultaneously empowered and 
exploited by the impact of global forces” (True 2003). A large number of women had 
employment, but in some cases this was against their personal desires to stay home. 
Additionally, they often held more menial jobs. In the political world, although 
present, women did not wield great legislative power. In truth, the situation for 
women was more complex than many in the West thought. However, difficulties 
aside, women did have an established role under communism, a voice in political 
discussion (especially at local levels) and social issues were addressed that were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It is difficult to know how much this participation was the result of Party encouragement, or personal 
desire for advancement.  
10 Some of this, though not all of it, was the result of government instituted gender quotas that set aside 




generally favorable to women. There was also a degree of stability and security for 
women under such a system. This is stability that a number of the older women I 
spoke with across the region lament losing (Interviews 2007 & 2008).  
Women in Resistance 
In the communist system there was not always a means by which to express one’s 
independence or efficacy. One way of doing this developed as the system cracked, 
creating some room for underground dissent.11 Women were present in all dissident 
movements and activities of the communist era. Women filled the ranks of Poland’s 
famed Solidarity (in fact represented over 50%) as well as Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia and First Forum in East Germany. Women dissented across the 
region, even in countries where such activity was less organized than in Poland and 
the Czech Republic. They assisted in the copying and dissemination of banned 
literature (Samizdat), held meetings in their living rooms, helped smuggle materials 
across the Iron Curtain to and from the West and were often runners disseminating 
valuable information (Siklova 1997; Day 1999; Interviews 2007-2008). Women were 
generally successful in these activities, because they manipulated gender stereotypes 
to their advantage by using grocery bags and baby strollers as hiding places for 
outlawed documents or other communications (Penn 2006; Einhorn and Sever 2003; 
Day 1999). However, if caught or targeted, they faced similar punishment as men. In 
the course of my interviews, I spoke with a group of women who were imprisoned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Many of those that took part in what could be classified as dissident activities, were not eager to 
embrace that label. For example, those adhering to Havel’s suggestion of anti-politics and living “truth 
to power,” did not see themselves as dissenting against the government, rather they saw their role as 
reformers. However, as Barbara Day, a British professor who organized underground lectures in 
Czechoslovakia points out, “…in a totalitarian society, any activity which does not conform to 
established rules is regarded by that society as oppositional and it becomes difficult to avoid use of the 
word ‘dissident’” (Day 1999, 8). Today, these individuals are more willing to agree that they were 




and then monitored because of their participation in these underground activities. 
They all explained that the physical and emotional toll was intense and long lasting. 
Despite participation in activities of dissent, even most of these women did not play a 
significant role in the transition processes in their countries.  
Women in Authoritarian Regimes  
The absence of women in the politics of transition in Eastern and Central Europe 
might not have been as notable, had not women elsewhere utilized similar political 
and economic upheavals to their advantage. During many “third wave” democratic 
transitions (and beyond), women mobilized and “stormed the stage.”12 They pushed 
for gender quotas, for anti-discrimination laws and for equal wages (Baldez 2003; 
Jaquette and Wolcheick 1998). As Baldez describes, “[i]n countries as diverse as 
Argentina, Korea, Spain and South Africa, women saw popular demands for 
democracy as an opportunity to press for the democratization of everyday life and the 
extension of women’s rights” (2003, 253). Beckworth (2000) points out that it is 
often transition “moments” when constitutions are being written, which present the 
greatest opportunities for women to organize or exert influence on behalf of their sex. 
The demise of communism in Europe had the potential to be one of these moments 
where such mobilization was possible.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Huntington (1992) coined the term “third wave” to classify transitions away from authoritarianism 
starting in the 1970s. First wave transitions were those that occurred from the period 1828-1926 and 
second wave refers to transitions from 1943-1962. Additionally, the idea of storming the stage was 
articulated by James C. Scott in his book Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts 
(1990). In the work, Scott argues that there is an official or public transcript that people in the lower 
hierarchies of power will present on the public stage, whereas their hidden transcript (their true 
feelings) are kept in the private realm in various forms. He suggests that circumstances can abruptly 
change when someone or some group storms the public stage. By doing this, the power structure is 
demystified. Regarding third wave transitions, women in other parts of the world saw opportunities to 
storm the public stage and make their private concerns public in an effort to change political and social 




Much of the rise of women during third wave transitions was evident in Latin 
America. Despite a more traditional culture that might not appear conducive to 
female mobilization along gendered lines, women’s political activity resulted in 
significant changes in Latin America during trying times.13 Women capitalized on the 
political opportunity structure that transition and crisis created to better their political, 
economic and social situations through joint action (Baldez 2003; Rakowski 2003).  
Witnessing these changes in Latin America and considering the apparent 
advantages of women in the ECE region (in terms of economic and political 
participation), many women’s rights advocates felt it was odd that, in Einhorn’s 
words, “[w]omen in the former state socialist countries [did] not object vociferously 
to their high redundancy levels” (1993, 114). Yet, women were not visible during the 
early transition years in either formal or low intensity political participation.  
Female High Intensity Participation in Post-Communist Europe: 
While the focus of this project is on low intensity participation, it is appropriate to 
start by exploring female high intensity (formal) political participation in the region. 
HIP includes running for office, joining party leadership, or in some other way 
committing extensive time and energy toward a political undertaking. Under 
communism, gender quotas and party “encouragement” of female involvement in 
political life, created visible women on the political stage. As mentioned, women 
made up a significant percentage of eastern parliaments, though their power in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In this regard, traditional culture refers to the fact that Latin American countries tend to follow a 
conservative form of Catholicism that emphasizes the role of women in the family. The continent also 
tended toward military rule and had a history of hierarchical order (influenced by its religious and 
military structures) that seldom prioritized women or their specific concerns. This has changed to a 
degree in recent years, in large part as a result of the actions of women and women’s groups during 
Third Wave transitions in that region. Today, as many as four Latin American countries have female 
Heads of State or Government indicating a marked degree of progress for formal female political 




communist legislatures is debatable. What is clear is that the number of women in 
formal politics dropped dramatically after 1989. Twenty years later, some of these 
figures are beginning to rebound, though the regional average still remains below 
1989 levels.  
The Relationship Between HIP and LIP 
Scholars, especially those studying women and politics, have long recognized the 
relationship between HIP and LIP. Much of this research has focused on the rather 
low percentages of women in formal political positions around the world, and the role 
that LIP plays in creating a pool of women for HIP. The line of causation is blurry 
and it is difficult to fully determine if HIP leads to LIP or the other way around. In 
truth, it is likely a reciprocal relationship. It is reasonable that women in formal 
politics could serve as important female role models, that they might advance female-
friendly policies, and might actively work to encourage not just more women in HIP, 
but female political activity at the low intensity level as well. On the other hand, LIP 
activity is often the basis from which women move from less intense to more intense 
political participation. Essentially female LIP could create an experienced pool or 
pipeline for women to increase their involvement from less formal to more formal 
political activities.  
Regardless of the theoretical argument for a top down approach where advocates 
seek to place women in HIP positions to assist women, or the decision to advance 
more grassroots (LIP) activities among women, the importance of a pool of women is 
crucial. LIP is the most immediate creator of that pool of women. Over the last 
twenty years, scholars have moved beyond looking to gender and campaigning. In 




has the support of her party, her sex is not a factors in voting decisions among the 
population (Matland and King 2002). Therefore, attention is now on the recruitment 
processes. Most prominent in this line of reasoning is the importance of the 
“gatekeeper,” often the party or elites within the party, who works to limit or advance 
women along the “pipeline” toward greater political involvement (Palmer et al 2001; 
Nevin 1998).  
In general the pool of potential candidates for higher office are part of business or 
social networks that have connections. One way to enter these social circles and to 
become an attractive candidate is through LIP activities. For many women who might 
take time off from work or who may have difficulty getting into the right circles, 
grassroots and LIP activities can be even more important for creating that pool of 
political women.   
Prior experience with either form of participation can be an advantage for 
furthering the reciprocal relationship between HIP and LIP. However, as will become 
clear throughout this dissertation, the perceptions of that experience is important. If 
there are positive feeling associated, then it is likely to build upon itself and 
encourage greater participation (LIP and HIP). On the other hand, if there are 
negative idea associated with political participation, it can be difficult to find a 
qualified pool of people (women in this case) willing to take part in LIP activities, let 
along more formal politics. The nature of past experience matters (Putnam 1993).  
When HIP and LIP are closely correlated, we would expect to see countries with 
high female HIP also exhibiting high LIP and vice versa. In the ECE region the HIP 




Russia and Bulgaria are all on the low end in terms of female HIP, and they also have 
low figures for female LIP. Likewise, countries like Lithuania and Latvia are right 
around the regional average for women in both HIP and LIP. Yet, the cases of Poland 
and the Czech Republic suggest that the relationship is not a given. The Czech 
Republic has above average LIP; however it also has one of the lowest figures (as of 
2008) of women in Parliament and in ministries. Poland is the opposite with notably 
high numbers of women in the Polish Sjem, yet below average numbers of women 
taking part in LIP activities.  
Women in Legislatures: The Initial Transition Period 
There was a dramatic decline in the number of women who were part of national 
legislatures after the first post-communist elections. The trend was visible across the 
entire region; including Southeastern Europe (the former Yugoslavia) and Russia 
(Einhorn 1993; Ruschemeyer 1998d; Irvine 1998; Millard 2004). In significant 
numbers, women chose to no longer engage in formal political activities during this 
period. This was as much, if not more, about women’s perceptions of formal political 
life as it was about how men conceived of women in politics.  
FIGURE 1.1 
Women in Parliament Immediately Before and Immediately  
After the End of Communism 
 





Many scholars contend that much of the decline in formal female political 
participation after 1989 was a direct result of the elimination of communist era gender 
quotas. Without the institutional requirement, significantly fewer women were elected 
to national legislatures post-1989 (Wilcox 2003; Matland and Montgomery 2003). 
This surely played a role. However, concerns regarding the time needed for this high-
level of political participation during an unstable economic situation, which 
employment statistics show disproportionately affected women, was also significant 
(Coyne 2010; Morgan 2008; Posadskays-Vanderbeck 2000). With time at a minimum 
and resources and jobs scarce during the initial transition, some argue that women 
discarded the third burden of formal political participation (Chiva 2005). Whereas 
under communism, formal political activity was in large part an obligation, in the 
1990s is was a choice and many women simply did not have the time for HIP.  
Another factor to consider was the general repudiation of reformers and dissidents 
in elections across the region in 1991 and 1992. As mentioned, a number of women 
were involved with dissident activities such as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in 
Czechoslovakia. Some of these activists, significantly more men than women, 
immediately filled formal political offices during preliminary elections in 1989 and 
1990. However, by the first rounds of formalized elections in 1991 and 1992 some of 
the challenges of transition had become evident resulting, in many cases, in a 
backlash against a number of the former dissidents. Therefore, the electorate ousted 
the few female dissidents who attempted formal political participation after 1989 with 
many of the other reformers from the communist era (True 2003).14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The exceptions were Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic) and Lech Walesa 




Between the removal of some gender quota policies and the rejection of dissident 
politicians during the early transition, fewer and fewer women were present in formal 
politics during the early 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, a slight upswing was evident 
in the number of women holding legislative office. However, figures remained much 
lower than under communist governance. As Matland and Montgomery (2003) 
reported, at the turn of the century, female representation in post-communist Europe 
was at 12%. This was lower than the 14% global average and it was certainly lower 
than the 25% average of “Western” states.  
TABLE 1.1 
 Women in ECE Parliaments January 1997 
Country % Women in Lower House 1997 % Change from 1988 
Bulgaria 13.3% -9.7 
Czech Rep. 15% -14 
Estonia 12.9% -19.1 
Hungary 11.4% -11.6 
Latvia 9% -23 
Lithuania 17.5% -14.5 
Poland 13% -7 
Romania 7% -28 
Russia 10.2% -21.8 
Slovakia 14.7% -4.3 
Source: IDEA Women in Parliament 1997 
 
Analyzing the data presented in Table 1.1 it is clear that the trend persisted 
beyond just the first post-communist election throughout what I have termed the 
initial transition period. In all cases, in 1997 the percentages of female 
parliamentarians remained well below 1988 numbers. The drop remained especially 
stark in Romania, Russia, Latvia and Estonia. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
familiar dissidents who joined political life after 1989, these two men rose to become popular post-
communist leaders. Havel was able to use his earlier sentiment of anti-politics to his advantage for a 
time, as he continued to claim a position above politics. Likely preparing to take the mantle of 
leadership, in November of 1989, Havel told the West German magazine Der Spiegel that what the 
times called for was a symbolic representation that no politician could be, rather the times called for 




Women in Legislatures: Today 
Rebuilding a female presence in the new Eastern Parliaments has been difficult 
and slow. Some women, such as Petra Buzková in the Czech Republic, did become 
popular politicians and garnered great support. However, Buzková is the exception, 
and even she retired from political life after a rather short career.15 In general it has 
been challenging to find women willing to engage in formal politics. Based on the 
recollections of women I spoke with in the region, and other literature on the issue, 
there appears to be three overarching obstacles to female formal participation in the 
region today: ideas of women in formal political life, lack of female recruiting and 
limited communication between women’s organizations and female politicians.16  
There remains a perception that formal politics is a “man’s world” and that 
women have a tougher time getting elected to office. Once there, the feeling among 
many of the women I spoke with is that women have to work twice or even three 
times as hard as men to make any progress. Most of the female politicians I spoke 
with recalled the difficulties they faced. One in the Czech Republic explained how 
unofficial party gatherings still often took place at strip clubs, where she feels 
uncomfortable.17 At best this is simply a case of male politicians being insensitive. At 
its worst, it suggests a deliberate attempt to exclude female politicians (and possibly a 
few men) or to make them feel uneasy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Petra Buzková, already much discussed in the media, created a huge episode when she had a 
medically necessary breast reduction. Male politicians made derogatory comments about the situation 
to journalists and also in parliamentary proceedings (Czech Interviews 2007-2008).  
16 Formal political participation and the explanations for the lack of female HIP in the ECE region is 
not the primary focus of this dissertation project. These observations are included here to provide 
valuable context, and as a means of assessing to some extent the relationship between HIP and LIP, 
however, they should not be considered exhaustive.  
17 The obstacles women face in the ECE region are not unlike many of the challenges facing women 
seeking political representation all over the world. However, given the history of the region as well as 
the mandates of EU membership, the fact that this is occurring in these countries runs counter to 




Adding to the perception of formal politics as a man’s game, there remain few 
avenues for highly political women in the region, and little pipeline support from the 
generally young, political parties. For the most part, parties do not recruit women for 
political positions, nor are qualified women often found in ministerial positions where 
higher ups in the parties can glean them to run for higher office. For example, Chiva 
notes that of the seven Romanian governments in place between 1990 and 2003, 
“only seven posts were occupied by women from an overall total of 147 ministers,” 
which represents less than 5% of the total (Chiva 2005, 976). In the late 1990s, under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Milos Zeman, there were no females in the Czech 
Cabinet. Zeman explained, “‘I wouldn’t want talented female politicians from the 
Socialist Democrats to be needlessly blemished by the decline of their popularity and 
prestige because of having to deal with immensely difficult and virtually 
unprecedented tasks’” (True 2003, 145). Although there was some objection to this 
sexist claim by Zeman, the discussion quickly moved on and the Cabinet went 
unchanged.  
One place where there has been a concerted effort to recruit and support female 
politicians, is in Poland. After 2004, the number of women in the Sjem (the Polish 
Parliament) rose and has stayed near 20%. However, there is some disagreement as to 
the reasons for the increase. Some point to the intensified activities of women’s 
NGOs as well as EU influence. Others point out that a number of the new female 
parliamentarians are in parties from the Right (such as Civic Platform – PO, and Law 
and Justice – PiS among others) and many of them have little past political 




for election so as to eliminate gender and women’s rights as a potential campaign 
issue (Interviews 2007-2008). Interestingly, some of the women I spoke with in 
Poland, felt that many of the political women now serving in public office, are 
playing token roles, not unlike many of the female politicians of the communist 
period. This is a good example of where high female HIP did not build upon female 
LIP and as such, based on my interviews, does not appear to garner much support 
among the general population. Additionally, in the Polish case, more women in 
formal power has, so far, not led to a corresponding increase in female informal 
participation.   
The political rise of Romanian President Traian Bâsescu’s daughter Elena, a 29-
year-old former model and media-proclaimed “Paris Hilton of Romania,” is an 
indication of the continued complexities of female formal political power.18 While the 
President’s Party originally rejected Elena as a candidate for the European 
Parliament, claiming that she had too little experience, she ran as an independent. 
Documents arose soon after, indicating that her father instructed the Liberal 
Democrats to throw all of their support behind his daughter, which they did. Soon 
after her election, Elena renounced her independent status and joined the Liberal 
Democrats again (Turp 2009).  
For those few women that do enter formal politics, and are successful, it is clear 
that they seldom maintain relationships with the nascent women’s groups in the 
region. I heard this complaint at almost every women’s organization I visited. For 
example, one woman I spoke with in Bucharest lamented the fact that her group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The fact that this woman bares the name of another important female politician in Romanian history, 
Elena Ceausescu, who also advanced due to her family connections, was not lost on some of those I 




helped advance the prospects of a female parliamentarian who they believed 
represented the group’s values. However, once in office, the politician cut all ties with 
the group. Having not spoken with this particular female politician, it is difficult to 
know exactly why she made this decision. It is possible that her political party 
encouraged her to make the break, but it is also just as likely that it was a personal 
decision. Other female politicians I spoke with stated that they did not foster such 
relationships with women’s groups, especially once elected. They explained that they 
often agreed with the work some of the groups were doing, but commented that they 
were already in a tenuous situation in male dominated legislative bodies. They did not 
need the “baggage” that association with a women’s group, even one that is not 
overtly feminist, would bring.19 They argued that association with women’s 
organizations delegitimizes their role as legislators. None of the women interviewed 
had many solutions for ameliorating this situation. 
Barriers aside, the percentages of women in formal political office have improved 
in some countries. It is notable, that in surveys I commission in three countries in the 
region, there was a fairly strong indication that many women do feel it is important to 
have women in office, even if it is not yet manifest in actually higher statistics of 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Women’s organizations are rather new, and controversial in the post-communist region. Women’s 
association, and feminist groups (the two are more often than not conflated in the region) have a 
complicated history in post-communist Europe and the stereo-types about women’s groups as feminist, 
anti-wife, communist and homosexual persist (see Chapters 5 and 7).  





How Important Is It To You That Women Be Politically Active (HIP)  








Czech Rep. 39.3% 53.4% 5.0% 2.3% 
NBL21 38.9% 46.4% 12.3% 2.4% 
Romania 27.5% 48.5% 16% 8% 
 
However, in the region only the NBL, Poland and Slovakia currently have figures 
that match the percentages of women in their parliament under communism. 
Surprisingly, percentages for the Czech Republic and Hungary remain essentially the 
same from the 1997 statistics. Additionally, with the exception of the NBL, none of 
the ECE countries examined are close to 30%, a figure that is widely held to represent 
a tipping point for real female influence in legislative bodies (Conaway 2006).22  
TABLE 1.3 
Women in ECE Parliaments December 2008 
Country % Women in Lower House 2008 % Change Since 1988 
Bulgaria 21.7% -1.3 
Czech Republic* 15.5% -13.4 
Estonia 20.8% -11.2 
Germany (NBL) 36.0% +3 
Hungary 11.1% -11.9 
Latvia 20% -12 
Lithuania 17.7% -14.2 
Poland 20.2% +.2 
Romania 11.4% -23.6 
Russia 14% -18 
Slovakia 19.3% +.3 
Source: IDEA Women in Parliament 2008 
* Four of these countries have bi-cameral systems. The percentage of women in the Czech Upper House is actually almost two 
percentage points higher than those found in the Lower House where studies generally indicate more female accessibility. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 German Democratic Republic (GDR) refers to the country of East Germany (1949-1990). The New 
Bündeslander-states (NBL) references what was previously East Germany and is now a part of a 
unified Germany. 
22 Some long standing democracies, the United States being the most glaring example, also fall well 
short of the 30% mark. In fact, only 18% of the United States Congress is made up of women. Features 
of the US electoral system, the dual-party structure, the primary cycle and Presidential as opposed to 
Parliamentarian governance are shown to hinder the election of women. Additionally, although their 
numbers are sorely under-represented in formal politics, women in the United States are highly present 
in LIP indicating that the basis is there for continued progress in female HIP in the country (Amer 




other three cases follow theory, with significantly fewer women in the Upper House as opposed to the Lower House. Upper 
House percentages: Poland- 8%, Romania- 5.8%, Russia- 4.7%.  
 
Despite setback, these modest increases from the lows of the early 1990s do indicate 
a more optimistic picture of women in HIP than was present in the early transition 
period.23  
Low Intensity Participation: 
High intensity, more formal, participation dipped dramatically after 1989, and it is 
only beginning to rebound some 20 years later. Low intensity, much less formal 
participation, was also quite low throughout the early transition years and beyond. 
Despite some positive evidence of increased numbers of women in national 
legislatures, at the lower levels of politics, there has been no corresponding increase 
in female LIP. Formal political participation is perhaps the most visible and 
significant area for research on the topic, however it is at the grassroots (the lower 
levels) where democratic participation is most important. In a democratic country, we 
would hope to see high citizen involvement in low intensity participation because this 
is the form of participation most commonly available to the average citizen, and 
especially to busy women. This is also the form of participation that Almond and 
Verba (1963), Putnam (1994) and others focus on when assessing the depth of 
democratic norms and processes.  
It is difficult to examine statistics on female LIP during the communist era 
because reliable data is simply not available. However, we can review data from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Although not the focus of this research project, HIP in Poland is a particularly intriguing question. 
The effectiveness of these female parliamentarians would be an interesting research question for future 
investigation. The previously mentioned case of Romania and Elena Bâsescu would also be an 
intriguing area for further research. In both cases, the nature of how female HIP is occurring is 
relevant. There is a feeling among a number of women in Poland that their female parliamentarians are 
in positions based on political considerations, rather than on their skill and talent. The same is also 
often said of Elena Bâsescu. In neither case is there currently a positive trickle down effect that is 




initial transition period of the 1990s to determine the level of female LIP at that time. 
What is clear in the data is that there is a regional and gendered component to levels 
of LIP.  
Regionally Low LIP: Initial Transition Period 
LIP encompasses activities such as voting, petition signing or demonstrating. 
Doing these things takes a relatively small amount of time and minimal financial 
commitment. Unfortunately, voting figures collected from the region during the 
1990s, and even in many places today, do not bifurcate exit polling by sex. Likewise, 
the World Values Survey (WVS) did not ask respondents if they voted in the relevant 
survey rounds. Therefore, I must eliminate voting as a means of measuring LIP 
during the early transition.24 The WVS does include questions regarding petition 
signing and demonstrating. These WVS questions can be broken down to discern 
differences between male and female responses. Using data from the 1999 WVS, a 
period that represents responses from the end of the initial transition period, it is 
apparent that there are differences in LIP that separate post-communist Europe from 
the West.  
Table 1.4 shows that when examining the questions indicating LIP during the 
initial transition period, the regional average for ECE was significantly lower than the 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I did include a voting question in my case surveys, and I asked people about voting practice during 





Average in US/Canada/W. Europe 199925 
 Petition Signing Demonstration 
Have 58.9% 26.0% 
Might 27.2% 41.2% 
Would Never 14.0% 32.8% 
 
Average in East/Central Europe 199926 
 Petition Signing Demonstration 
Have 29.9% 19.5% 
Might 31.0% 36.8% 
Would Never 39.1% 43.7% 
 
What is notable about the above table, is not just the remarkable differences in “have” 
responses, perhaps that is a product of availability, but the high number of 
respondents from the ECE region who said they “would never” participate in such 
activities. This clearly indicates a regional difference among people of ECE and of 
Western states when it comes to their willingness to participate in two examples of 
LIP.  
Gendered LIP: Initial Transition 
Within the ECE region, it is quite clear, that there is a gendered difference in 
responses as well. Tables 1.5 & 1.6 present the statistics for countries in the region 
delineated by male and female responses to questions about petition signing and 
demonstrating (indicators of LIP).  
TABLE 1.5 
Petition Signing: Female Responses 
   Have Done Might Do Would Never Do     Total 
Bulgaria  9.8% (42) 32.6% (140) 57.7% (248)      100% (430) 
Czech Republic 57.4% (546) 26.5% (252) 16.1% (153)      100% (951) 
Estonia  20.2% (100) 30% (149) 49.8% (247)      100% (496) 
Germany (East) 60.6% (312) 30.6% (158) 8.8% (45)      100% (515) 
Hungary  14.4% (73) 29.4% (149) 56.1% (284)      100% (506) 
Latvia  18.6% (95) 30.6% (156) 50.8% (259)      100% (510) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Canada (2000), Denmark, Finland (2000), Western half of 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, USA. There was no Norwegian survey taken in this WVS Round.  




Lithuania  27.8% (121) 36.7% (160) 35.6% (155)      100% (436) 
Poland  20.5% (117) 25.5% (146) 54% (309)      100% (572) 
Romania  9.2% (43) 27.8% (130) 63% (295)      100% (468) 
Russia  11.5% (145) 26.1% (329) 62.4% (786)      100% (1,260) 
Slovakia  58.9% (390) 21.3% (141) 19.8% (131)      100% (662) 
Regional Average 29.2% (1,984) 28.1% (1,910) 42.8% (2,912)      100% (6,806) 
     
 
Petition Signing: Male Responses 
   Have Done Might Do Would Never Do     Total 
Bulgaria  12.8% (50) 42.3% (166) 44.9% (176)      100% (392) 
Czech Republic 60.1 (531) 27% (238) 12.9% (114)      100% (883) 
Estonia  21.3% (88) 35.7% (148) 43% (178)      100% (414) 
Germany (East) 61.7% (272) 29.7% (131) 8.6% (37)      100% (440) 
Hungary  15.1% (68) 35.3% (159) 49.7% (224)      100% (451) 
Latvia  19.6% (84) 35.5% (152) 44.9% (192)      100% (428) 
Lithuania  27% (105) 40.9% (159) 32.1% (125)      100% (389) 
Poland  24.9% (127) 31.8% (162) 43.3% (221)      100% (510) 
Romania  12.2% (60) 43.6% (215) 44.2% (218)      100% (493) 
Russia  11.8% (127) 38.2% (412) 50% (539)      100% (1,078) 
Slovakia  59.7% (366) 24% (147) 16.3% (100)      100% (613) 
Regional Average 30.8% (1,878) 34.3% (2,089) 34.9% (2,124)      100% (6,091) 
Source: World Values Survey 1999  
 
 
While the average response for those that claimed they have signed a petition is 
not significant between men and women (30.8% and 29.2%, with women 
representing a slightly smaller percentage), again the “would never” responses are 
instructive. Whereas 42.8% of women questioned in the region indicated that they 
would never sign a petition, only 34.9% of males gave the same answer. This 
represents an average difference of 7.9%, which was especially relevant in Romania’s 
gender gap of 18.8%. Additionally, stark is the fact that over 60% of female 
respondents in Russia and Romania reported that they would never sign a petition.  
TABLE 1.6 
Participation in Lawful Demonstration 
Female Responses 
   Have Done Might Do Would Never Do     Total 
Bulgaria  15.1% (67) 31.4% (139) 53.5% (237)      100% (443) 
Czech Republic 23.6% (218) 41.6% (384) 34.7% (320)      100% (922) 
Estonia  9.6% (48) 27.7% (139) 62.7% (315)      100% (502) 
Germany (East) 44% (224) 32.8% (167) 23.2% (117)      100% (508) 
Hungary  4.2% (21) 25% (126) 70.9% (358)      100% (505) 




Lithuania  9.8% (44) 46.3% (207) 43.8% (196)      100% (447) 
Poland  5.1% (29) 27.9% (160) 67.1% (385)      100% (547) 
Romania  11.4% (58) 34.2% (174) 54.4% (277)      100% (509) 
Russia  22.7% (296) 29% (378) 48.2% (628)      100% (1,302) 
Slovakia  12% (75) 53.6% (275) 49.7% (311)      100% (626) 
Regional Average 17.5% (1,203) 33.5% (2,333) 49.0% (3,359)      100% (6,895) 
   
 
Participation in Lawful Demonstration 
Male Responses 
   Have Done Might Do Would Never Do     Total 
Bulgaria  14.5% (59) 45.5% (185) 40% (163)     100% (407) 
Czech Republic 32.1% (280) 41.6% (363) 26.3% (229)      100% (872) 
Estonia  13.3% (54) 35% (142) 51.7% (210)      100% (406) 
Germany (East) 48.1% (209) 32.7% (143) 19.2% (84)      100% (436) 
Hungary  5.1% (23) 34.3% (156) 60.7% (276)      100% (455) 
Latvia   26.9% (117) 38.9% (169) 34.3% (149)      100% (435) 
Lithuania  13.5% (54) 50.5% (202) 36% (144)      100% (400) 
Poland  15.6% (80) 35% (180) 49.4% (254)      100% (514) 
Romania  18.1% (96) 48.3% (256) 33.6% (178)      100% (530) 
Russia  24% (265) 37.2% (410) 38.8% (428)      100% (1,103) 
Slovakia  16.8% (98) 48.5% (284) 34.7% (203)      100% (585) 
Regional Average 21.7% (1,335) 40.5% (2,490) 37.7% (2,318)      100% (6,143) 
   
 
A similar pattern emerges when people in the region indicated their willingness to 
participate in a lawful demonstration. Table 1.6 shows a regional difference between 
men and women who responded that they would demonstrate (21.7% of men and a 
smaller 17.5% of women). However, as before, female respondents answered in 
significantly higher numbers, that they “would never” participate in a lawful 
demonstration (37.7% of male respondents compared to 49%, almost half, of female 
respondents – a 11.3% difference). This was highest for women in Hungary (70.9% 
of female respondents) and Poland (67.1% of female respondents).  
The responses to these questions indicate the gendered dimension of low intensity 
political participation in the region, and also displays quite a bit of country-to-country 
variation. For example both men and women in the NBL appear more willing to 




Within these country trends however, in all cases men were more participatory than 
women. 
Women’s Low Intensity Participation: Today 
The World Values Survey, the source of the above statistics on LIP, compiles and 
releases data sporadically. There was a recently available 2005 WVS Round, however 
it is a smaller sample than previous surveys and does not include statistics for the 
entire region. Most importantly, researchers did not conduct the survey in the Czech 
Republic, a case of particular interest due to its outlier status as a country with above 
average female LIP.  
Based on literature and my own surveys of three countries in the region (the 
Czech Republic, the NBL and Romania), as well as interviews conducted in four 
countries (the aforementioned three, plus Poland), female LIP remains rather low. 
There is a noted danger in comparing findings from different surveys. It is difficult to 
control for timing, survey structure and process. However, without a more current 
round of WVS, it is a productive means of estimating trends. 
TABLE 1.7 
Petition Signing: Female Responses 
   Have Done Might Do Would Never Do Total 
Czech Republic 22.8%   72.1%   5.2%    504 
Germany (NBL) 14.3%  47.3%  38.7%   450 




Participation in Lawful Demonstration 
Female Responses 
   Have Done Might Do Would Never Do Total 
Czech Republic 8.7%   52.0%   39.3%    504 
Germany (NBL) 28.2%   34.4%   37.3%    450 





In inquiring about LIP among ECE women today, I had survey takers ask about 
petition signing and demonstrating in the same format as the questions from the 
WVS. It is notable that large numbers of women still indicate that they would never 
take part in these LIP activities. In an attempt to go beyond the WVS questions, my 
survey takers also asked respondents about their willingness to explicitly participate 
or work with NGOs (dealt with in much more detail in Chapter 7). Again, over a third 
of respondents indicated that they would never do so, and only small percentages 
responded that they had taken part in such activities.27  
TABLE 1.9 
Participate with NGO 
Female Responses 
Have Done Might Do Would Never D/K Total 
Czech Republic 16.7%  41.8%  31.0%  10.5% 504 
Germany (NBL) 13.6%  42.4%  43.3%  0.7% 450 
Romania28  2.5%  35.6%  61.9%  ---- 602 
 
Another indicator of LIP is membership in political parties. Therefore, I included 
this question in my survey. Somewhat unsurprisingly, party membership was 
extremely low among women in my case countries, despite 20 years of democratic 
transition (see Table1.9). The fact that Romanian women were more likely to join a 
party than respondents in the NBL or the Czech Republic is somewhat surprising 
given that one generally accepted explanation for low party membership is the fact 
that membership in the Communist Party was previously “encourage.” Romanians 
lived under one of the harshest communist governments, therefore, it is a little odd 
that Romanian women would be the most inclined of the three cases to belong to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 I was unable to find a similarly worded survey question asked of western women. However, my 
sense is that western women would likely view NGO participation more favorably than those in the 
ECE region. NGOs have operated in Western Europe and North America for several decades now and 
tend to be accepted as a viable employment option for women as well as men. 





political party. However, the figure is very small. The political systems in the ECE do 
not require party declaration or alliance for voting, such as is the case in the United 
States where citizens must indicate Republican, Democrat, Independent or some other 
allegiance when they register to vote. Therefore, it takes a bit more motivation and 
involvement to join a political party in Eastern and Central Europe than it does to do 
so in the United States. Western Europe is more similar in terms of party affiliation 
process. The comparison here is less stark, yet still visible. For example, the 2005 
WVS shows that 7.6% of female respondents in Italy, 9.4% in Great Britain, 14.1% in 
Finland and 16.2% in Norway answered that they were party members.  
TABLE: 1.10 
Do You Belong to a Political Party?29 
Female Responses 
   Yes  No  Total 
Czech Republic 1.2%   98.8%    504 
Germany (NBL) 1.8%  98.2%   450 
Romania  4.7%  95.3%   765 
 
A current assessment of women’s LIP in the region today is presented in Chapter 7. 
At that point, I address the importance of EU eastward expansion, as well as the 
significant role of NGOs as they both relate to female LIP in the ECE region. 
Based on the numbers provided here, LIP during the early-mid transition period 
did display regional attributes. On average, people in the post-communist region were 
less inclined to participate in LIP activities than respondents in Western Europe, the 
United States and Canada. Evidence also shows the gendered nature of LIP. In all 
cases, women in the post-communist region were less likely than men to sign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Party membership is another example of LIP. The WVS does ask about party membership, however 
I did not include it in the earlier figures from the 1990s, as the number of respondents that said “Yes” 
were so tiny. Even in my 2008/2009 surveys, in all three cases the numbers of female party members 




petitions, attend demonstrations or join parties. The NBL are the outlier in this regard 
as women in the country responded rather highly that they would take part in LIP 
activities. Women in the Czech Republic and Slovakia also returned numbers that 
were above the regional averages. Based on surveys conducted for me in three ECE 
countries, though some increase is noted from the 1999 figures to today, average 
female LIP remains low in the region.  
Literature on Women in the Region: 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the numerous transitions away from communism 
in East and Central Europe, have proven to be a small cottage industry for 
researchers, especially during the 1990s. Much of this literature looks at the collapse 
of communism: roads toward democratization, economic transitions, ethnic conflict 
and EU or NATO enlargement (see Linz and Stepan 1996; Bunce 1997; Offe, 1997; 
Solnik 1998; Barany 2004; Grillot et al 2010, to name a few). Much less literature has 
focused on the continuing hardships that women in the region faced since 1989 
(significant exceptions include: Einhorn Draculic 1991; 1993; Rueschemeyer 1998; 
Irvine 1998; Gal and Kligman 2000; Matland and Montgomery 2003; True 2003; 
Penn 2005; Roth 2008, among a few others).  
In general, the issue of female political participation at varying levels in Eastern 
Europe remains understudied, and appears to be diminishing as the communist era 
becomes more distant and other areas of study become more popular. Women as a 
specific category of research is a relatively young area of political science research 
whose practitioners have historically attempted to get more attention. However, the 
overall shift in attention from the ECE region is due, in large part, to a shift in 




an ideological (and potentially devastating) war between East and West, since 1989 
western military interests have moved elsewhere. During the 1990s, there was a great 
deal of interest in how the ECE would move beyond its communist past, but as 
transition progressed, these questions seemed less intriguing to policy makers. Today, 
much research is focused on the rise of potential economic powerhouses China and 
India. Additionally, the Middle East, especially since the events of 9/11 and the US 
led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has garnered more and more political and academic 
attention. A number of more recent political science publications that explore the 
issues associated with gender, have also moved into research in these new geographic 
areas of interest. 
The shift from the ECE region, and specifically of women in the region, has 
meant less accumulation of knowledge on the subject. This has also resulted in fewer 
opportunities to learn about transition processes and how these processes affect 
women in particular and gender relations in general. The ECE transitions, and 
women’s roles in them continue to be an important area of research. These are issues, 
which could be important considerations in the current popular areas of academic 
research as China is currently liberalizing economically, and a number of countries in 
the Middle East may soon go through their own political transitions.  
In general, literature that does exist on female participation in post-communist 
Europe is characterized by three overlapping themes: women in formal politics, 
women as the losers of transition, and a focus on the incomparability of the 
communist and post-communist eras. In addition, the vast majority of these works are 




cases in the region. At times, an article will surface that makes a direct comparison 
between selections of two, or possibly even three, cases To date, there are few 
projects that thematically examine a number of cases side-by-side along specific 
variables and few that provide systematic data sets that can compare attitudes and 
political voice for women across the region as well as between given countries in the 
region.  Therefore, limiting our ability to move beyond observation and make some 
real conclusions about outcomes. 
Focus on Formal Politics 
Much of the important research conducted on female participation has focused on 
the number of women in parliaments (e.g. Matland and Montgomery 2003). This is a 
natural place to start, though it focuses only on one form of political participation; a 
very high intensity form.30 Some of this work has been quite insightful and has 
highlighted a number of structural and institutional barriers that limit the ability for 
women to gain high level political office (see Chapter 3).  
Researchers have found that system type, list structure and number of parties are 
all factors in determining a women’s likelihood for election to parliaments around the 
world (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Dalurup 2004; Conway 2005). Additionally, 
some suggest that “pipeline factors” and a lack of female political connection also 
have important gender implication during the candidate recruitment process (Waylen 
1994). My project utilizes the research and arguments of scholars looking at women 
in parliament to reach an understanding of the diminished rate of low intensity level 
political participation among the general female population of the post-communist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 At the beginning of this dissertation, I too started by addressing the situation regarding women and 




region. It also addresses the relationship between HIP and LIP, adding an extra 
dimension to studies of political participation in the region.   
Losers of Transition 
Much of the limited literature on women in post-communist Europe focuses on 
women as the “losers of transition” highlighting the negative consequences of 
capitalism, such as a marked increase in sexual exploitation through the sex-industry 
and human trafficking (Brunnbauer 2000; Behrend 1995). Even beyond the sex trade, 
there is an emphasis on female job loss (an issue addressed in this research as well) 
and, the increase in domestic violence against women among other issues. For 
example, in 1996 Polish academic Urszula Nowakowska wrote “[w]omen are the 
most visible victims of the period of transition, and they are going to pay the biggest 
price for economic and ideological reforms (revolutions) (1996, 29). To be sure, the 
transition process did negatively affect women in the region in a number of ways. 
Women did “lose out” in regards to the retrenchment of social coverage. 
Additionally, the growth and prosperity of the sex trade in the region is of grave 
concern (True 2003).  
Sometimes forgotten in these pieces, though, is the undeniable fact that the post-
communist transition has brought a number of benefits for women as well (Rellen 
2004; True 2003). These include greater access to food products and material goods 
(e.g. affordable appliances), freedom from government oppression and an enhanced 
ability to travel and exchange ideas and experiences with other women around the 
world (Interviews 2007-2008). Many of the women I spoke with in the region 
emphasized the complex nature of how the transition has affected women – both good 




fully explain the situation (for better and for worse) of women in the region under and 
after communism. This project, therefore, attempts to present a more nuanced 
explanation of women in the region’s social and political life.  
Impossibility of Comparison 
Another trend in some of the literature is to devalue the comparison between 
women under communism and women today (e.g. Brunnbauer 2000). These scholars 
argue that female participation before1989 was generally token participation that did 
not amount to a real voice. This argument is particularly prominent in studies that 
look solely at representation, because they can focus on the elimination of gender 
quotas after 1989 to explain the drop in female HIP.  
It remains debatable if women in communist style politics felt a sense of efficacy. 
Some researchers (True 2003; Rychard 1998; Regulska 1997) argue that many of the 
female political positions were token, but some do contend that the presence of 
women, in and of its self, was significant. The simple fact that women were “at the 
table” gave them some access to policymaking channels and to powerful networks. 
As Millard points out, “[h]owever ritualistic the formal sessions, women gained a 
degree of experience in the public domain. Setting a high official value on women’s 
participation added a symbolic dimension, even given the palpable domination of 
communist politics by men” (2004, 184-185). Einhorn agrees, explaining that “[t]he 
question of tokenism aside, there is no doubt that women were more politically active 
under state socialism. First it was an integral part of official discourse that women 
were citizens with equal rights in all spheres of life, and indeed that they had an 
obligation as well as a right to involve themselves at the political and decision-




of eastern parliaments was limited for all members (men and women), and controlled 
to a large extent from external Party forces and elite groups. Therefore, all 
parliamentarians of the era had limited power. It is true, however, that men had more 
opportunities to reach the higher echelons of the Party structure, and that women were 
seldom in extremely powerful positions (Reuschmeyer 1998).31  
Disregarding the comparison, due simply to the unique nature of communist rule, 
is misguided. In fact, it is the extensive differences between the two eras that are most 
intriguing because we are dealing with process and continuation rather than just two 
totally separate and stagnant periods of time. While I do not attempt to make a direct 
comparison between women’s participation before 1989 and after, I do argue that 
there were reasons to suspect that women would be involved in transition politics. 
These included: high numbers of women in the labor force, considerable female 
dissident activity and experiences from elsewhere in the world where women did 
mobilize during times of transition. Additionally, I will argue in the proceeding 
chapters, that the institutions (both formal and informal) of the communist era, have 
affected women’s participation in the post-communist era. Therefore, it is my 
contention that attempting to understand women’s political participation in the region 
in the 1990s, and even today, is impossible without a thorough examination of their 
participation, and indeed their position, during communism.  
Project Relevance: 
The political participation of women is important, because it has a direct link not 
only to women’s place in society, but also to their place as citizens. The specific 
relationship between the communist state and its female population created a situation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 As will be seen in Chapter 5, there were some women (e.g. Elena Ceausescu) who did wield 




unique to the region. This relationship was drastically altered after communism’s 
demise, but continues to influence how women view government, their own efficacy 
and hence their willingness to engage in political activity. The drastic differences 
between life for women under communism and today, as well as the lack of 
participation at such a crucial moment as the early 1990s, make this an important 
project. As Fuszara explains, “[i]t is crucial to study the mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion, which affect not only women’s participation in politics but also the 
opportunities thereby available to them” (2000, 261). As such, this project also 
generates insights into the means and motivations of participation in general.  
The scope of this research will go beyond the field of political science. The 
position of women in post-communist society is not only informed by their position 
in relation to the political structure, but by social and economic structures as well. 
Therefore, the conclusions will have relevance for those doing research in area 
studies, history, psychology, women’s studies and economics.  
A Fertile Testing Ground:  
The fall of communism and the subsequent transitions away from totalitarianism 
provides an exceptional testing ground for questions about the creation and 
sustainability of democracy, the role of identity and the shadow of the past (Howard 
2003; Linz and Stepan 1996). An exploration of the reasons contributing to the 
relative absence of women in the politics of transition across post-communist Europe 
can provide important information regarding these concerns. This is especially 
relevant in regards to female LIP, given that LIP is generally a much more common 
and accessible form of political participation than HIP. Indeed, understanding female 




democratization and civic society. There are a number of significant questions that 
this research on female political participation in post-communist Europe can inform. 
For example: What role does female political participation play in the transformation 
process? What are the effects of transition on different forms of political 
participation? How might participatory trends be reversed? What does a transition to 
democracy look like from a female perspective, twenty years on? 
In addition, this work will indicate how the specific actions of the state can affect 
women differently than men, especially in a post-communist system where women 
were previously a “protected” group. Writing about the role of the state in post-
communist Europe, Knezevic contended that, [t]he issue concerns not only the 
disappearance of women from the political or public space, but also, as a consequence 
of this, the loss of previously acquired special rights, or the renewed systematic 
jeopardization of those rights” (1997, vii). Women’s citizenship in Eastern Europe 
dramatically changed after 1989.  
Citizenship is a key concept when dealing with female political participation in 
the post-communist region of Europe. If one looks at T.H. Marshall’s delineation of 
citizenship, there is a stark difference between communist Europe’s experience and 
those of liberal democracies. Marshall (1950) describes three types of rights: civil, 
political and social. These correspond to legal fairness, paths toward political power 
and finally more everyday participation in society (Howard 2003). Communist 
systems downplayed the civil and political rights of citizenship, although they 
claimed advancement of a highly circumscribed version of political rights, and 




provide for social risk, which simultaneously operated to both emancipate and 
constrict women in the region (Fallon 2003). Because citizenship under the 
communist system emphasized social citizenship, the transition toward democracy 
after 1989 and the corresponding focus on civil and political rights has in itself 
required a transition for women.  
Currently, some researchers argue that there is an imbalance between citizenship 
rights in post-communist Europe because the social rights once granted are 
diminishing, especially for women (Corrin 1999). Heinen explains this alteration by 
explaining that, “[i]n those countries where the concept of ‘worker’ replaced that of 
‘citizen’ and ‘mother-worker’ replaced ‘mother-wife’ the employment guarantee and 
the social cover that went with it, as well as the subsidy system that met certain basic 
needs (food, lodging among others) gave a minimum protection to the individual” 
(Heinen 1997, 583). Ashwin (2000) and Einhorn (1994) agree, arguing that the lack 
of female participation is very much an issue of women’s citizenship rights, and about 
how women view their relationship to the state. Einhorn also points out that the 
movement away from social citizenship, in particular, has affected women as female-
specific issues have been largely pushed aside in favor of capitalistic goals.32 Issues 
of development and economic expansion, today often overshadow female concerns.  
Einhorn extends the discussion of female citizenship beyond the rights outlined 
by Marshall, explaining that citizenship writ large “implies active agency, the 
assertion of full individual autonomy within a community dedicated to the well being 
of its members, who are bound by broader ties than those of family or kinship” (1994, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Initially, the economic struggles associated with transition overshadowed social considerations. This 




3). Therefore citizenship in a modern democratizing state should include the 
participation of women and the acceptance of a female voice and role in the political 
world.33 Fallon agrees, stating that, “[e]ven today, political rights, such as voting, 
lobbying, and representation within the government, are central to women improving 
their citizenship status” (Fallon 2003, 227). Women’s citizenship is only complete 
with female activity and the acknowledgement of the necessity for a gendered 
perspective on policy. This project then provides insight on how institutional changes 
affect not just the citizenship rights of women, but how it can also change societal 
relationships between men and women.  
Theory:   
In this dissertation I present a multistep explanatory chain to explain levels of low 
intensity political participation among women in post-communist Europe. I use the 
“theory of logic,” which defines the concept of “cause in the individual case as a 
variable value that is necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome” (Mahoney 2008, 
417). A small N, case oriented, study is particularly conducive to this type of analysis 
(Goertz and Starr; Mahoney et al 2009). In real world situations, there is not just one 
cause for an outcome, but there are often causes that operate together, or relate to 
each other in given patterns, to affect an outcome (Mahoney 2008; Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002). Here I use a two-level theory to address both primary and secondary 
causes for the outcome of interest. 34 In the next paragraphs I explain the necessary 
terms as well as outline my dissertation argument regarding low female LIP in post-
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communist Europe. After briefly outlining and visually representing my argument, I 
provide an explanation of the variables and causes as well as their theoretical basis.  
Theoretical Structure 
I propose that there are three factors, which are particularly important for 
addressing the observed outcome of low LIP among women in the initial transition 
period.35 Mahoney et al write that often it is the case that “multiple causal factors 
combine together to produce particular outcomes” (2009, 124). Pierson and Skocpol 
(2002) refer to interactions and the related nature of multiple causal variables as a 
causal configuration. In my argument I propose that the communist legacy, the 
weakness of an institutionalized women’s movement and gendered job displacement 
each increase the likelihood of low female LIP in the countries of the ECE region 
during the initial transition period. The strength of these causes affects the intensity of 
the LIP outcome. For example, if gendered job displacement is not long lasting, LIP 
figures are likely to be higher than they would be in places where gendered job 
displacement is especially harsh and long lasting.    
 
Communist Legacy  
It has become clear in many areas of investigation that the end of communism in 
the ECE region, though bringing great changes, did not create a blank slate (Offe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Obviously, as with all social science puzzles, the outcome is over-determined. However, it is my 
contention that these three contributing factors are the most relevant for explain the situation of low 




1997; Howard 2003). Forty years of communist experience in Europe had a 
significant and enduring effect. The relationship between the State and its citizens 
under communism ingrained certain expectations, coping mechanisms and norms 
(Rueschemeyer 1998b). These were not patterns that simply disappeared in 1990. As 
Rychard put it, “[t]he complexity of the actual transformations is yet more evidence 
that communism was not simply an imposed system but had created its own dynamics 
and a certain degree of social rootedness” (1998, 29). The norms of everyday life and 
the suspicions associated with government policies persisted, influencing women’s 
willingness to participate politically in the early transition period.  
All of the countries of the region have had to restructure their political, economic 
and cultural systems simultaneously, which has proven to be a time consuming and 
difficult task (Offe 1997). Women’s communist experiences and their “Soviet 
inheritance” characterized how they reacted to the transitions (Ashwin 2000, 20). 
Women of the region faced similar concerns in the long transition period: 
employment, social protection, physical security to name but a few issues. To deal 
with these new concerns, while rejecting the formal institutions of communism 
regarding their gender (e.g. quotas that placed women in political positions and 
created female tokens), women in the region relied upon informal institutions 
(specifically family networks) from the communist era. After 1989, these networks, 
which often revolved around the private lives of women, took on an enhanced role as 
a source of familiarity and stability for women. The result of communist imposed 




legacy of distrust that left women of the region especially weary of government and 
suspicious of activities that called for the emancipation or advancement of women.   
Women’s Organizations  
One thing that had the potential to mobilize ECE women for LIP during the 1990s 
was the retrenchment or total elimination of social policies that previously did acted 
to specifically assist women.36 Despite the transitional upheavals that 
disproportionately affected them, in most cases, women in the region had little 
experience fighting for gendered concerns. Those women who did attempt to get 
involved often quickly found that their concerns were not priorities of their new 
governing systems and efficacy eroded as a result. The fact is, in the early 1990s 
women did not have the resources or experiences to protect their interests or the 
institutionalized base from which to mobilize as women. The protections that women 
enjoyed during communism (healthcare, housing, employment), were granted from 
above (from the state), they were not fought for by organized groups of women acting 
to better the position of women in the various countries (Offe 1997). With little 
exception, there was no strongly institutionalized women’s movement in the region 
prior to 1989, or anything that could have served as such, for women to draw upon 
after communism ended.37 A women’s movement also could have been a creator of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Certainly, women do not have to simply be politically active as women. However, scholars often link 
female political activity with a women’s movement, because the movement is an institutionalized basis 
that seeks to encourage such activity specifically of women (Beckwith 2005).  
37 A women’s movement, as defined by McBride and Mazur (2010), is gendered discourse by women 
and regarding women. Women’s organizations, groups that organize to specifically assist women or 
advance women’s rights, are important components of a women’s movement, but they alone are not 
sufficient. A women’s movement develops when those groups coalesce around a few specific issues, 
when they begin to pool their resources and form a network. A women’s movement is institutionalized 
when it has existed for such a time so as to become an accepted public entity, when membership is 
consistent and when there is an expectation of movement persistence. In some instances it may even 




female efficacy, which after 1989 could have further encouraged women to be 
politically active despite the challenges of transition. 38    
During the communist era, women of the region seldom thought in terms of 
gender. For them, there was a unity with all those that had lived under communism – 
even female dissidents fought for human rights with little attention spent on issues of 
women’s rights. Many interviewees described it as an “us versus them” mentality that 
did not distinguish between men and women (Interviews 2007-2008). Because there 
was little differentiation, and a recognition of communal suffering among the sexes, 
women seldom saw themselves as a unified group with unique concerns.  
There were women’s organizations prior to communist governance (pre-WWII) 
that advocated for women’s rights. A number of these groups were aligned or tied to 
early communist parties – based on the notion that the communist ideology, which 
claimed gender equality, would benefit women. Soon after coming to power in the 
USSR and then Eastern Europe, the Communists declared that women were free and 
emancipated; therefore there was no longer a need for feminism or women’s groups. 
In doing this, the communists effectively eliminated gender as a means of 
mobilization and claimed the issue space in much of the region for the next forty 
years. Although the Party worked to prevent non-state women’s organizations, they 
implemented polices that were aimed specifically at women. This created a public 
perception that erroneously linked women’s advancement to communism – in truth 
the system made women dependent on the state for social protection (Wolchik 1998, 
129).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Gendered Job Displacement  
Finally, perhaps the greatest post-1989 change was the drastic rise in 
unemployment and decrease in labor force participation across the region. To live in a 
society where almost everyone was required to work and had guaranteed 
employment, and then to have massive and persistently high rates of unemployment 
was challenging. The end of communism in the region required a significant amount 
of economic restructuring. Countries attempted different variants of gradualism and 
shock therapy in their attempts to recalibrate their economies to better integrate and 
eventually compete with the capitalist societies of the West.  
Unemployment affected all citizens in post-communist Europe, but women were 
hardest hit. There was an elimination of feminized jobs where women, who 
previously made up a significant portion of the labor force (in some countries women 
were nearly 50% of the labor force with over 80% of available women employed), 
suddenly faced high redundancy rates. Women were the first to lose jobs and feel the 
economic pressures of transition, because they held many of the low paying, 
industrial jobs (Kotzeva 2006). Theory suggests that female employment, even in 
what might be considered menial jobs, is often a means of efficacy creation 
(Schlozman et al 1999). Under communism, the ability to exert this efficacy was 
often restricted due to the structure of the governing system. After 1989, when those 
opportunities to further develop efficacy and use it in other arenas of participation 
increased, there was a corresponding decrease in female labor force participation. 
Hence limiting, for ECE women, the potential of the theorized link between labor 




One might assume that the elimination of large numbers of women from the labor 
market would mean that they had more time to take care of their homes and families 
or that this could have encouraged gendered mobilization. However, perhaps counter 
intuitively, the double burden of work and family actually increased for women in the 
early 1990s. The need for an income, especially for the large amount of single 
mothers who had previously received support from the state, though not often from 
their ex-husbands or the fathers of their children, remained high, but jobs were scarce. 
Women often had to spend increased time looking for employment, and they 
continued to have to find food and material goods that were now available, but often 
were more costly than before. At the same time, in most ECE societies women are 
expected to take care of the home, their children and elderly parents. With political 
participation, the third burden, now voluntary, time consideration was one of the 
influences pulling women away from participation.   
Two-Levels 
I enhance the understanding of my argument by presenting a two-level theory.39 
In exploring the basic-level causes of regionally low female LIP in the ECE region, I 
want to go a step further and examine the secondary factors influencing those causes. 
The communist legacy, institutionalization of a women’s movement and gendered job 
displacement themselves have important components, and indeed causes.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This means that there are basic-level (more proximate) causes explaining the outcomes, and then 
there is another layer of secondary causes related to the proximate causes. Though she did not 
articulate it as a two-level theory, Goerts and Mahoney (2005) use Skocpol’s States and Social 
Revolutions (1979) to articulate the two-level concept. Skocpol argues that peasant revolts and state 
breakdown together serve as basic causes for social revolutions. At the secondary level she explains 
that that peasant autonomy or landlord vulnerability leads to peasant revolts (base cause 1) and that 
dominant class leverage and agrarian backwardness along with international pressures result in state 




Secondary-level causes relate to basic-level causes either causally, ontologically 
or substitutably. A causal relationship indicates that the secondary factors directly 
influence the basic-level factors. An ontological relationship means that the 
secondary factors are not indicators, but “elements that literally constitute basic-level 
phenomena” (Goertz and Mahoney 2005, 498). For example, elections ontologically 
relate to democracy – they are part of democracy. The third type, substitutable causes, 
are “alternative means of achieving ends represented by variables at the basic level” 
(Goertz and Mahoney 205, 499). Most and Starr (1984) explain that “[a] substitutable 
relationship refers to a set of secondary-level variables that are individually sufficient 
but not necessary for the presence of a given basic-level variable; they are various 
means to attain a given end.” None of the relationships in the second-level are simply 
operationalizations of variables at the basic-level. The secondary-level factors are all 
variables that contribute or lead in some way to the outcome of interest (Goertz and 





Therefore, taken from the discussion above, I argue that during the initial 
transition, the basic level cause of the gendered communist legacy is ontologically 
reached by secondary causes of female tokenism and networks – these factors are 
contained within the communist legacy. The next basic level cause is the lack of a 
strong women’s movement. Here the secondary level relationships are causal. It is my 
contention that women’s groups did not exist or were inherently weak in most of the 
region before 1989 because of an us versus them mentality among the population and 
because communist doctrine claimed to have solved the “women’s question.” Finally, 
the basic factor is gendered job displacement. At the secondary level, the economic 
response, elimination of feminized jobs, and increased double burden help us better 
understand the reasons behind and effects of gendered job displacement.               
In sum, the (gendered) communist legacy, the weakness (or absence) of a 
women’s movement under communism and gendered job displacement after, as well 
as the secondary-level components that created them, are important for understanding 
women’s political activity during the early post-communist transition. These three 
variables coalesced in the early 1990s, effecting how women specifically viewed 
themselves, government and their role in the political sphere.40 
Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency 
The argument presented in this chapter generally draws from the work and 
theoretical contribution of historical institutionalists. Whereas institutionalists more 
generally investigate processes and relationships as they relate to the political world, 
historical institutionalists examine these same ideas over time (Katznelson 1997). As 
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likelihood and intensity of female LIP during the initial transition period. There are, however, 
alternative explanations such as educational attainment, economic development or religious propensity. 




Pierson and Skocpol articulate, historical institutionalists are those scholars that have 
“substantive agendas,” make “temporal arguments,” and who pay special “attention to 
contexts and configurations” (Pierson and Skocpol 2000, ?). My work here follows 
this pattern as I am articulating a structural argument that focuses on the constraints 
that formal and informal institutions of communism placed on women through an 
extended period of time.    
Historical processes are “path dependent.” Path dependency does not simply 
mean that history matters, it also means that the order of historical events is 
important. For a path-dependent argument, once a certain path is determined, later 
options are restricted, and reversing courses becomes extremely difficult (Esping-
Andersen 1999). As additional choices (paths) are made, they often reinforce or 
further institutionalize the previous choices in what Pierson describe as “the dynamics 
of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes” (2004, 10). As time progresses, the 
choices originally available may no longer be options. This can occur because 
opportunities change, or expectations alter, and retrenchment becomes difficult 
(Pierson 2000).41  
Since they follow a specific path and close off additional options, these juncture 
moments or times of decision, have long-term consequences. At a certain “moment” 
the decision is especially heightened. Such “critical junctures” occur after times of 
great upheaval, war, or the death of a ruler. For the people of Eastern and Central 
Europe (ECE), 1989-1990 was a critical juncture with far reaching consequences. 
Initially, the implementation (by choice and by force) of communism after WWII led 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





the region on a given path, and the revolutions of 1989 and the decisions of the early 
transition altered the path. As evidenced, because ECE women lived in different 
circumstances than men due to their sex and to the female specific policies of the 
communist system, their experiences of that system affected their own sense of 
efficacy, their trust in government, and ultimately their willingness to participate in 
political activity in the early 1990s.  
Conclusion: 
A generation after the fall of the Berlin Wall much has changed for women in the 
post-communist region. No longer are women expected to work and have children to 
support the socialist state, but also no longer are women guaranteed jobs, housing or 
generous social risk coverage either. At a time when many expected women to 
participate politically, few did so. As will be seen throughout this project, the 
communist legacy, the weakness of a women’s movement prior to 1989 and gendered 
job displacement after the end of communism all contributed to low levels of female 
LIP during the initial post-communist transition in Europe.   
Outline 
In Chapter 2, I explain my research methodology and provide basic background 
information on my case studies. Although the bulk of the manuscript addresses the 
argument articulated in this chapter, there are additional variables that one might 
consider relevant for addressing female LIP in post-communist Europe. Therefore, 
Chapter 3 explores alternative explanations and demonstrates why my argument 
provides the greatest explanatory power. In doing so, I determine that the alternatives 
fall short. For example, the often cited explanation for the lack of female political 




region, this is not especially helpful as women were well educated during and after 
communism. Along with the educational argument, I present and reject economic 
development as well as religious and democratic advancement arguments.  
After determining that alternative explanations are not as helpful in addressing the 
most important contributors of low female LIP, I then organize the dissertation as 
empirical chapters that correspond with the three basic explanatory variables of my 
argument. In Chapter 4, I examine the nature of female communist experiences and 
how this has influenced their political perceptions after 1989. I determine that female 
worldviews throughout the 1990s were very much constrained by their communist 
pasts. In Chapter 5, I explore the role of an institutionalized women’s movement on 
female political participation. Again, the communist experience is important here, as 
it become clear that there were intentional policies implemented by the communists 
that eliminated the issues space of women’s potential concerns hindering the 
development, in most cases, of a women’s movement. The last of the empirical 
chapters, Chapter 6, explores gendered job displacement and specifically addresses 
the policies and consequences of economic restructuring on the female population of 
the ECE region. The conclusion is that unemployment became gendered, and as such 
that much of the potential for a labor force and political participatory link diminished 
for women during the early transition years.   
Finally, in Chapter 7, I address female LIP in the region 20 years after the end of 
communism. It is here that I review the responses to my country surveys, which show 
that a number of women today see women in political participation as important. 




be involved in such activities. The findings show very little evidence of a generational 
difference in views of female LIP. In this final chapter, I also address the role of 
NGOs and EU expansion as it relates to female participation. I conclude that although 
the process of EU expansion and the increase in NGO activity in the region over the 
past two decades has in many ways advanced the position of women, it has yet to 
have a corresponding effect on female LIP. Instead, the issues of the communist 
legacy continue and the development of a women’s movement in the region that 
could specifically target female political activity remains nascent. Additionally, 
gendered job displacement and employment competition all are issues that continue 










My objective in this research is to explore why women in the post-communist 
region did not participate in low intensity political activities in significant numbers 
during the initial post-communist transitions. I also address those instances where the 
trend did not hold, and explore why certain countries exhibited higher levels of such 
participation among women. The argument presented in this dissertation generally 
explores the post-communist region of Europe, but specifically addresses the 
conditions present in four cases: the Czech Republic, the New States of Germany 
(NBL), Poland and Romania.      
What follows is an explanation of my methods for exploring the research 
question. From there I explain the case study selection and address the inherent 
difficulties associated with the chosen cases. Finally, in the end I provide an 
introduction of the four case studies addressing their communist past and some of 
their post-communist challenges, establishing context for the forthcoming empirical 
chapters.  
Approach 
The puzzle under investigation informs methodological decisions, as does the 
overall objective of the project. Because I am dealing with a relatively small number 
of cases (even if I include the entire region, the number of cases is still limited), and a 
rather broad research question, it is difficult to pursue a purely positivist approach 
looking for direct causation that can be generalized to a significantly broader 




operated together to create a situation where women in the ECE region were largely 
not compelled, and in some cases systematically discouraged, to participate in low 
intensity political activities. In doing this, both a local and regional approach is 
necessary. 
Initially following the fall of communism in Europe, there was a tendency among 
journalists, politicians and even scholars, to lump the states of post-communist 
Europe together. Given the joint history of these countries, in many ways it was 
appropriate to take a regional approach to exploring interesting puzzles. However, as 
the Communist Bloc dissolved, it became obvious that there were several differences 
emerging among the various countries that comprise Eastern and Central Europe. 
While it is still beneficial to analyze trends across the region, additional in-depth-
analysis of given states are warranted (Einhorn 1993; Linz and Stepan 1997). 
Therefore, this project examines post-communist Europe as a region, but also 
includes case study analysis of four case countries: the Former East Germany, 
Romania, Czech Republic and Poland.  
Methods 
Dealing with complex, and in many ways intangible, concepts like efficacy and 
desire to participate requires a large toolbox; utilizing mixed methods. For my 
project, this included collecting data from a variety of sources, relying on both 
qualitative (process tracing) and quantitative analysis (cross-tabulation and factor 
analysis) and conducting extensive in-country fieldwork. By analyzing different data 
sources and by employing a wide range of tools, I can triangulate the results and 





To complete the project, I have compiled and reviewed a variety of sources. 
Initially, I did a thorough search for secondary sources to provide a solid 
understanding of the situation for women in Eastern Europe both before and after 
1989. I found much of this information in published journal, books, newspapers, open 
sources on the Internet and various archives. Sources included newspaper articles, 
government publications and procedures and academic articles.  
Newspaper and government accounts prior to 1989 provided context for what was 
accessible to people in the ECE region from official sources, and they gave an 
indication of government policies and priorities. Those published after 1989 highlight 
government reaction to the early transition period and pointed to the pressing issues 
of the early transition process. Reading underground publications, available at 
archives and on the Internet, I was able to determine the grievances and issues of 
average citizens.  
Another valuable resource was academic journals and books that addressed the 
post-communist region and the effects on women. These sources indicated possible 
variables that could potentially explain female LIP, which I then was able to assess in 
this project (see Chapter 3 on Alternative Explanations). Finally, of huge importance 
were the compilation books in which women of the region reflect on their lives and 
their futures within a few years of communism end. These provided me insights into 
the feelings and thoughts of average women, who were commenting on those times as 
they were living them.  
Most of the sources I reviewed were available in English. I also read some 




received local assistance to translate documents from Romanian, Polish and Czech 
into English.  
Fieldwork in Eastern Europe 
Secondary sources lay the groundwork for investigation and are invaluable in 
providing a framework. However, there is no replacement for visiting the places of 
research and speaking with people. Therefore, to understand the motivation of women 
in post-communist Europe, I spent 13 months in the region doing on-the-ground 
research (Summer 2007-Fall 2008). While abroad, I conducted a number of semi-
structured elite and non-elite interviews in the Czech Republic, eastern Germany, 
Romania and Poland.42 Elites included public officials who hold office or work in 
government ministries. For me, these were mostly women, though a couple of men as 
well, who had run for or served in political office, were in their Party hierarchy or 
who had worked on campaigns. I contacted these people through publically available 
information (Internet sources primarily). During interviews, I asked elites if parties 
have specific gendered policies, if they have worked to mobilize women politically, 
and where parties or organizations focus energy and resources, among other 
questions.  
Non-elites, representing the bulk of those interviewed, were average women who 
live and work in the countries under investigation.43 These less formal interviews 
allowed me to get a real feel for what average women in the region think about and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Specifically- the Czech Republic (Prague, Klando); Germany (Leipzig, Dresden, Weimar, Halle, 
Berlin); Romania (Bucharest, Cluj Napoca); Poland (Warsaw, Gdansk, Torun). 
43 I conducted interviews in English and German and used voluntary translators when necessary. I 




where their concerns lie.44 I asked interviewees about the proper role of women in 
politics, their willingness to act politically, and the reasons they do or do not feel 
efficacious (See Appendix A for sample interview questions). Some, though certainly 
not a majority of these women, belonged to women’s organizations or were affiliated 
with local universities. Some of the women in my informal interviews were older 
women, in their late-50s and older, who talked with me about their lives under 
communism, their perceptions about the early transition period and about the current 
situation.45 A group of women in each country were also in their twenties; too young 
to remember much about communist governance. Despite this, these younger women 
added their insights into how the communist era and the early transition years 
affected women in their respective countries. However, they were most helpful in 
discussing the current situation regarding women and their willingness to participate 
in low intensity political activities today. This first post-communist generation of 
women is especially important, as they provide a measure indicating the depth of the 
legacy of communism in the region. Howard (2003), for example, suggested that the 
communist legacy would be strong enough to influence the socialization processes of 
even those born long after the system changed.46 All of the women I spoke with in the 
region added interesting commentary on my research topic.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 As required by the University of Oklahoma’s Internal Review Board (IRB), in no cases were 
interviewees compensated for their time or compelled to participate in the project. 
45 The women I interviewed are broken down into three categories. The first are those that I often refer 
to as young or younger women. These are females in their twenties and early 30s, who represent the 
first generation of women to come of age after the end of communism. The second group, the middle 
generation, are women I interviewed who are in their mid-thirties to mid 50s. This group of women 
were young adults during the early transition period. Finally, the third classification is the older 
generation of interviewees who were in their late 50s or older. This group is made up of women who 
came of age in the 1960s or 1970s who were middle aged in 1989. 
46 One of the earliest theorists on generation change is Karl Mannheim (1958 [1928]). Mannheim 




Both elite and non-elite interviews were determined by snowball sampling where 
an interviewee would suggest additional people to interview. It was not uncommon 
for an interviewee to make calls to contacts on my behalf as our interviews were 
concluding. University contacts in each country were also very helpful in providing 
interview leads.47   
Visiting Eastern and Central Europe allowed me to conduct a number of 
interviews in person, which provided a significant basis for the arguments put forth in 
this dissertation. Doing fieldwork also gave me access to a number of country 
resources, such as government archives, as well as organizations and libraries focused 
specifically on gender (e.g. the Gender Studies Centre in the Czech Republic and the 
Frauenforschungs Bildung und Informaztionzentrum in Berlin). At these places, I 
perused books that were unavailable or obscure in the United States, found extensive 
additional secondary sources and spoke with curators with expertise. Finally, I was 
given access to universities in the region (including their libraries) and met with a 
number of academics doing gender related research or post-communist studies, which 
allowed for a real discourse over my research topic. None of this would have been 
available without fieldwork.   
Opinion Polls  
In conjunction with my interviews, I also wanted to get a scientifically 
representative sample of women’s popular perceptions in certain countries in post-
communist Europe. Opinion polls are a useful tool for gauging, and indeed 
numerically calculating, public perception of various issues. In addressing female LIP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This method does not provide for a random sample.  However, it is debatable if a random sample is 
ever truly possible with interviews. Given this fact, I took special effort to ensure that I spoke with 
women of various ages, backgrounds, economic circumstances and opinions. The telephone surveys 




in the post-communist region, statistics derived from survey questions asking 
respondents to indicate their willingness to participate in different LIP activities, their 
views of government and their assessments of life before and after communist rule 
are highly instructive.    
Ideally, I would have explored opinion polls from the communist era that asked 
questions regarding perceptions of political participation and that asked respondents 
to indicate their level or participation. However, there is great difficulty in finding 
reliable data from the communist era, if data exists at all. There are few, if any data 
sets available that ask opinion type questions that would represent women during 
communism (Fuszara 2000). Opinion data that does exist from the time is highly 
suspect. It is hard to imagine a scenario in communist societies where representative 
samples were polled and even more unlikely that respondents felt secure in providing 
their true assessments. Any opinion figures released by the state or the Party, was 
likely a means of propaganda for advancing a political cause. Even polling from the 
time conducted by Western sources is not likely to present an accurate picture, due to 
the aura of fear and invasive spying - any respondent could potentially be 
compromising their own safety and that of their family (Ibid).    
Though polling data from before 1989 is generally not available, there are 
available statistics from the post-communist era that specifically ask respondents 
about their participation in LIP activities and their views of the political system. The 




years or so.48 World Values Survey statistics from the mid 1990s are, therefore, 
available and utilized in this study (see Chapter 1).  
In an effort to get more up-to-date opinion statistics, which would indicate how 
often women in the region participate or are willing to become involved in LIP 
activities today, I contracted with local research agencies and universities to conduct 
telephone surveys.49 My surveys are of a representative sample in three of the case 
countries: Czech Republic, NBL50 and Romania.51 Sample size was generally 500 
female respondents.52 Survey takers asked women of different ages, personal 
backgrounds, economic situations, living situations and educations throughout the 
given country a number of questions in their native language. Going beyond the basic 
questions of the WVS, my questions were more specific to the region and LIP. In my 
surveys, interviewers asked women questions relating to their ideal work situation, 
their lives today, trust in government and where relevant, how they compare their 
situations now to their lives before 1989. These answers give me a good indication of 
what women in the region are feeling and they provide useful insights for assessing 
the political and socials situation of women in the region today.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The WVS project conducts surveys all over the world. Due to the massive amount of data collected, 
compilation takes some time and there is generally a lag between data collection and when it is made 
available to the public.  
49 Another goal of my fieldwork was to find appropriate agencies that could conduct my surveys. 
Although I could have potentially made these contacts from a distance, it was better to make them in 
person.  
50 I instructed NBL survey takers to talk only with women who had been born or grew up in the 
GDR/NBL. We took every effort to ensure that western women were not part of the sample.  
51 IPSOS- Prague, Czech Republic (504 women); FGM Research- Leipzig, Germany (450 eastern 
women); Bucharest University Department of Sociology- Bucharest, Romania (700 women). Students 
at the University of Bucharest collected my Romanian data as part of University-related project that 
went through its own university IRB process. I investigated doing a Polish survey in conjunction with 
Nicolaus Copernicus University, but the expense was beyond my research budget.   
52 Since the WVS indicates a gendered difference between men and women’s willingness to take part 
in LIP, my surveys focused only on women. This was also a financial consideration. The average of 
500 participants was selected to provide a statistically reliable indication of opinion. This is a figure 




Quantitative Tools: Crosstabs and Factor Analysis 
Coupled with qualitative tools, I also analyze the WVS and my own surveys, by 
quantitative means. This is particularly helpful as I gauge the level of female 
participation in the early transition period and today. To measure LIP, I utilize 
questions from the World Values Survey (WVS), which ask respondents about taking 
part in petition signing, political discussion and demonstrations. I am limited to the 
battery of WVS questions, but this provides a clear measure of responses. For 
contemporary comparison, I asked similarly worded questions in my telephone 
surveys conducted in three case countries on my behalf in 2008. 
The feelings of women in these societies are numerically measurable using the 
tools of cross-tabulation and factor analysis. Cross-tabulations enhance basic 
descriptive statistics. They allow for a more detailed comparison of variables against 
each other to provide a percentage of respondents that meet both variable 
requirements. For example, I can see in table format, what percentage of women who 
live in a rural area indicated that they would sign a petition. Factor analysis, on the 
other hand operates to see which survey questions “hang together.” This allows me to 
see if responses to certain questions were related to responses of other questions. 
When this occurs, there is thought to be an underlying value or motivation that is 
driving the relationship. Therefore, if all of the questions about specific forms of LIP 
factor together, it is likely that there is value (negative or positive) attached to 
participation that is leading toward similar answers from respondents.  
Finally, logistic regression is not generally the best method for assessing scaled 
surveys. However, it can indicate the statistically significant role of chosen variables 




number of demographic variables (age, education, marital status among others) 
against each survey question.    
Evidence and Variables 
I have proposed that the communist legacy, the lack of or weakness of a woman’s 
movement prior to 1989 and gendered job displacement afterward, are important 
factors for understanding low female LIP in the post-communist region during the 
early transition. The objective of the project is to tell a theoretically grounded story 
that best explains the outcome of low LIP among women in post-communist Europe. 
Therefore, for each of the important variables, I look for indicators that show the 
story’s path. This can take the form of persistent themes that run through interviews, 
historical trends or common ideas that become apparent. In the next section, I address 
how I examined each of the three aforementioned variables.    
Communist Legacy     
In exploring the relationship between the communist legacy and female LIP, I 
examine the formal and informal institutions of gender during the communist era and 
address their role during the early transition away from communism. To do this, I 
investigate the formal policies of communist governance specifically geared toward 
women. At the same time, during the communist era, informal institutions 
materialized, in particular small family and service networks, which allowed women 
to function despite the limits and intrusions of the state. I also attempt to see how 
these two features of communism operated to create a situation where women were 
especially suspicious and distrustful of government and of people beyond their closed 




The initial goal was to establish official government policies related to women in 
politics during communism. From there I address female (and male) reaction to such 
policies. To assess the communist legacy, I rely heavily on official documents and 
communications between party officials and members of the Politburo. I also read 
historical accounts of reactions to the early implementation of some of the gender 
policies of communist times, and analyzed how negative thoughts about government, 
which developed under communism, are still evident in these recollections after 1989. 
While conducting my fieldwork, I was able to speak with a number of women who 
were old enough to discuss how gender policies personally affected them during the 
1960s, 70s, and 80s. These same women also supplied invaluable information about 
the tactics they used to endure communism. Additionally, they provided insights into 
how these institutions (formal and informal) affected their level of trust and 
corresponding desire to act politically during the early 1990s. I also asked younger 
women to reflect on the role of the communist legacy in their lives. Finally, my 
surveys highlight areas of communist attitude persistence.  
A Women’s Movement 
Another important variable is the strength of an institutionalized women’s 
movement that can serve as the structure upon which to build efficacy and to 
encourage effective and organized female mobilization that can in turn influence 
female LIP. In this project I utilize McBride and Mazur’s definition of a women’s 
movement as “…collective action by women organizing explicitly as women 
presenting claims in public life based on gendered identities as women” (McBride 
and Mazur 2010, 226). A women’s movement generally corresponds with enhanced 




women’s organizations themselves. Women who are active in a women’s 
organization learn important organizational skills, they can create domestic and 
international networks of support and a sense of purpose among members. Such 
participation can also lead to personal empowerment and enhanced efficacy, which 
can serve as means of encouraging women to become involved in other areas. An 
institutionalized basis also provides women who are active in the movement, and 
even those who may not be, a known institution and a level of legitimacy for 
advancing women’s issues.   
Where a movement exists and is relatively institutionalized we would expect to 
see higher levels of participation because a venue for the expression of female 
concerns is available.53 As the women’s movement strengthens, so too do options for 
female involvement increase. On the other hand, in instances where there is no 
women’s movement or the movement is especially weak and disorganized, a possible 
means of female efficacy creation is absent and we would expect to see a 
correspondingly low statistic for female LIP.  
To test this among my cases, I look for the existence of groups that had autonomy 
from the communist State, which were voluntary, and which represented women 
acting for women. I explore the activities that these rare groups undertook. This 
requires looking through public records found in archives as well as publications from 
groups that could make up a women’s movement. The expertise of women working 
today on women’s issues in the region is helpful in this regard as are the recollections 
of women in the general public. I looked for instances where the perceived benefits of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Again, institutionalized refers to a formalization that occurs overtime where legitimacy and 




involvement in women’s organizations (the foundation of a women’s movement) are 
evident. Did women comment that their activity in women’s groups led to a greater 
sense of confidence or ability. Did they learn skills (e.g. organizational skills, 
communications skills) that might translate well into the political sphere? Do women 
who might not be active in the women’s movement, see organizations associated with 
it as a means of having specifically female concerns addressed? Finally, do any of 
these women go so far as to say that their involvement in the women’s movement 
encouraged them to be more politically aware or active?  
Conversely, in those places without a movement or a weak movement, I look to 
signs that there was a dearth of benefits as a result. Did interviewees point to the lack 
of a women’s movement as a reason for why they do not think in gendered terms or 
do not mobilize as women? Or at a more basic level, do women comment that they 
did not feel efficacious, or did not feel that their gendered concerns mattered? 
Reviewing the means by which women could organize under communism and the 
recollections of women interviewed and surveyed, the importance of the women’s 
movement variable as a creator of female efficacy and experience that could influence 
LIP becomes clear.  
Gendered Job Displacement 
A final important factor contributing to low female LIP was the gendered job 
displacement experienced after 1989. Theory suggests that labor force participation 
can correspond with political participation; that participation in one realm can lead to 
participation in another realm (Almond and Verba 1963; Pateman 1970; Sobel 1993). 
Employment is thought to be important for political participation because it leads to 




greater desire to participate in the political arena. Therefore, I initially assess the 
levels of female involvement in the labor market, paying special attention to the post-
1989 drop. If gendered job displacement relates to female LIP, I would also expect 
interviewees to emphasize the value of labor participation, to point out that 
employment gave or gives them personal satisfaction and a sense that they can 
control their lives. Additionally, I would anticipate comments about the importance of 
the skills they learned on the job, the value they place on information sharing and 
socialization as well as perhaps comments regarding the financial independence that 
labor force participation allows them. I specifically seek indications that efficacy was 
or is created on the job, and a sense among women that this produced an inclination 
toward participation beyond the labor market. I am arguing that it was the drop in 
female labor force participation, and removal for many women, of a venue for 
efficacy creation. Therefore, I also sought indications that there were negative 
feelings associated with job loss and economic upheavals that related to the ability to 
create efficacy.     
Labor force participation is determined by examining official records from the 
four case studies as well as the region as a whole. Labor force figures as well as 
employment figures are readily available. To measure the effect of female labor force 
participation on political participation, I assess literature and interview data looking 
first for evidence that employment does result in the aforementioned benefits. For 
example, was there information sharing about dissident activities or political concerts, 
despite the fear of spying? In addition, did women express sentiments that 




employment can result in learning, information dissemination and efficacy, I then 
seek a link between the positive externalities of labor market participation with the 
desire to be active politically. Again, it is necessary to see if interview respondents 
claimed that because they felt empowered through their labor force participation they 
were inclined to seek out political empowerment. Additionally, did the loss of 
employment result in a weakened sense of control or efficacy that discourages 
political activity after 1989.  
Case Study Design 
Over the next pages, I articulate my case study selection. In doing so, I outline the 
specific conditions I was looking for as I scanned the region for possible cases. In 
choosing the Czech Republic and eastern Germany, I have picked data rich cases that 
are crucial to the region, but these are also two of the most challenging cases for 
examination due to the simple fact that the very nature of their existence has changed 
since 1989. I explain why I included these two countries and discuss how I address 
their inherent challenges. Finally, having explained my case selections, I present a 
brief overview of each of the four cases.  
Scope Conditions 
The area of formerly Soviet influence is expansive. The specificity of post-
communist Europe, however, winnows down the options. For my purposes, it was 
necessary that the cases be countries where democratic transition has begun – where 
LIP was and is voluntary.54 It is unlikely that one could find significant LIP in places 
where the process of democratization has not started. Based on these qualifications, I 
eliminated cases such as Georgia and Belarus where democratic development has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Howard (2003) also eliminated those countries in the former Soviet Sphere, which had not yet begun 




been slower and remains tenuous. These requirements also removed the countries of 
the former Yugoslavia, which were embroiled in a series of wars throughout the 
1990s, the time period of much of this investigation.  
My scope conditions limited my possible cases to about 12. My goal was to find 
three or four cases that represented both similarity and difference along my 
explanatory variables. Ultimately, I selected four cases that represented a wide 
geographic expanse, differing cultural and religious proclivities as well as dissimilar 
levels of dissent during communism. However, all of the cases showed high levels of 
women in formal politics during the communist era, evidenced high levels of female 
educational attainment and all had social policies that allowed for generous social 
coverage for women but also imposed a series of expectations or “burdens.” Although 
there were obviously some stark differences between these four countries during the 
communist era, in general there were a great many similarities. Their economic 
structures, political systems, gendered policies and educational attainment levels were 


















High High High Active Low Above 
Average 
NBL High High High Active Low High 
Poland High High High Active High Low 
Romania High High High Limited Low Low 
 
Two of the cases, Poland and Romania, are geographically, linguistically and 
culturally quite separate. In terms of dissent during communism, the two were also 
dissimilar. Poland became home to Solidarity, one of the most famous and large 
organizations of the last century, which actively worked to enlighten citizens to the 




country that was relatively isolated and tightly controlled, there was very little room 
for such dissent. However, these differences aside, both Poland and Romania indicate 
low levels of female LIP. These two cases represent what Van Evera (1997) would 
call “typical cases” in that they represent some of the differences in the region, yet are 
within the majority of cases when examining the outcome (female LIP) of interest.   
My other cases, the Czech Republic and the NBL present one of the best pairs of 
similar cases in the region. Both industrialized before WWII, both were the sites of 
uprisings early in their communist histories (1953 in the NBL and the 1968 Prague 
Spring in what was then Czechoslovakia). By 1949, both countries had been created 
by exogenous rather than endogenous forces. Additionally, both had dissident 
movements where women played active roles. Despite these similarities, the NBL 
indicated high female LIP during the initial transition period, and while the Czech 
Republic had above average LIP, it was significantly below the NBL numbers. The 
Czech Republic and Poland also represent some similarity, yet they have quite 
divergent levels of female LIP as well.   
In sum, there is a significant degree of variation in levels of female LIP among the 
four cases. Romania and Poland have rather similar low levels of female LIP. On the 
other hand, according to WVS statistics, the Czech Republic has moderate levels and 
the NBL has the highest rate. Therefore, there must be additional factors responsible 
for the variation exhibited along the dependent variable. This selection of cases 
provides a broad and diverse area for study that will allow me to make country-
specific observations as well as to generalize to a degree to the entire region of post-




Difficulties with Chosen Cases 
Obviously one of the most glaring challenges in dealing with the cases I have 
selected is the fact that one of the cases (the GDR) is no longer a country, and another 
(the Czech Republic) did not exist in its present form until 1993. The easy thing to do 
would be to find other cases to explore. However, by doing this, I would be 
eliminating arguably two of the most significant and data-rich cases in the region. 
Both cases and the NBL in particular, have made available a number of documents 
and personal recollections from the communist era. There are archives and libraries in 
these two countries, again particularly in Germany, that provide important insights 
into the daily lives of women during the communist era and the early transition years. 
In regards to the Czech Republic, the fascination with the Prague Spring and the 
publications associated with Charter 77 (as well as the documents themselves), 
resulted in a number of important documents and assessments of communist life in 
Czechoslovakia from western sources. Additionally, there has been an effort in the 
Czech Republic to collect some of the Samizdat publications, which also serves as 
valuable resources. Therefore, challenges aside, the GDR and the Czech Republic are 
both data rich sources, and they played pivotal roles in the events of the communist 
era and its decline. They are vital cases for any understanding of the region during the 
1990s.  
Despite its designation as Czechoslovakia, under communism the country was a 
federalist entity with both the Czech and the Slovak lands retaining much of their 
ethnic homogeneity throughout the history of Czechoslovakia (Bunce 1999). 




Divorce of 1993, designate easily into the Czech Republic and Slovakia despite the 
fact that the two countries had not yet separated.  
The GDR presents a slightly more difficult situation. The GDR existed from 1949 
until October 3, 1990 when it officially joined with West Germany. Unification (or 
reunification) has undoubtedly created a unique situation in Germany and particularly 
in the New States (NBL). Though unification is certainly an important component in 
many regards, it would be a fallacy to claim that unification fully explains all current 
German puzzles.  
The NBL, more than perhaps any other state in the ECE region, has made 
available to researchers a wealth of resources relating to the communist era and to the 
early transition years (Kolinsky and Nickel 2003). These include the opening of 
security files, numerous museums and archives around the country as well as 
university divisions devoted to the study of the communist and post-communist eras. 
In order to minimize the effects of unification, I have separated the statistical data 
from the early transition to reflect the former East Germany. In my own telephone 
survey, only those respondents who claimed that they were born or raised in East 
Germany or the NBL were included. Additionally, in those instances where 
unification does in fact affect a variable in question, I unapologetically address it as 
such.  
The Cases  
The selection of the Czech Republic, the NBL, Poland and Romania provides 
cases that exhibit variation on the female LIP outcome of interest. They represent a 
broad sample, they are among the most important countries in the region and they are 




the four cases under investigation. This will serve as a basis for the forthcoming 
empirical chapters.  
The Czech Republic: 
After 1989, capitalism brought the women of the Czech Republic access to goods 
and products that made their lives substantially easier. However, capitalism in the 
Czech Republic has necessitated a dual income for most families, meaning that 
women need to work. Even if women wanted to stay home, very few could afford to 
do so. At the same time, latent sexism of the communist system became blatant 
during the early transition and has become common practice. Despite growing 
attention to gender inequalities, and above average levels of female LIP, high-level 
positions in business and politics remain limited for women. Additionally, sexual 
harassment is commonplace and sex trafficking through the Czech Republic is a 
notorious problem. Czech women, like those in the entire region, have experienced a 
number of ideological shifts that have altered their position in society and in political 
life. 
In the years between the two World Wars, Czechoslovakia earned its 
independence and became one of the more industrial states in Europe. The years of 
the First Republic (1918-1939) were progressive times as the new country developed 
into a democracy. The country’s President, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, was not only 
quite popular, he was open to the ideas of gender equality, encouraged the 
enfranchisement of women and pushed for more women in higher education. He also 
actively supported the creation and development of a young but growing women’s 
movement during his years in power. Masaryk explained, “‘Let women be placed on 




179, 2004). Part of his support of women’s rights likely came by way of his marriage 
to an American activist (see Chapter 5).  
In 1938, the country fell to the Nazis, after the doomed Munich Agreement. When 
WWII ended, the Russian Army liberated the country and many Czechoslovakians 
embraced the Soviet system. By 1948, the Communists had grabbed power via a 
coup, with minimal resistance. In the spring of 1968, Alexander Dubček proclaimed 
that he would create “Socialism with a human face” in Czechoslovakia. Even the 
leader of the Women’s League, an organization commonly viewed as a Party 
appendage, was actually quite active in attempting to reform the Party internally in 
1968 and 1969. During that time, the League pushed for greater attention to women’s 
issues and advocated for stronger protections for working women and mothers 
(Interviews 2007-2008; True 2003).  
Many of those I interviews described the Prague Spring of 1968 as a time of 
greater freedom and cultural expression. However, the Prague Spring would prove to 
be short lived when in August of that year Soviet troops and Warsaw Pact members 
offered “friendly assistance” to put down the cultural unrest. A policy of 
normalization was undertaken and was the official policy until the end of the 
communist era. There were many victims of normalization process. One was the 
leadership of the Women’s League, which the Party quickly replaced with women 
deemed to be more loyal to the communist cause. By 1970, the only organization that 
claimed to represent women developed even more fervently into a Party controlled 




Though facing great opposition, oppression and grave consequences, in 1977 a 
group of Czechoslovakian citizens, among them a significant number of women, 
signed the document Charter 77 to challenge government hypocrisies. The 
government had signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975 claiming to uphold the ideals of 
human rights and dignity, yet these were not luxuries afforded the citizens of 
Czechoslovakia. Eventually, as many as 2,000 Czechoslovakians signed the Charter 
(True 2003; Day 1999). From Charter 77 sprouted VONS, (the Committee for the 
Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted) which specifically sought to provide information 
about and support to the dissidents wrongly imprisoned by the State. VONS also 
included a number of active female dissidents (Day 1999).   
On November 17, 1989, with little violence, the “Velvet Revolution” occurred. 
The spark came after a small protest commemorating a Nazi atrocity, resulted in 
police aggression and quickly turned into a massive referendum on Czechoslovakian 
communism. In this, Charter 77 and its female leaders and members were 
instrumental. These women helped transmit information and they joined the 
thousands of other citizens in protests against the system. By 1993, political issues 
resulted in the Velvet Divorce with the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia 
declared their separation into independent countries (Havelkova 1997).  
Today, women in the Czech Republic are becoming more involved in advancing 
their joint concerns and examining their roles in society. There are new female 
organizations (e.g. Forum 50%, Czech Women’s Lobby) that seek to educate women 
in the country as well as gender study programs that are becoming more common at 




women’s groups is to draw upon the history of female political activity during the 
First Republic – there is an attempt to replace the enduring legacy of women’s 
experiences under communism, with the legacy of female activism from the First 
Republic. However, despite these efforts, successes so far have been limited 
(Interviews 2007-2008).  
Romania: 
A middle-aged female explained the political situation of women in Romania by 
stating that, “[t]here are two acceptable images of women here. Be sexy and 
manipulative or be smart and man-like. The second gets the respect, but the first gets 
the attention.” Although women in Romania are more politically (both high intensity 
and low intensity) involved now then they were in the early transition period, they 
remain among the least represented in the region. Sexist employment practices, 
diminished social services, violence against women and sex-trafficking all remain 
issues with which the country’s women contend. Despite these joint concerns, there 
have been only minor efforts to unite women to challenge obstacles to their sex. A 
large part of the problem comes from the historical view of politically active women, 
so negatively associated with former First Lady Elena Ceausescu in what is termed 
the “Elena Effect.” 
Born into a poor family in rural Romania Elena Ceausescu found herself at the 
center of Romanian history in the 20th century. With little education and few 
prospects, young Elena became involved with the Communist Party and married the 
man that would become its leader. Standing at her husband’s side, Elena held high 
status and power in communist Romania in her own right for over 20 years. However, 




earned, she took a position as a minister in her husband’s government, and she 
encouraged him to fill his cabinet with her family members. A cult of personality was 
built around the two, her no less than him (Siani-Davies 2007). In fact, many felt she 
was the brains behind the dictatorship and the restrictive policies, particularly 
regarding the brutal anti-abortion policies and prenatal restrictions that became 
pervasive after 1966. When the events of 1989 percolated in Romania, she and her 
husband fled the capitol by helicopter only to be found, put on trial and shot on 
Christmas Day of that year.55 Elena Ceausescu rose higher than any other woman in 
Romania but her fall was not only dramatic, it had far reaching consequences for her 
sex and their future political voice in the country. For almost two decades, the image 
of “Romanian political women” bore the negative image of Elena Ceausescu, leading 
men and women alike to disregard female political activity at any level.  
Romania presents an intriguing case for other reasons as well. Of particular 
interest is the fact that the country was a late-industrializer, which had consequences 
that specifically affected women. The country was a predominantly agricultural 
society when the communists took over. Contrary to the Czech Republic or Germany, 
Romania did not industrialize before World War I or even between the wars. 
Industrialization in the country occurred almost entirely after communism was 
introduced. In fact, the country retained a significant proportion of its agricultural 
base well into the 1970s. Often cited as a traditional society, perhaps partially due to 
the agricultural necessities of the family, gender roles in Romania before 1945 were 
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fairly paternalistic. In fact, women in Romania did not get the vote until the 
communist came to power and made it official in 1948.56  
When Ceausescu came to power in 1965, he did so as a reformer. As elsewhere in 
the region, a decreasing population became a serious concern, with little immigration 
into the country to bolster lowering birthrates. The demand for labor was even great 
given that industrialization was occurring at the same time. Romania transitioned 
from an agricultural society to an industrialized one in a remarkably short period of 
time. At the end of the 1940s, an estimated 80% or Romanians worked in agriculture. 
By 1989, that figure was only 28% (Pasea Harsanyi 1995). With increasingly more 
women leaving the countryside and finding industrial work, there was a natural 
decrease in births. In an attempt to increase the population, the government created a 
number of incentives for families, and especially women, to encourage larger 
families. For example, a mother of 6, 8 or 10 children would receive National Valor 
Awards for her “support” of the communist cause (Ciochira 1996, 134).  
Where encouragement failed, the government instituted policies outlawing 
abortion and all other forms of contraception. This was unique under European 
communism, where abortion (even in Catholic Poland) was fairly accepted, cheap and 
available. The lengths taken to ensure that women (and doctors) were following the 
laws were extensive and invasive. Ironically, though initially birthrates rose after 
passage of the 1966 abortion ban, they soon fell again because women took 
extraordinary steps to insure against unwanted pregnancies (Pasea Harsanyi 1995).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Finland was the first European country to extend suffrage to women in 1906. A number of Western 
countries, including the United States, allowed women to vote without restriction during the period of 
1918-1921. Most ECE countries also changed their laws and allowed women to vote just after WWI: 
Russia in 1917; Germany (then unified), Poland, Latvia and Estonia in 1918; Belarus and Ukraine in 




Unlike elsewhere in the region, there was not a significant dissident movement in 
Romania and certainly there was no women’s movement during that time. One 
woman explained, “[d]issident activity in Romania was essentially doing small things 
that were not allowed (e.g. celebrating Easter). People found small ways – through 
culture, education and art.” However, a couple of people did protest the policies of 
the Ceausescu administration, and a couple of them were women. Acting as an 
individual, not as representative of any specific dissident or women’s movement, 
Professor Doina Cornea was one of the few that publically spoke out against the 
communist system in Romania. In 1983, Cornea lost her university job over an 
assignment that veered from the accepted communist curricula. Officials later jailed 
Cornea and her son for distributing information critical of the government. Though 
often cited as the most important dissident in all of Romania, in her writings and 
speeches, she does not speak of inequalities among the sexes or present a gendered 
perspective. Whereas Professor Cornea might have presented a more positive image 
of female political engagement to counter the “Elena Effect,” this is not a position she 
sought.  
When the “revolution” came, it came from the masses. Romania experienced one 
of the few violent transitions away from communism in Europe. Even after the 
protests, riots, and political executions of December 1989, uncertainty remained. 
Many have argued that the transition is far from complete, with many facets of the old 
system in place and many of the old guard claiming the reins of power (Ibid; 
Tismaneanu 2003). Corruption and scandal dominated the 1990s and today the lack 




Women have not found much of a voice in the new Romania. This is especially 
true among some of the minority populations. The country is quite diverse, claiming 
19 different ethnic groups. Of these, the Hungarian and Roma populations are 
significantly large. Roma women in particular face dual discrimination based on 
ethnicity and gender.57 There are some women in the current Basescu administration. 
However, in most cases these are very attractive women with ties to the President. His 
daughter, ironically named Elena, for example has moved up the ranks quite quickly 
and many interviewed see her and other women currently in high political office 
simply as “sex symbols.” This new image of political women in Romania, though 
perhaps less damaging than the image created by Elena Ceausescu, is likewise not 
encouraging women to be politically active.   
The New German States 
Escaping some of the serious problems of sex trafficking and violence against 
women that have plagued many of its neighbors further East, women in the NBL still 
deal with hiring prejudices, large wage discrepancies and underlying sex 
discrimination in everyday life (Hempele 1997). This is further complicated by the 
cultural and social differences that unification with the more traditional West 
Germany has brought to the fore. These issues aside, the NBL statistics indicated the 
highest level of female LIP during the 1990s.  
At the close of World War II, the Russians took out the frustration and fatigue of 
fighting a lengthy and deadly war on the citizens of Germany. Most of the people that 
inhabited the eastern zone at that point were the mothers, daughters and wives of 
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all too understudied situation. Of particular interest, is the dual challenge that Roma women face based 
on their sex and their race. Although not the focus of my project, this would certainly be an interesting 




soldiers. These women would feel the physical wrath of Russian anger as eastern 
women were beaten, abused and raped across the Russian occupied territory of 
Germany (Interviews 2007-2008; Beevor 2002). Few escaped the assaults.58 With no 
Marshall Plan and reparation demands from Russia, it was these same women who 
piece by piece, brick by brick, cleared and rebuilt the formerly great cities of Berlin, 
Dresden, Leipzig and others. These became the Trumelfrauen – the women of the 
rubble.  
Despite the atrocities committed by many Russian soldiers, a number of people in 
the eastern zone were willing and enthusiastic about creating a socialist utopia in East 
Germany. While West Germany dealt for years with Nazi guilt, the East was able to 
avert much of that due to their decision to create a communist country in the GDR. 
Many women were also in favor of the communist Party (Joppke 1995).  
The building and fortification of the Berlin Wall in 1962 isolated the country. 
Though there were a number of attempts to cross into the West, and music and 
literature opposing some of the positions of the state was always present, there was 
only limited dissent until the 1980s. By then, a number of groups developed to 
encourage change within, though not removal of, the government. Many of the 
groups gained protection under the auspices of Church related activities. As the end 
of the decade neared, dissident groups had grown in number, yet they were dissimilar 
to dissident groups elsewhere. Rather than advocating for human rights, they focused 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 One East German woman told me that she and her younger sister went to the countryside to stay 
with an aunt during the spring of 1945 in the hope that they would be safe from the Russians. 
However, it was not long before the Red Army came through the village. The woman described her 
own abduction and rape by two Russian soldiers, which resulted in significant blood loss and the 
contraction of an STD that put her in the hospital for two weeks. She also told me of her aunt who was 




on peace and the environment. In the GDR, there was still a sense that the system was 
fixable, with few within calling for its end. Even the famed author Christa Wolf, who 
openly criticized the GDR regime, was a proponent of communism until the very end 
(Ibid).  
Women were pivotal members in these groups, as they were in Solidarity and in 
Charter 77. What is unique to the East German dissident movement, however, is that 
often the women who participated did so specifically as women, not just as citizens of 
the GDR. There were a number of groups made up solely of women who sought to 
change communist policy to ease the pressures placed on their sex (see Chapter 5). In 
East Germany, as nowhere else in the region, dissent had a gendered nature in the 
sense that women were mobilizing for changes to female policies, not just to the state 
system. The surprisingly bloodless escalation of events in Leipzig in the fall of 1989, 
led to similar protests in East Berlin. These activities involved a number of German 
women including activist Bärbel Bohley, the so-called “the mother of the revolution” 
(Joppke 1995, 156). On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall opened.  
Throughout the spring of 1990, East Germans voted in a series of elections 
eventually deciding to unite with West Germany. During this time, there were a 
number of roundtable talks in each of the East German states. Women were quite 
visible in the early roundtables as well as in the early elections for the short-lived East 
German government. Discussions addressed issues regarding the effects that 
unification, social retrenchment and economic transformation could have on women. 
For example, concerns about the elimination or downsizing of state-run nurseries 




less and less time on these concerns. Those parties and women who had brought these 
issues to their political platforms also did not fare well. Unfortunately, many of them 
allied with parties that were not in favor of immediate reunification. In the 
momentum of those months, the desire to unify trumped all else and the citizens of 
East Germany went to the polls for the more traditional, and western, Christian 
Democrats (CDU). Despite these events, women in the NBL continued to engage in 
low intensity political activity during the early transition years.   
Poland:  
In the early 1980s, much of the world was watching Poland in awe as a group of 
shipyard workers in Gdansk led a lock-in strike challenging government policies 
concerning their wages, working conditions and general treatment. Before long, 
similar strikes were taking place throughout the country. History often recalls the 
vibrant man at the center of this struggle, the leader of Solidarity and the country’s 
first post-communist President, Lech Walesa. However, less familiar to the world is 
that fact that one of the sparks that set the strikes in motion was the firing of crane 
operator Anna Walentynwicz.59 Women played other important roles in the Gdansk 
drama. Many took part in the strikes and wives and sisters would come to the facility 
gates everyday bringing food for those barricading themselves inside. There are also 
accounts of events inside the shipyards, which indicate that it was a small group of 
women that pushed to keep the Gdansk strike going in support of the entire country’s 
striking workers when government officials agreed to concessions that would only 
benefit those in Gdansk (Penn 2003).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Eighty-year-old Anna Walentywicz died in April 2010. She was one of many leading Polish figures, 




When the government reacted with force a year later to put down Solidarity, then 
estimated at 10 million strong, and imprisoned Walesa and other leaders, again 
women continued the struggle. In her book, Solidarity’s Secret (2003) Penn tells the 
story of a group of women who ran an underground newspaper that published 
accounts of prisoners and government abuses. Walesa himself suggested that these 
women played a significant role in preserving the movement while he was in prison 
(Penn 2003).  
The fact that these women would fight for the Polish cause is perhaps no surprise. 
There is a prevalent notion of the ideal Polish woman that centers on the image of the 
self-sacrificing mother. This notion comes from the image of the Polish mother found 
in Polish lore and arguably bolstered by the Catholic faith. As one young Polish 
woman explained to me, there is an “idealism of motherhood, of Mary. Women take 
pride in the sacrifices that they make for the family and the state. Part of this is not 
seeking recognition of these sacrifices” (Polish Interviews 2008). Penn and others 
have suggested that it is this female image that is the reason why, despite their great 
activity historically in fighting for Polish independence through the centuries, that 
women are always in the background filling in when the men are gone. A politically 
active woman I spoke with agreed, stating that the image of “Mother Poland is the 
number one issue” that she must deal with when recruiting women.  
The image of Polish womanhood is arguably conflated by the importance of the 
Catholic Church in Poland, which some believe presents a certain ideal. For example, 
in 1979, much beloved Pope John Paul II spoke to women about their place in Polish 




motherhood is the vocation of women…It is women’s eternal vocation’” 
(Nowakowska 1996, 29). It has also been suggested that due to the Church’s role 
separate from the communist state, a situation rare during the era, the Church was 
poised to fill the space left by the communists after 1989. “The Church helped end 
communism, and for that they get a lot of respect” (Polish Interviews 2008). Yet, as 
indicated in Chapter 1, there are a growing number of women in Polish formal 
politics. Although a number of them are from the Right, which tends to take a more 
traditional view of gender relations and in Poland is more aligned with the Catholic 
Church, the fact that they are there should not be discounted. This runs counter to the 
notion that in what might be considered a more traditional society such as Poland, 
women are necessarily excluded from political participation.   
Women in Poland deal with similar issues as women elsewhere: sexism, finding 
affordable daycare centers, violence against women. One of the other situations has 
been the massive migration of Polish people (men and women) out of the country. 
With the possible exception of the NBL, more than anywhere else in the ECE region, 
Poles have left to work in other countries (particularly Great Britain and Ireland) and 
they seldom return.   
Conclusion   
In this chapter, I have articulated the methodology and tools used to address my 
research question. I have also explained my process of case selection (the Czech 
Republic, the NLB, Romania and Poland) and provided a brief look at the history of 
my cases and the past and current situation for women residing within them. In the 
forth-coming chapters, I explore these four cases by way of exploring the literature, 




some of the women in the region and reviewing contracted opinion polling. Before 
moving on to that discussion, the next chapter addresses alternative explanations to 










In this chapter, I address alternative explanations for understanding low LIP 
among the women of post-communist Europe during the initial transition. I look 
specifically at the most plausible explanations; low educational attainment, removal 
of gender quotas, development theories and the role of a patriarchic culture to 
determine their potential explanatory value for the post-communist region. After a 
systematic evaluation of these alternative explanations, it will be apparent that they 
do not adequately address the outcome of interest. Specifically, educational 
attainment was quite high during the communist era, the previous existence of gender 
quotas rather than encouraging actually discouraged LIP, development has not 
correlated with female political participation and the patriarchic culture is not unique 
to the region.   
There are a number of possible explanations for why most women in East and 
Central Europe did not rush the stage after 1989. However, a number of the 
arguments put forward to explain the lack of women in formal or high intensity 
politics, such as the removal of gender quotas or electoral system structure, lose their 
explanatory power when used to address low intensity participation patterns. Some 
alternative explanations that are quite compelling in other parts of the world, for 
example educational attainment, prove to be less so when assessed in the post-








Examining Levels of Female Low Intensity Participation 
There are few studies that specifically explore the causes of varying degrees of 
low intensity participation. However, there are arguments put forth explaining the 
lack of more formal, or high intensity, participation among women. Past studies have 
utilized available statistics on percentages of women holding executive leadership 
positions or seats in legislative bodies. In these investigations, a number of supply 
and demand side factors have arisen for explaining why there tend to be significantly 
lower numbers of women in parliaments around the world. Studies have shown that 
parliamentarian systems, multi-members districts, multi-party systems, left-leaning 
parties, gender quotas and linkages between politicians and women’s groups are more 
conducive to women seeking political office than their alternatives (Paxton and 
Kunovich 2003; Kenworthy and Malami 1999). For example, parliamentary systems 
are more “female friendly,” as are closed list systems where women might be placed 
in specific list positions. On the other hand, two-party systems are less likely to 
produce female legislators. A multiparty system allows various women to represent 
different issues and opens up more avenues for female candidates. However, too 
many parties can be just as bad as a dual party system for benefiting women’s 
prospects. Too much diffusion of interest can leave women on the outskirts of 
electoral politics often pushing them into small, issue-specific and ineffective parties 
(Kenworthy and Malami 1999).  
Investigating HIP, it is now common to differentiate paths and obstacles to 
political participation through a supply and demand approach (Norris and Lovenduski 




explanations address structural or external features that can either help or hinder 
female inclusion. For example, as previously explained a multi-party system (3-5 
parties) creates more opportunities for women to run and serve in political office. On 
the other hand, supply side factors are internal. An example of a supply side argument 
for low levels of female HIP might be the availability of education or the fact that 
women often start later in politics due to child rearing concerns.  
Some of the explanations listed here and above, such as multi-member districts 
and multi-party systems do not translate to the LIP level. The number of political 
parties and the type of electoral system are not directly relevant for addressing LIP 
among women. However, other arguments derived from research on female HIP, 
education and cultural attitudes for instance, could also be important for 
understanding women’s LIP. In the next section, utilizing the demand and supply 
concept, I address possible HIP factors that could translate to LIP (e.g. gender quotas, 
education and political culture). I also present a few other possible explanations (e.g. 
democratization and economic development) advanced by scholars for specifically 
examining LIP. 
Demand Side Factors 
Alternative Explanation #1: Democratic Development 
In practice, democracy has not always included the voice of women. However, 
today democracy tends to advance the notions of civil and political rights for all 
citizens, including women. Therefore, there is an expectation that as countries move 
closer to the democratic ideal, there will be a corresponding increase in women’s 
rights, opportunities and political position. Essentially, there is an expectation that 




representation” (Saxonberg 2000, 146). The guarantee of women’s rights should 
provide women the means and motivation to act in their interests.  
The effects of democratic development on women’s rights and female political 
participation have been apparent in many corners of the world. For example, as 
Argentina moved toward a democratic system of governance in the 1980s, women 
organized and have remained active in the post-authoritarian regime (“Despite 
Recent…” 2010). Citizens of the country even elected a woman, Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner, to the presidency in 2007 (Barrionvero 2007).60 The transition away 
from authoritarian rule and toward increasingly democratic governance, contributed 
to more women seeking to advance their rights (Waylon 2000)   
The process of democratization includes the implementation or progression 
toward free and fair elections, the right to speak out against the government, and the 
ability to assemble and protest freely (Dahl 1991). The democratization of post-
communist Europe has been extremely positive in many regards. In these countries, 
there are now (quickly implemented after 1989) a number of new checks and 
balances of the political process that operate to protect democratic measure and to 
limit the possibility of a return to authoritarian or oligarchic rule. Additionally, 
citizens have the ability to protest peacefully and to openly disagree with their 
governments. Elections have also become structured and legitimate modes of power 
transition. Some issues remain, as this is an on-going process for the region, however 
by any measure democracy was progressing in the early transition period and today is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 This is an example of the LIP to HIP relationship. Women were active in politics, often with and 
through the help of what developed into a women’s movement in the country, during and after the 
transition away from authoritarianism. Female participation in low intensity activities, in significant 
ways provided a basis for more women in HIP, all the way up to Kirchner’s election as the first female 




accessible, available and in large part internalized among the population (Tavits 2005; 
Linz and Stepan 1996).  
Yet, as democratization has advanced, in regards to female LIP the expected 
correlation is not apparent. While some countries of the region appear to have 
increased their female LIP from the 1990s with enhanced democratic development, 
others have not. There does not appear to be any clear pattern. This democratic 
development theory does not provide a great deal of explanatory power, because the 
correlation, more democracy and greater female LIP, is not apparent (at least not yet) 
in the ECE region. The two events are not happening as theory would suggest, 
therefore we cannot conclude that one, democratic development, is causing the other, 
greater LIP.   
Alternative Explanation #2: Economic Development 
There is also an economic developmental approach to female political 
participation. The theory states that the more economically developed a state, the 
more willing its female population to participate politically. It is best to measure 
economic growth by examining a country’s gross domestic product (GDP); the sum 
of goods and services produced within a given country. This positively correlates 
with standard of living and is therefore viewed as a positive indicator of a country’s 
economic prosperity (Demetriades and Hussein 1996).  
An economic development theory pertaining to female political participation 
suggests that as a state develops economically, there is a corresponding growth in 
material availability and want leading to enhanced competition for jobs and resources. 
With enhanced competition comes a desire for greater justice: a realization of 




suggests that development leads to a lessoning of traditional, female disadvantaging 
values, which should encourage more women to get involved politically. When a 
significant number of women have resources, which come with economic 
development, these women will begin to fight for protection and enhancement of their 
rights via political avenues (Matland and Montgomery 2003).   
Economic growth also allows for the consideration of other concerns, because 
with basic needs met there is simply more space for articulation and advancement of 
additional issues. Kenworthy and Malami explain the theory along these terms 
suggesting that, “[t]he wealthier the country, the less politics may be dominated by 
concerns of economic growth and well-being, and the more willing parties and voters 
may be to allow other considerations” (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, 241). One such 
consideration could be the inclusion of women in the political sphere (Kenworthy and 
Malami 1999). Therefore, from a rational perspective, women should act to level the 
playing field to enhance their position.   
Though the theory sounds plausible, Norris and Inglehart point out that there has 
been significant research to dismiss the idea that socio-economic development is 
necessary for female involvement in the political system. Such research would 
include Matland (1998) who determined that development is significant and related to 
female political formal participation, but only in fully developed states. Kenworthy 
and Malami (1999) came to a similar conclusion about developed countries. Matland 
and Montgomery (2003) also found little evidence to support an economic 
development theory specifically in the post-communist case. In a global assessment, 




but only in PR systems. However, their findings specifically did not indicate that the 
pattern was relevant in the ECE region.  
TABLE 3.1 
GDP as Per Capita In ECE Countries 
Source: Nation Master. (http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php). 
Table 3.1 shows one indicator of economic development in the ECE countries 
from the early transition through to 2006. With some downturn in the Russian GDP at 
the turn of the century, it is the only country that did not exhibit consistent growth. By 
2006, Russia too seems to be rebounding. Also notable is the ranking increase of 
these countries. For example, whereas Romanian GDP per capita in 1992 indicated it 
was the 106th highest along this indicator of economic development, by 2006, it was 
the 53rd highest. Clearly, the post-communist countries of Europe continue to develop 
economically, as is the case with the democratic development theory. Yet, there is no 
consistent correlation between economic progress and female LIP. Returning to the 
Romanian case, GDP has increased substantially, yet female LIP has not. In fact, in 
my Romanian survey explored in Chapter 7, Romanian women questioned were 
extremely hesitant to take part in LIP activities with the figures actually dropping 
since 1999.    
Other scholars reached similar conclusions in their own investigations and a 
review of GDP growth throughout the 1990s does not correspond with female LIP 
 1992 (global rank) 1997 2002 2006 (global rank) 
Romania $1,100.98 (106) $1,564.51 $2,101.74 $5,645.24 (53) 
Poland $2,198.00 (75) $4,064.21 $5,179.67 $8,864.73 (38) 
Slovakia $2,215.51 (74) $4,005.72 $4,557.85 $10,223.34 (35) 
Czech Rep. $2,903.08 (60) $5,544.87 $7,379.28 $13,877.02 (31) 
Hungary $3,592.75 (54) $4,443.29 $6,566.87 $11,226.70 (34) 
Latvia $1,755.93 (80) $2,503.36 $3,984.08 $8,797.00 (40) 
Bulgaria $1,214.51 (97) $1,246.98 $1,982.08 $4,089.22 (66) 
Estonia $2,903.08 (70) $3,528.87 $5,379.59 $12,236.60 (32) 
Lithuania $2,314.14 (72) $2,793.13 $4,075.14 $8,770.09 (41) 




rates at that time, nor do they today. The countries in the region all have relatively 
similar levels of economic development, yet as explained earlier, there is variation in 
terms of female LIP among the countries. While I reject the economic development 
theory that women will participate when economic indicators are moving in positive 
directions, I do argue that one aspect of economic development, employment, is 
relevant. Yet, I argue that it was the elimination of employment opportunities (that 
specific occurrence) had an effect of female LIP during the initial transition period 
(see Chapter 6).   
Alternative Explanation #3: Elimination of Gender Quotas 
Many scholars (e.g. Wilcox 2003; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Havelkova 1997) 
agree that the elimination of gender quotas, a common protocol among most of the 
states of communist Europe, is at least partially responsible for the dramatic decline 
of female legislators after the first post-communist elections. This is a reasonable 
argument for explaining why women held as much as 30% of seats in communist 
legislatures before 1989 and why those percentages dropped significantly after the 
first post-communist election. In most cases, policy no longer reserved a number of 
legislative seats for women, which contributed to a visible decline in female 
politicians.  
Those that advocate for gender quotas generally argue that the effects of quotas 
go beyond electoral representation. Quotas assure women a political voice and 
indicate the party or the state’s commitment to greater female inclusion. It is the hope 
of quota proponents that these facts will also encourage women to increase their 




it is plausible that the removal of existing gender quotas could have an adverse effect 
on female LIP. 
The usage of gendered quota systems has been one method by which women’s 
groups and countries have attempted to bridge demand side obstacles in the hopes of 
getting more women into political office. Baldez explains that, “[q]uotas are seen 
worldwide as the most viable instrument for increasing participation of women in 
political decision making” (Baldez 2004, 4). For this reason, there has been a marked 
swing toward the creation of gendered quota systems around the world (Dalurup 
2004). Quota systems are an attempt to alter the political structure of voting rules to 
help mediate for possible discrepancies brought on by economic and or cultural 
causes.61 By requiring that the electoral system reserve a given percentage (often 
around 30%) of candidates to legislative office be women, the policy aims to lessen 
barriers that women face as they try to join the formal political arena (Jones 2004).62 
Gender quotas have become quite popular and appear to be successful in increasing 
female HIP globally. For example, Htun and Jones found that quota systems are 
effective at increasing the numbers of women elected to legislative office. Their 
research showed an average eight point increase in female legislators among states 
around the world after they instituted gendered quota systems (Htun and Jones 2002). 
However, while various countries the world over are embracing gender quotas, ECE 
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relevant for this project (Baldez 2004; Dalerup 2004).  
62 There are different types of quota systems (party quotas, candidate quotas, reserve quotas and 




countries quickly removed them after 1989 and in large part remain adverse to what 
many continue to view as a communist-style policy (Interviews 2007-2008).63    
One could argue that the removal of gender quotas meant fewer women in 
political office, which in turn led to fewer women taking part in LIP activities. 
However, this appears to be a rather tenuous argument. On the contrary, I contend in 
Chapter 5 that the very existence of such quotas during communism, rather than their 
elimination after 1989, has affected the willingness of women to engage in low 
intensity political activities. Whereas the elimination of quotas surely led to fewer 
women in political bodies, the existence of policies that required gender quotas 
during the communist era had a more direct effect on female LIP after 1989 than the 
removal of such policies. We know that past experience with female participation, 
HIP in particular, can have negative effects on both female HIP and LIP later. This 
was the case in much of the ECE region. There was, and in some instances continues 
to be, an association of political women with communist ideology, which was 
manifest in policies, such as gender quotas requiring female inclusion. The 
communist attachment and the desire to reject things visibly associated with the 
communist era, is an important component of the communist legacy, which helps 
explain low levels of female political activity during the initial transition period in the 
region. Essentially, the elimination of quotas was an indication of the public’s dislike 
of the policy, an effect of the communist legacy, rather than the cause of low intensity 
participation (see Chapter 5).  
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activity and extensive open debate as opposed to the communist systems that were imposed “from 
above.” Additionally, advocates claim that the token nature of the communist quotas is not nearly as 




Supply Side Explanations 
Demand side theories, such as economic and democratic development, were 
unable to convincingly address low female LIP during the initial transition period. 
We now turn from inadequate demand side explanations, to an examination of 
possible supply side factors. Supply side explanations relate to the pool of people 
(women in this case) available for political participation. In this section, I examine 
supply side arguments such as educational attainment, patriarchic culture and 
religiosity to determine if they might be instructive for understanding low LIP in 
post-communist Europe. 
Alternative Explanation #4: Educational Attainment 
In analyzing participation and women’s rights globally, research indicates that 
educational attainment is a good indicator of female political involvement (Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980; Conway 2005, 53). Some research shows that in countries 
where women have substantial access to education, they receive better treatment, 
have an enhanced sense of efficacy, and therefore participate in higher numbers than 
in countries where fewer women are educated. Scholars hypothesize that educated 
women are available for public office and should be invested in political society. 
Additionally, the more educated women are, the more likely they are to feel 
efficacious and participate in political and social organizations. Evidence suggests 
that this is a fairly strong link (Paxton et al 2007; Schlozman et al 1994, 974-975). To 
test this argument, scholars often examine the relationship between education and 
HIP such as holding office or party leadership. It is also quite plausible that 
educational attainment could correlate with LIP among women such as protesting, 




Though a strong indicator for female political participation (HIP and LIP) 
elsewhere, Eastern and Central Europe may be an exception to the educational 
attainment theory. The argument that high levels of female education will correlate 
with high levels of female LIP in post-communist Europe does not hold, because 
levels for female education in the ECE region were, and remain, quite high. Even 
though there is some variation in education levels, it is not nearly as large as the 
variation in female LIP evidencing no clear relationship between the two.   
TABLE 3.2 
Sample of Female Educational Attainment in Europe 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Economic Commission for Europe 2003.( www.unece.org/stats/trends) 
*Germany looked similar to Austria, but from this data it was impossible to separate East from West. 
 
One of the positive advancements that came out of 40 years of communist rule 
was the decision that both men and women should be educated for the good of the 
socialist state. Though not among my case studies, Albania provides an example 
“…before the communist takeover, the majority of women were still illiterate. By 
1955, illiteracy had been eradicated among all women (and men) under the age of 40 




Tertiary Upper Sec + 
Tertiary 
Romania 47% 45.3% 7.7% 53% 
Poland 33% 55.9% 11% 66.9% 
Slovakia 31.6% 59.8% 8.7% 68.5% 
Czech Rep. 27.6% 63.9% 8.3% 72.2% 
Hungary 37.8% 40.6% 11.5% 52.1% 
Slovenia 38.1% 47% 14.8% 61.8% 
Latvia 30.7% 51.8% 17.5% 69.3% 
Bulgaria 40.5% 39.1% 20.3% 59.4% 
Estonia 17.2% 42.9% 28.9% 71.8% 
Lithuania 30.5% 28.1% 41.0% 69.1% 
W. Europe     
Portugal 83.6% 8% 8.4% 16.4% 
Italy 63.1% 28.4% 8.4% 36.8% 
Greece 61.5% 26.7% 11.8% 38.5% 
Austria 37.7% 52.4% 9.8% 62.2% 
Luxembourg 51.2% 33.2% 12.2% 45.4% 
France 50.6% 31% 18.4% 49.4% 
Spain 68.1% 13.2% 18.7% 31.9% 
Sweden 19% 42.5% 22.6% 65.1% 




and, in the 1980s, half of Albania’s university students were female” (Brunnbauer 
2000). Across the European communist region, women were educated in high 
numbers, on par with the educational attainment of men. In fact, by 1989 women 
often received more education than men and certainly more than many of their West 
European counterparts (Emigh and Szeleny 2001, 9). 
Despite the many upheavals of the region’s transitions, the desire for and means 
to achieve an education has not changed. Women in post-communist Europe remain 
amongst the most educated in the world (Fuszara 2000). Table 3.2 shows that the 
majority of women in East European countries are currently educated at the upper-
secondary or tertiary levels. When taken together, no East European country is below 
50% of female education above the upper secondary-level and most are well past with 
more than 60% of their female populations educated beyond the lower-secondary 
rank. This is not the case for many West European countries in the sample. In terms 
of female education, this puts the region on par with Sweden, long considered one of 
the most liberal and female-friendly countries in the world (Dalerup 2004; Esping-
Andersen 1999). Francis Millard explains that because there are so many educated 
women in the ECE region, “there is no real sense to doubt the availability of a ‘pool’ 
of women capable of political action” (2004, 190).  
As evident in the above table, there is some variation in educational attainment 
across the region. Likewise, there is some variation in female LIP as exhibited by the 
WVS data presented in Chapter 1. However, the variation in both data sets does not 
appear to correlate. For example, in the above table, Estonia has one of the highest 




totaling a high 71.8%. Yet, Estonian responses to the WVS question about 
willingness to participate in legal demonstrations presented one of the highest “would 
never” statistics at 62.7%. Poland likewise, had numbers that suggest the weakness of 
an educational attainment and LIP relationship. Additionally, the surveys conducted 
for me in three countries of the region do not support the educational attainment 
argument (see Chapter 7). Regressions run on the participatory survey questions did 
not indicate that education level was statistically significant in influencing women’s 
responses to participation questions.    
One could argue that the education provided under the communist system was 
substandard. I will not debate this assessment, as it is known that a great deal of 
educational time and money was spent on teaching ideological doctrine. However, 
this does not rectify the educational attainment argument in this case. The education 
received by communist students, at least at the preliminary levels, was relatively the 
same despite one’s gender. Additionally, the educational attainment levels of women 
in the region have remained consistent through the communist and now post-
communist eras. The curriculum advanced today in the region is undeniably more in-
line with Western standards. It is clear that women were highly educated in 1990, and 
they remain an educated population today. This fact means that the education level of 
women in post-communist Europe does not adequately account for their low LIP 
levels during the initial transition period or today.  
Alternative Explanation #5: Patriarchic Culture 
There are also a number of scholars that argue in favor of more cultural 
explanations for addressing low female LIP. Cultural arguments look toward shared 




system of shared meanings and symbols” (Ross 1997). One such cultural argument is 
that women living in more patriarchic or “traditional” societies are less likely to 
participate politically. Scholars such as Paxton and Kunovich (2003) and Kenworthy 
and Malami (1999) suggest that in these societies there is a shared view, internalized 
by men and women alike, of politics as a “man’s game,” which can be perceived as a 
culturally indoctrinated image that discourages women from political participation.64  
Norris and Inglehart’s examination of the WVS does suggest that there are 
different attitudes regarding motherhood and the role of women in post-communist 
Europe as compared to other areas of the world. What Norris and Inglehart discover 
is that people in the region as a whole views female representation in government 
positions as less important than those living in the Nordic countries or Western 
Europe. The authors attribute this to cultural factors. Norris and Ingelhart, though, fail 
to provide a strong causal link between culture and the attitudes they find. The idea 
that the private sphere is the domain of women, and the public sphere (especially 
politics) is the realm of men is certainly pervasive, but it exists elsewhere and hence 
does not explain what is unique to the region.  
Culture is important and certain aspects may harbor greater influences in certain 
case countries. However, I would argue that cultural values influence institutions, but 
it is the institutions that provide the “rules of the game” and constrain options. These 
institutions, such as the informal networks developed to manage life under 
communism, are included in my analysis. While a patriarchic culture could influence 
some institutional arrangements, in general it does not provide the most compelling or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Both sets of authors develop a tool to measure paternalistic culture and then determine a correlation 




direct explanation for addressing the outcome of interest in the post-communist 
region.  
Alternative Explanation #6: Religious Conservatism 
Another cultural explanation, one often linked to traditional patriarchy, is 
religious conservatism (Baranievska 1997). In regards to women’s participation, 
some suggest that the mores and values placed upon the female image in more 
fundamental faiths, Catholicism, Islam or more traditional views of Protestantism 
affects the willingness of women to act politically (Ibid). Therefore, in countries 
where there is a high level of religious affiliation or citizens attend church services 
regularly, we would expect to see less women participating politically. 
Moving beyond culture, one could also make a structural argument for the effects 
of religious conservatism on female LIP (e.g. Kenworthy and Malami 1999 looking at 
female HIP). This argument focuses on the structure of the institutions of faith. 
Where hierarchy is revered and there are canonical barriers to female inclusion in 
those institutions, there appears to be a corresponding social and political hierarchy 
among the sexes. For example, the Catholic Church places high-esteem and a 
historical legacy in its hierarchy: Pope, Bishop, and Priest etc. While there is room 
within the Catholic Church for nuns and laywomen (as well as an important position 
given to mother’s of religious men), the very structure precludes female involvement 
in the higher echelons of the faith. Therefore, the argument is that in societies that 
adhere strongly to these hierarchical, traditional, religions, society mirrors the 
religious structure and provides institutional and societal barriers to women’s political 




Both the cultural and institutional arguments in this regard are instructive, yet 
they provide more context than causal explanation. For example, the importance of 
the Catholic Church in Poland and its impact on the daily lives of Poles is undeniable. 
However, low LIP is evident in other less religious countries in the region. The 
Catholic Church could not be responsible for lower participation among women in 
Estonia, Russia and other non-Catholic states. Conversely, other Catholic countries, 
Slovakia for example, exhibit LIP on the slightly higher end for the region. 
Interestingly, Matland and Montgomery (2003) found that in looking at the 
relationship between female political participation (in their study HIP), Catholicism 
was a significant indicator in Western Europe, but not in Eastern and Central Europe. 
This does not indicate the religious conservatism is not an important factor, yet it 
does mean that the investigation must continue for explanations with greater 
applicability across the region.   
Additionally, even so-called religious states, such as Catholic Poland, pose an 
interesting contradiction. As mentioned in Chapter 1, both Poland and Bulgaria today 
have relatively high percentages of women in their legislative bodies (HIP), yet they 
also both are among the lowest in the region regarding female LIP (see Chapter 1). 
This indicates that the relationship between religiousness and female participation is 
not as clear as one might expect.   
It is difficult to totally discount the influence of cultural factors in addressing how 
women in the region perceive their efficacy and hence their willingness to get 
involved in LIP. Therefore, in an effort to mediate the potential effects of culture, for 




cultural variation in terms of pre-War history, religious orientation, and views of 
female identity. 
Conclusion  
Developmental, cultural and educational arguments do not adequately explain the 
noted variation in levels of women’s LIP in post-communist Europe. These theories, 
while in some cases helpful for addressing female participation in other areas of the 
world or in examining HIP, do not provide enough clarity or uniqueness to be reliable 
explanations for low female LIP in the ECE region during the initial transition period, 
or today. Democratic and economic development is growing at a much fast and more 
consistent pace than female LIP. Gender quota elimination after 1989 did not affect 
women’s willingness to be politically active, yet their very existence previously is 
likely a more important contributor. Female educational attainment is also not 
satisfactory as it was commonplace before 1989 and remains so today. In addition, 
variation in education levels does not seem to correlate with variation in LIP levels. 
Finally, cultural arguments suggesting that patriarchy or religiosity is responsible for 
low female LIP, also do not adequately explain the regional trends.  
On the other hand, my argument that the communist legacy, the weakness of a 
women’s movement prior to 1989 and gendered job displacement after, are 
interrelated factors helping to explain low female LIP in the post-communist region 
holds up. The relationship and intensity of the three variables also accounts for 
variation on LIP among the cases addressed. Having reviewed the literature, 
addressed the research puzzle and examined alternative explanations, the rest of this 











Gendered Communist Legacy 
 
A history that unfolds peacefully seems to flow somewhere beyond people’s 
awareness, but a history full of uprisings and reversals, occupations, liberations, 
betrayals and new occupations enters the life of a people and cities as a burden, as a 
constant reminder of life’s uncertainties…forty years of the totalitarian system have 
left behind a material and spiritual emptiness and filling this emptiness will be full of 
difficulties, tensions, disappointments and tragedy  
(Ivan Klima 2000, 57). 
 
 
Almost twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, I spoke with Edith Kramer 
in a small village in the former West Germany. Frau Kramer was born in Berlin in 
1921. As a young mother, she witnessed the destruction of that city during the closing 
days of World War II and the events that ensued when the Russians sought their 
retribution on the women of Hitler’s Germany. After the war, she was one of the 
Trümelfrauen who brick by brick cleared and rebuilt many of East Germany’s cities. 
Although she had feared he was dead for over a year, Frau Kramer eventually 
reunited with her husband and together the family fled East Germany. They left 
behind friends, parents, siblings and cousins. The construction of the Berlin Wall 15 
years later separated them more permanently. Frau Kramer relayed to me her 
memories of November 9, 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Despite the passage of 
time, she explained that she cried with happiness for the end of the GDR government, 
but also with sadness for the times lost, the memories missed, and the friends and 
loved ones she had left. She cried the hardest for those who did not live to see the 
destruction of the wall. Twenty years later, the scars were still fresh. Likewise, for 




The communist legacy has affected nearly every aspect of people’s lives in the 
post-communist era, including how citizens view government and their place in the 
political sphere. Thomas Magstadt put it well when he wrote “[t]he tendency of old 
habits and values to stick to the social fabric of post communist societies is a common 
problem that afflicts even the most transitional state in Eastern Europe” (1998, 4). 
Though relevant to all people in post-communist Europe, the communist legacy has a 
specifically gendered nature. It is inaccurate to say that the transition away from 
communism affected women more than men. However, women’s realities were 
different and they faced particular challenges as women. The communist legacy, and 
its unique gender attributes, has had lasting effects on the political participation of 
women in the post-communist region. Due to state actions that sought to encourage 
women to be both mothers and employees, while also making them heavily 
dependent on the State as opposed to the traditional male breadwinner, women 
experienced communism differently than men. The residual effects of communism 
during the initial transition were also dissimilar for men and women. In particular, 
women were especially affected by the removal of social policies, such as state-
provided nursery care, and the corresponding changes in the relationship between 
women and the previously father-like state.  
In this Chapter, I argue that a legacy of distrust is an important component 
contributing to a lack of female LIP in much of the ECE region during the early 
transition years.65 Political activity requires time and energy, as well as a willingness 
to extend one’s social circle and work together for common goals. Given the creation 
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of a negative image of politically active women, created by communist party 
tokenism, and the persistence of fear, characterized by the female centered personal 
networks, many women chose not to engage in LIP during the initial transition years.	  
The Gendered Communist Legacy of Distrust and Female LIP 
The communist system created an aura of distrust – distrust of government and of 
other people. This was universal, however due to the nature of communist rule and 
the Party-established paternalistic relationship between women and the government, 
this distrust was particularly evident among women in the region. The communist-
instilled lack of trust is one of the significant legacies of the communist period that 
persisted well into the post-transition period and even currently remains influential. 
For a number of women in the region, the communist legacy of distrust played a key 
role in their determinations about LIP after 1989.  
From a female perspective, distrust was fostered and affirmed under the 
communist system by the formal institutional practice of establishing token female 
political actors and in the informal strategy of forming close, personal networks, 
which often centered on women and the safety of the private sphere. These two 
factors, female political tokens and private sphere centered personal networks, 
therefore, contributed (secondary causes) to the communist legacy that deterred 
female LIP, because they related to how women viewed their political and social 







Political tokenism denotes the policies and practices implemented by the 
government to place women friendly to the Communist Party in political positions. 
This was done to pay homage to the official communist doctrine, but it did not 
necessarily correspond with a genuine commitment of the Communist Party to 
equality between the sexes. The rejection of more formal institutional arrangements 
that sought to put women in token positions in the communist political infrastructure 
has resulted in a backlash against women in politics of any form. Tokenism created a 
negative image of female political participation, manipulated and controlled from 
above, that endured past 1989 and discouraged many women from even low intensity 
political participation.  
On the other hand, networks refers to the insular, small, close-knit relationships 
that citizens developed as a means of protection from state encroachment and as a 
means by which to get the often scare goods needed for daily life. Because the home 
was generally the only space beyond the watchful eye of the state, and due to the 
female responsibility to find food for the family, women often became the centers of 
these informal networks. While these networks originally developed as an informal 
strategy of protection from the state and as a corresponding means of ensuring some 
level of privacy, during the initial transition period their purpose altered somewhat. 
There was no longer an invasive government intruding into the private lives of its 
citizens, particularly its women, yet this was replaced by a great deal of uncertainty 
and instability. Continuing to rely on networks, especially the family networks, 
allowed women (and surely men in some cases) a sense of continuity. The networks 




significant roles within them under the previous system. Therefore, in this sense, the 
networks were part of the communist legacy that continued to be significant, though 
in a slightly different way, after communism ended.  
What follows is an explanation of women’s lives under communism. Then I 
address the communist legacy factors of tokenism and networks in greater detail and 
show how they relate to the low LIP outcome. In doing this, I examine the communist 
legacy of distrust in my four case countries: the Czech Republic, NBL, Poland and 
Romania. All of the cases had similar communist experiences and all of them have 
had to deal with the communist legacy. From there I explore the theoretical 
underpinnings that lend support to the argument put forward in this chapter.   
A Gendered Communist Legacy  
The Nature of Communism  
Prior to 1989, despite cultural and historical differences, the economic and 
political structures of East and Central Europe were quite similar. Forty years of 
communist-led governance and the concerted effort of the Party in each country to 
control its citizens resulted in a group of countries that formed a cohesive region and 
produced citizens that had similar experiences and out-looks (Cermáková 1995). 
Formal institutions in communist Europe shared common characteristics across the 
region. Bunce highlights four communist institutional characteristics. The first was 
the “ideological mission of the ruling elite” which sought not stability, but 
transformation and control of the economy, society and the population (1999, 21). 
The second feature was that in each country, the party had “a conjoined and political 
monopoly” where it was difficult to determine where the state began and the Party 




explains that the Party so thoroughly controlled the state that “the state apparatus was 
never free in an institutional sense to make decisions.” Finally, the fourth institutional 
characteristic was “…the extraordinary institutional penetration of the party-state.” 
The communist system was especially invasive, attempting to monitor and control 
economic, cultural, and personal interactions and relations (Ibid, 23-24). This 
intrusive characteristic resulted in a “surrender of autonomy” (Ibid, 24). Citizens had 
little voice and few opportunities to create civil or political society out of the sight of 
the watchful eye of the state (Ibid; Howard 2003). The formal institutions created by 
the state were relatively consistent in each country, and the tactics and informal 
means by which each of the populations dealt with life in the communist era were 
also similar across the region.  
The residual effects of communism affected everyone: men and women. 
However, the effect on the sexes was dissimilar, which led to different reactions to 
political life both before and after 1989. European communist governments served as 
a paternalistic force in the lives of women. This is true to a degree for men as well. 
However, the State’s involvement in the lives of women, as workers, mother, wives 
and grandmothers was different than for men. So often, this relationship between the 
State and its women was created through policies that both advanced women, and 
held them back. Through this, women became much more reliant on the State during 
the communist era, than men did.66 They provided a number of social benefits 
through formal gender policies, but also expected women to sacrifice time and energy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 This in no way is meant to indicate that women had it tougher under communism than men. Rather, 
it is simply an explanation that the system affected the sexes differently and in fact was built in such a 




to the state.67 The policies of the communist governments and the nature of the 
informal institutions that developed during that time, created a female perspective that 
influenced the actions and reactions of the region’s women after 1989. Due to past 
actions of the State, women after 1989 were suspicious of policies that claimed to 
advance their sex and they chose to rely on the known informal family networks that 
previously provided genuine security and after became a place of stability. The 
gendered communist legacy has affected how women experienced the early transition 
and how they viewed their political and social roles. Heinen noted that, “…[It] is 
clear now that the changes in mentalities will take much more time than changes in 
structures: a Communist system based on the respect of hierarchy and general apathy 
has molded ways of thinking and acting for a lasting period. On the whole, these 
factors tend to discourage the ‘normal citizen’ (and women more than men) from 
taking part in the re-foundation for the new political framework” (1997, 590).       
Fear and Distrust 
Personal experience and stories of life under communism recall fear, spying and 
betrayal (Sperling 1999; Howard 2003). A westerner living in the region during the 
early 1990s explained that “fear permeated everything. No one wore color and 
everyone walked around with bowed heads to avoid attention and eye contact.” The 
invasive nature of state-controlled civil society during communism created a vicious 
cycle. The norms that participation in that society fostered, such as distrust of politics, 
government and in many ways each other, were norms that continued despite system 
alteration. This occurred because norms do not suddenly change, past experiences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 As explained in greater detail in earlier chapters, women were provided generous social coverage 
that included extensive paid leave to have children, provided free childcare facilities and assured 




continued to play a role in how people reacted to the changing conditions of the early 
transition period. The instability of the early 1990s in some ways reinforced the 
norms, for example women often continued to rely on the family networks that 
developed under communism, because during the early transition period they 
represented what was known and familiar. This increased as social benefits women 
received previously, which were viewed by many as obligations of the state, just as 
nursery care were eliminated by the new governments (Einhorn 1993). It has also 
prevented women from mobilizing politically. Due to the fear and distrust previously, 
there was little sense of female identity strong enough to mobilize around after 
communism. 
The everyday realities of communist rule meant that children socialized into the 
system developed a specific and deeply engrained worldview: a legacy of distrust and 
individualism (White 1979). On the one hand, as will be seen, many hated the system 
under which they lived and hoped for something different. This accounts for the 
rejection of many of the more visible symbols and formal institutions associated with 
communism during the early 1990s. On the other hand, the socialization of more 
informal practices and institutional arrangements remain a strong component of the 
post-communist era (Racioppi and See 1995; Misher and Rose 1997; Brunnbauer 
2000). It is ironic that an ideology lauding the primacy of the communal would in 
practice result in a system that in many ways enhanced individualism.   
The communist legacy does not persist in isolation. The post-1989 resilience of 
certain features of the legacy relate to early socialization processes and the 




earlier proclivities existed, but that the transition period proved unstable and the 
expectations for the transition away from communism were seldom met, certainly not 
at the speed that many desired. 
Informal Institutional Persistence  
In the early months of the transition, there was an overwhelming sense of joy and 
optimism. However, the changes undertaken were massive and few could have 
imagined the sacrifices that transition would require (Jaquette and Wolchick 1998; 
Interviews 2007-2008). A middle-aged Czech woman described the early transition 
period as “a weird and difficult time” where she felt both ecstatic about being free, 
but uncertain about what the future held. Another slightly older woman told me that 
there was “great enthusiasm and then disillusionment and frustration” as 
unemployment and the cost of living increased. The promises made were slow in 
coming and the consequences, particularly the precipitous economic decline across 
the region, were widely felt. This left many grasping for something familiar, and the 
old survival techniques provided that necessary sense of stability (Johnson 2001, 
253). The uncertainties, economic difficulties, and general instability of the early 
transition period reinforced some of the features of the communist legacy and earlier 
socialization processes. Whereas women relied on the informal networks that often 
revolved around women, after communism they still looked to the close-knit groups 
that had developed for a sense of continuity, trust and stability (Johnson 2001; Misher 
and Rose 1997).  
Throughout the early 1990s, states quickly dismantled and replaced the formal 
institutions of the communist era with western models. By the end of the decade, 




of communism were gone and that institutional structures geared toward democracy 
and capitalism were evident (Bunce 1999). This has been an extensive process, one 
that is still incomplete.68  
The communist system epitomizes Putnam’s vicious cycle of governmental 
distrust and cynicism. This cycle continued to affect perceptions after 1989. For 
example, Misher and Rose (1997) found that trust in the political institutions in the 
region was rather low during the early transition, with most respondents to the 1994 
New Democracies Barometer battery of questions evincing high levels of government 
skepticism. These scholars explain that communist memories “provide[d] a powerful 
common frame of reference” and that “[t]he consequence [of relying on past informal 
institutions] was massive alienation and distrust of the Communist regime and a 
lingering cynicism toward both political and civil institutions” (Misher and Rose 
1997, 426-427).  
To see just how long lasting the effects of the overall communist legacy were 
consider an experiment done by economists Alberto Alesina and Nicola Fuchs-
Schündeln. The authors examined the case studies of East and West Germany, 
addressing perceptions of government responsibility and redistribution policy. East 
and West Germany presented a natural experiment because they were originally one 
country, which separated because of exogenous politicking by the Allies after WWII, 
rather than any internal division. Therefore, the evident large-scale variation can 
reasonably be attributed, at least in some part, to the differences in their governing 
and economic structures from 1949-1989. Almost 20 years after unification, Alesina 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 A transition is not a linear process with a set time frame. While it is easy to indicate when the post-




and Fuchs-Schündeln found that there remained vast differences in expectations about 
the role of government between the two sides of the formerly divided country. It is 
especially revealing that these tendencies were apparent even among easterners 
currently living in what was West Germany (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, 
1,507). My own interviews in Germany (eastern and western) support the fact that 
these differences are apparent among women of the two sides of the formerly divided 
country. Eastern women lamented to me that they felt different than their western 
sisters and that they felt their roles were dissimilar, even twenty years after 
unification. My survey of NBL women asked respondents if they felt they had 
different opinions about family, work and politics than women who grew up in the 
western half of the country. In each case over 75% of the NBL women responded that 
there was a difference. Given the length of time since unification, these findings 
emphasize the profound impact of the communist legacy, especially during the early 
years of transition. This is a legacy that affects all countries of the post-communist 
region of ECE.  
Tokenism: State Mandated Female Participation  
One of the factors specifically contributing to the sense of distrust among women 
during the communist era was the concerted effort, by the communists, to place 
females in political life via official state policy. The Party, in many cases mandated 
specified percentages of women in political bodies. At other times, the Party placed 
women with connections or certain pedigrees in high positions. Because there were 
originally few women in political posts and it was essentially a decision from above, 
political women often became and certainly many, not in these positions, felt these 




did what they were told.” An interviewee in the Czech Republic went further, 
explaining that the women chosen to fill communist quotas were “handpicked by the 
Party because they were uneducated [unintelligent], opportunistic or had 
psychological problems.”69 This was not a positive image of female politicians. Those 
women who shunned female political participation because of this image, had few 
other avenues in which to find empowerment. Labor force participation could have 
served this function, and certainly resulted in the development of important skills that 
could have encouraged greater participation in the political arena, yet the political 
structure during communism made that realization difficult (see Chapter 6). For some 
women, dissident activity served as a means of empowerment. For other women, 
empowerment came from their position in the home and their role in the informal 
networks that centered in the private sphere (see next section).     
Communist doctrine called for gender equality, so the Party attempted to make 
women more visible in the public sphere (Chylinska 1965). Policy and practice 
developed to place women in political positions within the Party, the governing 
infrastructure, and legislative bodies. The formal structure of the system also 
officially encouraged women to be politically active in the Party (Chylinska 1965). 
The Party often tied such participation to employment and educational opportunities 
for women.70 Serving the Party in this capacity opened jobs to members and their 
families that were unavailable to less active citizens. Although the true munificence 
of communist officials is debatable, the means by which the Party attempted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 This was the stereotype though not always the reality. As explained elsewhere, women in the ECE 
region were highly educated and those that chose to get involved in the Party may have done so out of 
a devotion to the Communist Party, or they may have seen it as a means to get ahead. 




politicize women did display an egalitarian image before the rest of the world. 
However, there is little evidence of genuine dedication to deeper inclusion of these 
women in general (Einhorn and Sever 2003).  
Tokenism has a negative connotation. It denotes the idea that a single person or 
small group of people are the embodiment or representation of a larger group of 
people, but that they are generally symbolic rather than agents that wield any 
legitimate power or control. Literature has traditionally analyzed tokenism in terms of 
sex or race in specific sectors of the labor force. These “tokens” generally face a 
number of challenges as they attempt to live up to the standards of their profession 
and deal with discouragement from those who have historically occupied the given 
field. At times, some companies, organizations and agencies may seek token 
representatives to advance their own agendas. By having such employees, these 
bodies can claim to be diverse and open. These minority representatives become 
token when they lack internal and external credibility, when they fail to receive a 
long-term commitment from above that continues to advocate for their genuine 
participation, and when they fail to advance (Yoder 1994). This is what occurred with 
women in communist society. Despite the rhetoric and policies placing women in 
political office, there was no continuing support from the Party to see that these 
women were included and heard. There were also very few that actually advanced up 
the ranks, and those that did were the ones that strictly followed policy line.  
Ironically, because the communists claimed to advance gender equality, policies 
that assisted women became associated with the governing system: despite the 




with communist practice, it has a very negative association in much of post-
communist Europe. This is quite evident in discussions about gender quota systems. 
Many men and women in the region continue to associate gender quotas with the 
communist system (Interviews 2007-2008). As Marin explained (1997), ideas of 
liberated women were associated with ideas seen in communist propaganda. Even 
today, many in the region view women in politics, even grassroots politics, in 
comparison with the female tokens of the communist era.  
Many people in the ECE region did not like the former image of politically active 
women, but in large part, it was women themselves who rejected the idea of political 
participation due to this association. Women explained to me that they were then, and 
some are even now, weary of the association with the communist style image of 
political women. In fact, Anti-communist rhetoric “disabled many individuals and 
groups from participation in the political process, most importantly labor unions, 
former dissidents and women (True 2001 13). Women were skeptical that political 
activity would result in a positive outcome for them. They also have been suspicious 
that government policies aimed at women are genuinely for the best interests of 
women. This concern is directly related to their communist experiences as well as 
those of the early transition period when guarantees (primarily social) aimed at 
helping women were retrenched under the new democratic governments. This 
deterred women from political activity. The tokenism of the communist period was 
manifest in the Party “encouragement” of politically active women, the existence of 






The Triple Burden  
Much has and will be written about the “double burden” of work and family 
placed on the women of communist Europe. There was a government encouraged, 
societal expectation that most women would join the labor force, and work long and 
often strenuous hours. At the same time, women were encouraged to have a number 
of children (often via financial incentive) and to care for those children as well as the 
household responsibilities with minimal help from their husbands. The state 
attempted to make both of these duties manageable, but life was challenging for many 
of the region’s women.71 It was rather common that a woman would work a long shift 
and then would stand for hours at the local market to see what goods were available 
that day.72 Women in the region also often went without or were slow to get cars, 
washing machines, dishwashers, and other products upon which western women 
relied (Siklova 1996; Einhorn 1993; Drakulic 1991).73  
Unlike women elsewhere in the world, women in communist Europe carried not 
just a double burden, but in actuality a “triple burden.” Not only were there the duties 
of work and home, but there was an additional responsibility that women participate 
in party activities. There was an expectation that citizens join the Communist Party, 
and even if they did not formally do so, they often had to attend party rallies, advance 
the party ideology, join state-monitored organizations, and make sure their children 
became “good communists.” Failure to participate could raise suspicions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 This is not unique to communist Europe. Women are quite often expected to manage the home and 
in many societies, these same women work full time. What is unique is the concerted effort made by 
the communists to place women in the workforce (“forced emancipation”) without a large-scale 
grassroots movement to advance women into the labor market. Additionally, was the additional 
expectation that women also be involved in political activities (see Chapter 6).   
72 The lines were especially evident in the 1980s.  
73 The lack of household appliances is clearly also evident in the developing world. However, the 
Communist Bloc was tied to one of the two great powers of the 20th Century, the Soviet Union, and it 




conspiracy against the government or of having democratic sympathies; something 
few people wanted to do in a system where the government and police informants 
closely monitored citizens. One Czech woman in her 70s recalled that, “[a] lot of us 
had to join the Party, despite not wanting to. There was a lot of shame about that.” 
Although their dedication may have been lacking, many I spoke with reported that 
they did attend Party functions and did claim Party membership. One woman 
explained that to not do so could negatively affect her children’s future opportunities, 
so she did what was necessary.74 Therefore, despite the apparent dislike of the Party 
among many, women made up large percentages of the communist parties and were 
often found at Party functions or meetings. Though they complied when necessary to 
avoid the punishment of ostracism or potential demotion at work, few women 
appeared to embrace the communist triple burden (Interviews 2007-2008).  
After 1989, many women attempted to ease their load (Interviews 2007-2008). 
Family responsibilities remained, and though the second burden of work often 
became difficult to fulfill, the necessity for employment or a means to help support 
one’s family persisted. In fact, women I spoke with explained that a means to earn 
money after 1989 was of utmost importance, and hence not really something they felt 
could be eliminated (see Chapter 6).75 Although many of the food lines disappeared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Government record keeping was extensive. A child’s records would follow him or her throughout 
their entire life. Parents had to take this into consideration when they made choices about their political 
participation.  
75 In Chapter 6, I argue that gendered job displacement is a contributing cause of low female LIP in the 
early 1990s. The comments by those interviewed, reflect the ease of giving up the third burden. For 
many, giving up family responsibilities was not an option, although we do see an increase in the 
marrying age and the age at which women had their first child from the 1990s on. The possibility of 
eliminating the “burden” of work was also not really an option for many, yet work became more and 
more difficult for women to find. Therefore, the time that women did have, was often spent either 




after 1989, women still felt a responsibility to search out cheap goods and continued 
to spend significant time dealing with “…the constraints of daily life” (Heinen 1997, 
587). Therefore, for many the third burden of political activity was the easiest to 
abandon. In many ways, women during communism were over extended, and this 
part of their “burden” was often the easiest to give up once given a choice. Women 
interviewed frequently stated, that with the desire to maintain the well-being of their 
families and the need to work or look for work, “we just didn’t have a lot of time.” 
Additionally, because women’s participation had been a requirement of the 
communist state, diminishing their political activity was a means of rejecting a formal 
communist institution, and the communist ideology. One German woman 
remembered, “…we wanted a choice and didn’t really have time for politics.” 
Therefore, the triple burden was in large part rejected by eastern women after 
communism ended. 
Communist Gender Quotas  
The most formal means for creating the illusion of gender equality during the 
communist era was in the implementation of political gender quotas. Looking 
globally, quotas traditionally set aside a certain number of seats, electoral slots, or list 
positions for women. These are generally done through constitutional decree, 
electoral law, or party determinations. In general, the policy aims to bring more 
women into the political realm in an attempt to remove gender barriers to formal 
participation. Today, gender quotas garner high praise from women’s rights activists 
who see them as a proactive policy to enhance formal female political participation 
and consequently, many hope, a female voice in policy. The intention is that these 
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women will be full political participants, not tokens with little tangible influence.76 In 
fact, Dalerup (2004) comments that there is a sort of global “quota fever” driving 
more and more individual parties as well as governments to implement such 
policies.77  
Quota systems encouraged today, however, are dissimilar to the ones that were 
found in communist Europe. In most countries of communist Europe, with the 
exception of East Germany, policy dictated that women should represent at least 30% 
of legislative bodies. However, in the communist system, this was not necessarily an 
attempt to remove electoral barriers to advance the political prospects of qualified 
women. Rather, it was a means to provide an image of equality, and in many cases, it 
was established as an incentive for women to be active in the party and to continue to 
follow the party line. To be sure, quotas did grant political positions to a number of 
able women who likely would not have had such opportunities otherwise. It is also 
possible and plausible that holding office created a sense of efficacy and value for 
some of these female officials in a system where efficacy was difficult to develop. 
However, only minimal power was centered in the legislative bodies, and decisions 
were instead made at the Politburo level, where no women were present. Therefore, 
communist era quotas had minimal impact on women’s participation in substantive 
decision-making, and in essence often created political tokens rather than female 
politicians (Brunnbauer 2000).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 For more on recent implementation and effectiveness of gender quotas around the world see: Gray 
2003, Baldez 2004, Wahlen 2007, and Dalerup 2004.  
77 In fact, in international efforts to assist in the democratization processes in Iraq and Afghanistan, 




Many men and women in the region did not hold women who filled political 
quotas under communism in high esteem, and instead considered those female 
politicians of the communist era to be “greedy, self-promoting, unintelligent, party 
props.” Based on interview data, these were labels more often attached to female 
Party members of the communist era, than to male politicians. The token nature of 
quota placement made female politicians more visible, and left many questioning 
their motives and qualifications. I heard comments noting the fact that these women 
did not earn their positions, that they were Party props or simply ambitious women 
that were in political life to advance themselves. A number of women I spoke with 
explained that they did not want to join politics during the early transition because of 
this negative association. “Life was hard enough, why would I want to fight that 
[image] as well?” explained one respondent.  
Communist gender quotas instilled an image of female political activity that was 
ridiculed throughout that period and beyond. A young woman in the region explained, 
“[w]omen who enter politics [in any form] are viewed as overly aggressive or bitchy 
and they have trouble advancing women’s rights or even joining with other women in 
politics.” She also mentioned the on-going association of female political activity 
with communism. Explaining that, “it is harder to get women involved” (Interviews 
2007-2008). As a result, gender quotas under communism, rather than encouraging 
female participation, have deterred women from the political arena after 1989. 
Women did not want to be political cogs, nor did they often readily embrace the now 
ingrained, negative image of political women (Interviews 2007-2008; Jaquette and 




Nepotism and Association 
Under communism women were also placed in political positions based on their 
past party activity, their associations, or family connections. Quotas provided a means 
through which to advance loyal women. However, nepotism and patronage also 
assured that a small group of women was promoted into ministerial posts or more 
influential party positions. The few women of the communist era who actually held 
any substantive power, reached those heights not usually on merit, but rather their 
relationships to those high up in the party. Clientelism and patronage were quite 
common for both sexes, but again because there were so few women in top-level 
positions, their gilded paths to power were often more visible. These women were not 
token in the sense that they had no power, in actuality they often had quite a bit, but 
they are token in the sense that they in many ways molded and presented a tangible 
image of what political women should be. The most famous examples are East 
Germany’s Margot Honecker, and Elena Ceausescu of Romania who both played 
important roles in their husbands’ administrations, and helped shape (along with the 
unpopular triple burden and gender quotas) the image of communist women and 
legacy of distrust that persisted long after these women left the scene in 1989.  
Margot Honecker was an active socialist early in life. By her early 20s, she had 
joined what would become East Germany’s Communist Party, the SED, and became 
romantically attached to one of the Party’s rising stars. After her marriage to Erich 
Honecker in 1953, she found her position improved and quickly moved up the ranks 
of the party. Despite the fact that she received no formal education after the 
elementary level, in 1963 Margot Honecker became Minister of Education, a position 




and 10th grade students to receive military training in school. She argued that this 
policy would better prepare students to defend the socialist state. The policy was 
highly contested by many sectors of the public, but Honecker refused to reconsider 
and the training was implemented (Kellerhof 2007).   
Mandatory military training in schools was unpopular, but it was her role in 
pushing the policy of forced adoption that solidified Margot Honecker as “East 
Germany’s most hated woman” (Kellerhof 2007).78 She implemented a policy of 
forcibly taking the children of political dissidents and giving them to “loyal” 
families.79 There are few records linking these children to their biological parents and 
due to the young age of many of the children, they have no memories of their former 
families. Often the children did not know they had been adopted, and when they did, 
they were simply told that their parents had abandoned them.80 As of 2009, there were 
still some 2,000 people seeking information regarding their missing children, taken 
more than 20 years earlier (Kimball 2009). For the women of East Germany, and 
those in the rest of the Communist Bloc, Margot Honecker represented a very 
striking, negative image of women in power. One eastern German woman I spoke to 
said, with noted disdain, that Margot Honecker “was no role model!” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 She was often called the Purple Dragon or Blue Eminence due to her oddly tinted white hair 
(Kellerhof 2007).  
79 In a famous case, Jutta Gallus was caught attempting to escape East Germany with her two 
daughters. She was imprisoned and the girls were taken from her. Upon her release she was deported 
to the West without the girls. While in this case the family of the father raised the children, Jutta was 
not allowed contact with them. Once in the West she lobbied politicians for her children and even took 
to protesting at Checkpoint Charlie (the border station) everyday for several years. She also joined with 
others in the West in search of their own children who had likewise been taken. Gallus was finally 
reunited with her then teenage daughters in 1988, after six years of separation (Verth 2006).  
80 This is a practice also used in Argentina during the Dirty War, in Australia with “the missing 




Farther east, another powerful woman advanced to the forefront of communist 
politics. From the outside, Elena Ceausescu looked like a Romanian national hero and 
the epitome of the strong political women that communist ideology sought to 
produce. However, Ceausescu’s national image was as a usurper, a fraud who gained 
positions she had not earned, encouraged pre-natal policies that “betrayed her sex,” 
and lived lavishly while average people suffered (Tismaneanu 2003; Interviews 2007-
2008). Even almost twenty years later, many I spoke with still describe her in 
extremely negative terms and claim that she was the puppeteer that “pulled the 
strings” of the Romanian dictatorship.   
Elena Ceausescu was born to a peasant family in rural Romania, and never 
received an education beyond the 4th grade. When she was a young woman, she 
moved to Bucharest where she became active in the Communist Party. Later, in 1957, 
she married Nicolai Ceausescu and with him rose up the ranks of the Party. Once her 
husband gained power, Elena made it her goal to advance herself and those closest to 
her. She especially pushed for the promotion of women she had befriended 
(Tismaneanu 2003).  
Ceausescu basked in her husband’s power and sought adulations for herself. 
Citizens were required to mark her birthday with festivities; the government 
commissioned plays and songs to celebrate her glory. For example, on one birthday 
she was described by journalist Ilie Purcaris as, “‘[t]he woman who today, side by 
side with the man at the country’s helm, is taking upon her shoulders – fragile as any 
woman’s shoulders but strong and unswerving through strong and un wavering 




devotion that none of our women has attained before’” (Ibid, 219). In another 
instance, a Party official read the following statement to the crowds of “admirers:” 
“‘The entire country highly appreciates the outstanding activity you carry out in the 
fields of science and technology…Your valuable work – crowned by some of the 
most prestigious scientific, cultural and educational institutions from around the 
world – represents, much to the pride of all our people, a greatly important 
contribution to ensure the flourishing of the nation…’” (Ibid, 214). The image painted 
was outwardly glowing. 
However, little of the visible adulation of Elena was genuine affection on the part 
of the citizenry. In fact, Elena represented a visible hypocrisy. The communists 
claimed to value education and to seek gender equality. Yet, here was a woman who 
received rewards for her scientific endeavors, which were completely contrived 
(Fisher 1998). For example, she was awarded scientific degrees and claimed 
authorship of scientific articles and findings despite having done none of the work. 
This contradiction was not lost on the citizenry (Interviews 2007-2008).  
In particular, many women felt betrayed by Elena, feeling that she was a traitor to 
her sex. One woman I spoke with in Bucharest called her a “witch.” Another woman 
in Cluj-Napoca described Elena Ceausescu as “evil.” The pre-natal policies enacted in 
her husband’s administration were ones that she championed and for which many still 
credit her with articulating and advancing. The intrusive nature of these policies, 
which required women to have quarterly gynecological exams at their places of 




among Romanian women; of the state, women in politics and other people in 
general.81  
Research suggests that she was not a true role model to Romanian women under 
communism, and in fact, the image of womanhood and particularly women in 
political life that she represented was quite negative. One woman in Bucharest stated 
emphatically, “Elena was not a woman, but an institution!” The hatred for her had the 
potential to unify women against her and the policies that she helped implement. Yet, 
dissent was not much of an option during the harsh Ceausescu regime, and ironically 
the negative image of politically active woman that Elena created, prevented this 
from happening after her death. This did not happen, in many ways due to a very real 
fear that the women who mobilized as women against her policies, would become 
associated with her.   
After Elena Ceausescu’s death in 1989, researchers and journalists addressed this 
“Elena Effect” which greatly skewed the image of strong women (Oprica 2008). The 
Elena Effect is credited with deterring many Romanian women from seeking political 
office, or even less formal political activities (LIP), during the initial transition years. 
An interviewee in Cluj-Napoca explained, “Elena provided a negative role model and 
served as a scapegoat, discouraging women from participation.” Another young 
Romanian woman said of earlier generations of women, “[t]hey didn’t have a model, 
but did see what wasn’t working (Elena) yet still they weren’t able to produce [their] 
own model.” Men did not want to deal with women who were ambitious, and women 
did not want to be associated with the negative image of Elena and other political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 This is hauntingly depicted in the 2007 Romanian film 4 Luni, 3 Saptamini, 2 Zile (4 Months, 3 
Weeks, 2 Days) directed by Cristian Mungiu. The film won the acclaimed Palm d’Or at the Cannes 




women. The Elena effect was especially significant during the early transition, though 
it remains an obstacle for Romanian woman in political life today. One woman I 
spoke with, who recently found employment in a government Ministry, explained that 
to this day, the few politically active women in the country, such as herself, must 
often contend with the negative image of Elena. This was an obstacle she faced in her 
own career and a comparison that even this successful woman admitted she “ran 
from” for many years. 
Persistent Negative Image of Political Women 
From the demands of the triple burden, the implementation of symbolic gender 
quotas, and the nepotistic practice of putting wives and sisters in important party 
positions, the communists created a formalized female tokenism and a corresponding 
skepticism of policies and practices claiming to advance women.82 For forty years 
under communism, policies sought to place a number of women in political life in 
Eastern and Central Europe. Because officials mandated these policies from above, 
and were often manipulated by and associated with the communist party, they altered 
the region’s image of the visible, politically active woman. Marin (1997) asserted that 
political women in the communist era were more hated by the public and were 
actually considered more dangerous. Due to their numbers, they were also more 
noticed. The image associated with Honecker, Ceausescu and other women in 
political life affected women’s perceptions of political participation, their trust in 
government, and their willingness to become involved once given the choice. In many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 It is interesting to note that there is a difference in perception about gender quotas and those sorts of 
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became reliant upon. Women I spoke with looked very negatively on the placement policies, yet saw 
the social programs as more of an obligation of the state. Childcare for example, was something that 
the state should provide for mothers. Even today, there is a sense that the state should include those 




ways, men also reacted to the image of political women of the communist era. 
However, while sexist attitudes have been an additional barrier to female 
participation, it would be a misinterpretation to suggest that women failed to 
participate politically during the transition due to sexism against women. In large 
part, women made these determinations for themselves based on their experiences 
under communism and during the early transition.  
Networks & Trust 
As mentioned, the Communist Party attempted to monitor and control almost 
every aspect of daily life. The result was a genuine fear of the state and its Party 
apparatus that could easily fire someone without cause or flag someone’s educational 
record that would preclude certain employment opportunities. The state was able to 
accomplish this bureaucratic feat by utilizing, via incentive and threat, average 
citizens. For example, officials estimate that as many as 500,000 East German 
citizens were informants for the Stasi (Koehler 2000, 9). This situation meant there 
was very little trust among the general population.  
The only area where there was opportunity for personal expression, individuality 
and security was the private sphere: and even that was not always beyond the reach of 
state influence. True explained that [b]ecause possibilities of exercising influence in 
an outward direction – in the public sphere – no longer existed, people diverted more 
of their energy in the direction of the least resistance, that is, in the private sphere” 
(2003, 34). In an attempt to protect themselves citizens in communist Europe often 
rallied around the private sphere, creating very small groups that they relied upon. 
Women were often at the center of these networks “[b]ecause women were 




representation of this sphere and the politics within it” (True 2003, 50). Small, close-
knit networks of the communist era represent a more informal institutional practice of 
communism, one that continued into and was reinforced during the transition period. 
An older woman in Prague echoed other comments I heard, explaining that, “close 
networks of trust were, and to many remain, important.” Whereas once these 
networks were a means of getting material items or preventing spying by the many 
paid informants, after 1989 for women of the region in particular, they were an arena 
of familiarity, comfort and stability.  
Networks as Survival Strategies 
Networks during communist times were a means to get goods, to remain secure 
and to build small social communities (Heinen 1997; Howard 2003). These networks 
functioned as “…an atomized society, one in which trust [was] confined to small 
local pockets of interaction” (Sapsford and Abbott 2006, 62). Such social strategies 
were apparent across the region as Cermáková pointed out, “[o]ver the years of 
communist rule, social structures underwent a certain degree of homogenization” 
(1995, 75).  
Howard (2003) explains that there were two types of networks that developed out 
of the communist institutional structure. There were what Howard refers to as family 
networks, comprised of trusted family members and very close friends. Given that the 
state controlled much of the public lives of its citizens, private relations became 
especially important, as it is only people in those networks that can be trusted. One 
woman recalled that, “[l]ittle routines were very helpful in former times.” People saw 
“…the family as a refuge…as the only space permitting the development of personal 




opportunistic or service networks (Howard 2003). These developed out of material 
want and economic scarcity. Given the existence of long lines (especially during the 
1980s) and limited goods, it was always helpful to have a network of people from 
whom you could get services or special consideration. If a grocery clerk was part of 
your service network, he might keep some butter or sugar off the shelves for you to 
purchase without having to wait in line and potentially go without. Clearly, there 
were times when the two types of networks overlapped (Howard 2003, 28). It is also 
important to point out that there were times where personal networks might mobilize, 
such as in times of dissent, though they always remained rather insular. 
Considering the threat that strangers and potential spies played in communist 
times, it is not surprising that people in the region remain rather skeptical of those 
they do not know. In fact, the distrust runs so deep that I was told more than once, 
that these many years later I was only being given an interview due to references 
from contacts I had previously made. As I was told by a Czech interviewee, “[t]here 
is a long tradition of keeping the private, private.” People continue to rely on these 
close networks and maintain distance from those that are not personally connected.  
There is a strong understanding throughout the region that people mind their own 
business; there is a legacy of taking care of one’s own (Nash 2006). An American 
scholar I interviewed who lived in Prague during the early 1990s explained a situation 
in which she witnessed a young woman who was standing too close to a streetcar 
when it passed.83 The woman’s backpack got caught on a rod on the tram, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 This woman moved to Prague early on during the transition. Although she did not experience the 
Velvet Revolution, she did witness first hand what the city looked like during the 1990s. She was a 
reporter at that time, paying particular attention to what was happening in the city. She was 




propelled the young woman off the ground, spun her around, and threw her to the 
sidewalk. What so startled the professor I spoke with was that the streetcar did not 
stop, nor did anyone on the crowded street help the dying woman. When she relayed 
the story to her Czech friends, they were sad for the young woman who died, but did 
not find it odd that no one stopped to offer assistance. In a society that monitored the 
activities of its citizens, even the simple act of stopping to help an injured person 
could lead to unwanted attention or suspicion. Citizens avoided any potential 
interaction with government officials, because it could lead to greater awareness of a 
person’s daily activities, a concern that carried over from communist times.     
A lack of trust and a heavy reliance on family networks in particular, operated as 
a survival technique for citizens in the entire region. This was true throughout the 
communist period, but became more significant at certain times, such as instances of 
government crackdown. For example, following the early successes of the Polish 
Solidarity movement, the government sought to end the union’s momentum and 
instituted curfews and several new restrictions on the movements and 
communications of the Polish citizenry. After Poland was placed under Martial Law 
in 1981, citizens had to be even more careful about whom they talked with and where 
they went. The protection of family networks, as in any time of crisis, dissent or war, 
therefore, was extremely important. A middle-aged woman I spoke with in Poland 
acknowledged that “[i]n Poland, people think of self and family, not of common 
good. [This] comes from communism” This was also quite evident in Romania. Of all 
the countries in communist Europe, attempts by the Romanian government to breach 




most aggressive. This meant that family and service networks were, by necessity, 
especially close and guarded. This informal institution, networks, did not disappear 
when the Berlin Wall fell, and became even more ingrained and took on slightly 
different roles during the uncertainties of the early transition period. People, 
especially women, maintained this familiar and “safe” informal institutional practice.  
Family, Women and the Private Sphere 
Family, and to a significant degree service networks, centered on the private 
sphere and hence around the lives of women (Day 1999). Women often determined 
who was in the network and how it would function. The special function of the 
private sphere as one of the few areas somewhat guarded from state interference, 
further heightened women’s roles in the home and family. Therefore during and after 
communism, family and service networks were especially relevant for the region’s 
women. Women were in charge of taking care of the family including children, 
parents, and in-laws. The private sphere was the only place where people could retain 
their identities and where women could protect and educate their children and 
families (Marin 1997). One women interviewed explained, “the role of mother creates 
stability – women keep things together” Additionally, women did almost all of the 
household chores, including the shopping. It was women who had to find the means 
to get what was left of butter at the market, or who had to find shirts and pants for 
their family members to wear. Women were the ones that got medicine for their 
children’s maladies and took the elderly to their doctor’s appointments. Therefore, 
women were crucial, and often the primary actors within both family and service 




The importance of networks, and women’s position within them, particularly 
older women, was expounded by the living arrangements of communist times. Not 
only did many families of East and Central Europe retain close ties to their families, 
but they also often resided under a single roof. This was not always simply a cultural 
disposition to retain a multi-generational home, but rather an economic necessity 
given the dearth of homes and apartments.84 Children would wait years to get their 
own apartments, and more often than not would stay at home or move in with in-
laws. It was not uncommon to have three generations sharing a two or three bedroom 
apartment (Drakulic 1991). This closeness and connectedness of families during this 
home, further acted to maintain women’s position within the private sphere and the 
networks that came to characterize social interaction during the communist era. 
Network Persistence 
The need for service networks has diminished somewhat with the introduction of 
liberal capitalism and the eventual influx of goods, although past patterns of bartering 
and bribery continue to some degree in the new markets (Interviews 2007-2008). 
Although service networks have lost some importance, there remains a comfort with 
the family networks and a general distrust of those outside one’s social group. Having 
developed a means of economic and political security during communism, the family 
networks in particular evolved into an area of stability during the uncertain times of 
the early transition. “That is how you are trained in this part of the world,” Drakulic 
wrote. “[N]ot to believe that change is possible. You are trained to fear change, so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 In most cases, the state controlled the sale of homes or apartments. In some cases, such as Romania, 
apartments were given to families at minimal cost, but there was often a very long wait, sometimes 
many years for an apartment. Families would often trade in one size apartment for another, always 
monitored by the state apparatus. Drakulic (1991) explains that in many instances, apartments would 
be shared to provide room for another family, often one chosen by the state, and kitchens and 




that when change eventually begins to take place, you are suspicious, afraid because 
every change you ever experienced was always for the worse” (1991, xiii). The fear 
that communist governance had instilled in the population did not simply disappear in 
1989; while state intrusion and heavy-handedness disappeared new anxieties, 
particularly economic anxieties set in. As a Romanian women recalled, “under 
communism the path was dictated and it was hard to divert from that path. When 
things opened up, it was hard to know which way to go.” Obviously, women’s paths 
were not as determined as this woman seems to indicate. However, her point that 
there was at least an illusion of stability, (guarantees of employment, housing, 
childcare options) existed. With this structural instability, old survival tactics were 
employed to deal with the new situation. The strength of the family network was one 
such strategy that remained and took on new functions during the transition.  
Theory:  
The reaction of women in the region follows theoretical reasoning. Specifically, 
theory suggests that institutions and institutional patterns matter. Even when formal 
institutions, such as the policy of placing women in political positions, disappeared, 
the reaction to the practice can continue or evolve under new structural arrangements. 
On the other hand, despite the alteration, and in this case rejection of formal 
institutional policies, people (women in this case) tend to hold onto informal 
institutional practices, such as the discussed family networks, to guide them through 
uncertain times. Here I look at the concept of institutions and explore the theoretical 








Institutions are formal and informal structuring devices that direct and constrain 
action. They are the rules and boundaries that dictate proper behavior (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004; Johnson 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). In the formal sense, 
institutions might be the official ministries of government, electoral systems, or the 
programs of a welfare state. These guidelines and structures are clearly written down 
and spelled out, though they may not always function effectively. Informal 
institutions are less official practices that engrain and develop over time. These are 
“… socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). 
They include an expectation of certain actions and responses. Often, informal 
institutions will develop to bolster formal institutions for enhanced effectiveness.85 In 
some cases, informal institutions might become especially beneficial and develop into 
a more formal practice. In authoritarian systems or in cases where state action is 
ineffective, informal institutions often develop as a substitute for governing 
institutions or as an effort to compete against formal systems (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004, 228-229). The unofficial, yet consistent, activities of citizens in communist 
Europe, such as grafting at work or bribery of officials fall within this classification.  
In exploring informal institutions, it is important to distinguish them from 
inconsistent behaviors in reaction to the inefficiencies of weak states. Informal 
institutions are also different from the closely related concept of cultural norms. In 
this instance, Helmke and Levitsky point out that an informal institution relies on 
“shared expectations,” whereas cultural norms center on “shared values” (2004, 728). 
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Finally, North (1990) advises focusing on the “rules” as opposed to the “players” of 
the game to maintain a distinction between informal institutional practices and 
informal organizations. Although all institutions are somewhat resilient to change, 
informal institutions, especially substitutive ones that are reactionary in nature, are 
especially resistant, even in instances when the formal institutions they are reacting to 
are altered (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).   
Early Life Socialization 
Because the legacy of distrust, and the formal and informal institutions associated 
with it, develop from experience through a process or socialization and learning, it is 
important to understand something about the learning process. In a number of 
academic disciplines, scholars have sought to understand social learning. Research 
has found that childhood experiences are important indicators for how we act as 
adults. Children develop values and learn norms and ideas early in life. These views 
are reinforced as we mature (Hayward and Gorman 2005; Denzin 2010 [1977]).  
It has been determined that political activity and awareness at a young age fosters 
later involvement. Research also shows that we often take on the values of our 
parents and that to some extent their experiences influence us as well (Sears and 
Valentino 1997; Orum et al 1974). In fact, studies in the United States have long 
shown that children often develop the same political leanings as their parents. Early 
socialization is not just important because it influences our political outlook, but also 
because it is rather consistent and inflexible. As Pierson explains, “[o]nce established, 
basic outlooks on politics, ranging from ideologies to understandings of particular 
aspects of governments or orientations toward political groups or parties, are 




people self-categorize their ideological position, but also about how they feel about 
government. In this regard, Mishler and Rose present a lifetime learning model in 
which trust in government develops at an early age and is “reinforced or challenged 
by subsequent experiences” (Mishler and Rose 1997, 434). Our overall political 
worldview, therefore, forms early and stays relatively stable throughout the life cycle.  
While new rules and structures can rather quickly eliminate formal institutions in 
times of change, the coping norms that we develop in childhood often remain with us. 
Similarly, the informal institutions followed by our parents, are relevant in our lives 
as well. For forty years, the communist system of Eastern and Central Europe played 
a central role in the political socialization of those populations.  
Theory also suggests that there is a connection between legacy and political 
participation or civic involvement. Political Scientist Robert Putnam (1993) famously 
explored civic participation and faith in government as they relate to government 
effectiveness during a time of regional governmental restructuring in Italy.86 Putnam 
explained that civic participation fosters norms of reciprocity and trust resulting in a 
self-reinforcing equilibrium or virtuous cycle. The result of such a cycle is a wealth of 
social capital and efficacy in self and in government that results in high levels of 
government effectiveness. A legacy of positive interaction has long-ranging effects 
and can sustain citizens through difficult times. Putnam describes this in Northern 
Italy where citizens tend to be politically active and their regional governments tend 
to be responsive. On the other hand, Putnam explains that the opposite occurred in 
Southern Italy where a lack of participation correlates with deepening norms of 
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distrust and corruption, creating a vicious cycle of mistrust. Given this situation in 
Southern Italy, citizens have developed survival techniques and have come to rely in 
large part on informal institutions, namely the Mafia, for needs that the government is 
not fulfilling. A vicious cycle can be particularly difficult to bring to an end despite 
changes in formal institutions. However, over time, new norms and increased civic 
participation can turn a vicious into a virtuous cycle. 
Putnam’s observations in Southern Italy are relevant to an examination of female 
political participation in post-communist Europe. After 40 years of authoritarian and 
highly invasive governance, a vicious cycle of distrust evolved. Despite changes to 
the formal structures of the state and the economy, a lack of trust remained, and the 
survival strategies citizens relied upon through the era of communist rule persisted 
with some alteration. During the initial transitions period, this link between civic-ness 
or political participation and the common good was not apparent. This is perhaps 
most evident when Drakulic (1991) described the lack of good will and “ownership” 
of common space that characterized the communist era. People, in general, did not 
feel a need to keep their streets and parks clean and with the consequences of helping 
potentially detrimental, little was done.  
Conclusion: 
Utilizing tokenism (the result of formal institutional practices) and networks (an 
informal institution); I have argued that both formal and informal institutions created 
a legacy of fear and distrust after communism that uniquely effected the region’s 
women and their willingness to take part in low intensity political participation. The 
formal institutions and structures associated with communism were quickly 




This was especially the case with regard to gender quotas and political equality 
policies that contributed to female tokenism.87 These policies resulted in suspicion 
during the communist era, creating an image of female political activity that was 
extremely negative. The result was a continued rejection of that image after 1989 and 
a persistent distrust of the state and in particular state policies claiming to benefit 
women as a group. Not wanting to be associated with this image, nor feeling trustful 
that those in power would work to advance their concerns, in general women in the 
region have abstained from LIP.  
On the other hand, a number of informal institutions, the ways in which the 
average citizens (specifically women) conducted their daily lives, their coping 
strategies and methods of survival, persisted for many women after communism, 
though taking on new purpose.88 Networks evolved in part, due to fear of the state 
and of other citizens. The networks carried over into the post-communist era as some 
of the fear experienced earlier did not automatically disappear. Also, for women who 
came to dominate these networks, after communism they altered some in purpose to 
provide stability and control over the lives of women and their children during 
uncertain times. This internalized inward-looking proclivity aspect of the communist 
legacy, also contributes to a lack of desire by women in the region to be politically 
active 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Some aspects of female tokenism, specifically more informal practices of nepotism and patronage, 
have also persisted, though generally to bolster men in politics rather than women. However, formal 
institutions were quickly eliminated.  
88 For example, we know that informal institutional practices such as bartering and bribery developed 






Institutionalized Women’s Movements 
 
Introduction: 
In the spring of 2008, I sat in Dana Nemcova’s Prague apartment talking about 
her experiences living under communism. This was the same apartment that Dana had 
shared with her husband and their seven children. Mrs. Nemcova was one of a group 
of Czech and Slovak women who joined the dissident movement of the 1970s and 
1980s.89 She was a member of VONS, a signatory of Charter 77, and she served as a 
spokesperson for the Charter 77 organization. Mrs. Nemcova also paid heavily for her 
participation with jail time, the demotion of her children’s educational opportunities, 
and intensive interrogation. Despite the obstacles, she continued to support the 
Czechoslovakian dissident movement. Given her activist experience, I wondered why 
she and women like her did not organize in greater numbers, as citizens but 
particularly as women, to promote their interests during the initial transition away 
from communism. As she explained, under the old system there was no women’s 
movement and no thought of women’s rights. “It didn’t really cross our minds,” she 
said. “We didn’t think in terms of gender, we thought in terms of us against them (the 
state).” Women across the post-communist region echoed these comments 
(Interviews 2008). Yet once regime change came, and the unifying force of state 
oppression diminished, few women mobilized as citizens and even fewer as women.  
One known means of facilitating female political participation is through forums 
that instill female efficacy and empowerment. A women’s movement is one the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Her incarceration and interrogation while she was pregnant was included in one of the official 
documents of Charter 77, which were submitted to the government as the group attempted to point out 




greatest creators of female efficacy and therefore can serves as a mechanism for 
political participation. However, due to the very structure of communist governance, 
few ECE countries saw the development of such a movement, or even the women’s 
groups that make up a movement, before 1989. Without this basis, fewer women were 
politically active than might have been had a women’s movement been in place to 
provide an institutional basis for female participation after communism.  
The dramatic changes resulting from the end of communism created opportunity 
for the development of new political and economic structures and for the 
empowerment of the average citizen. As mentioned, however, even with new 
freedoms and opportunities after 1989 women did not act in large numbers to fill the 
political space. In this chapter, I argue that an important component of low LIP during 
the early transition years (along with the communist legacy and gendered job 
displacement) was the fragility of a women’s movement in much of the region. 
Where mobilization did occur under communism, primarily in the form of dissident 
organizations, issues pertinent to women were not specifically addressed. A women’s 
movement could have provided women the institutionalized structure from which to 
mobilize, a venue for the airing of grievances and an avenue for gender-based 
efficacy. Without such an organization, there was little direction and positive 
institutional memory around which women could coalesce.90 Therefore, the lack of or 
weakness of an institutionalized women’s movement in most countries in the region 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 As explained in Chapter 1, a women’s movement is often made up of a number of women’s groups 
or organizations that pool and network together to eventually unify around a couple of significant 
issues and become a women’s movement. Such a movement is institutionalized when it has existed for 
a period of time so that people give it some legitimacy and expect it to persist into the future. It also 
generally means that a degree of professionalization among leaders in the movement and their workers 




meant there were few means of mobilizing women and enhancing their efficacy that 
would have encouraged greater female LIP after communism.91 
 
In addressing the lack of an institutionalized women’s movement in three of my 
cases (the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania), I contend that an us-versus-them 
mentality against the state resulted, which bridged gender differences unifying men 
and women.92 Additionally, I argue that communist gender dictates often obscured 
genuine gender concerns and instead created a negative association, first with 
women’s rights and bourgeoisie attitudes and then with such rights and communist 
governance. Essentially, communist doctrine claimed to have answered the so-called 
“women’s question,” removing gender issue space and influencing the ability for a 
women’s movement to develop.  






During Communist Era 
Level of Female 




Yes No Moderate 
GDR Yes Yes High 
Poland Yes No Low 
Romania Yes No Low 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 One other way of doing so is via labor force participation. However, the transition away from 
authoritarianism resulted in steep cuts in jobs traditionally held by women, thus also limiting the role 
of labor force participation for the empowerment of women (see Chapter 6).  
92 For a larger discussion of “institutions” see Chapter 4 of this manuscript. Briefly, here the term 
“institutionalized” refers to a set of either formal or informal acknowledged rules and expectations that 
constrain action. An institutionalized women’s movement would mean that there was some form of 





Of the four cases under investigation, East Germany is unusual in that women 
organized along gender lines in the later years of the GDR. In the 1980s, a small-scale 
women’s movement encompassed a number of groups, which focused specifically on 
the position of women in society (Ferree 1994). The existence of the East German 
women’s movement correlates with higher LIP among GDR women after 1989. The 
previous existence of a women’s movement, as will be evidenced toward the end of 
this chapter, allowed for a continuity of female leaders and though the groups took 
different forms after communism, women previously involved continued to join 
together to face some of the challenges of the post-communist transition.93  
In Poland and the Czech Republic, and to a much lesser degree Romania, women 
joined dissident organizations and fought alongside men to advance human rights. 
However, there was little in the three countries that classified as a stable or 
institutionalized women’s movement. In examining the NBL, it is clear that the 
country exhibited characteristics of both the communist legacy of distrust (Chapter 4) 
and certainly gendered job displacement (Chapter 6). However, I argue here that due 
to the development and growing institutionalization of a women’s movement in the 
GDR during the 1980s, the country’s women had a basis upon which to organize and 
mobilize as women during and after 1989. This accounts for the fact that women of 
the NBL displayed markedly higher rates of female LIP than their neighbors.   
In the following sections, I provide a definition of what constitutes a women’s 
movement. I also provide the theoretical underpinnings relating the existence of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 This refers to the fact that the West and East German women’s movements had some difficulty in 
finding common ground and determining how they might best operate to meet their desired goals. The 




woman’s movement to female political participation. I then explore the factors, 
specifically the us-versus-them mentality and communist doctrine, which hindered 
the development of such a movement in Czechoslovakia, Romanian and Poland. 
From there, I address the GDR’s women’s movement; the positive linkages between 
such a movement and female LIP are evident. In the end, I conclude that the absence 
or presence of a women’s movement is a strong factor for explaining female LIP in 
post-communist Europe after 1989.94  
Lack of Women’s Movements in Communist Europe  
Defining a Women’s Movement 
A social movement, be it for the advancement of women or other segments of 
society, is one of those things that is often known when seen, but difficult to define. 
Dalerup describes a social movement as “conscious, collective activity to promote 
social change, with some degree of organization and with the commitment and active 
participation of members or activities as its main resource” (Dalerup 1986, 218).  
Today, most still examine the women’s movement as a sub-category of social 
movements (Beckwith 2005; Ray and Kertweg 1999). Ray and Kertweg, for example, 
broadly define a woman’s movement as “…the range of activities in which women 
engage to better the circumstances of their lives” (1999, 48). The key components of 
a women’s movement include a wide network, group activities that seek to protect or 
promote the position of women, and the ability to mobilize groups and members 
around issue areas. McBride and Mazur, draw a more narrow classification, 
describing a women’s movement as “…collective action by women organizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 As will be seen in Chapter 6, though women’s LIP in the Czech Republic was affected by the lack of 
a women’s movement during the communist era, the minimal gendered job displacement experienced 




explicitly as women presenting claims in public life based on gendered identities as 
women” (McBride and Mazur 2010, 226).  
In some cases, the terms “women’s movement” and “feminist movement” are 
interchangeable. However, it is best to address a feminist movement as one type of 
women’s movement because the two concepts do not necessarily denote the same 
thing (Beckwith 2005). McBride and Mazur claim that a feminist movement has the 
“goal of changing the position of women in society and politics.” Actors in it seek “to 
challenge and change women’s subordination to men” and seek to “challenge and 
change the structures of gender-based hierarchies” (McBride and Mazur 2010, 236). 
On the other hand, a woman’s movement is a situation where women join as women 
to improve their lives and give voice to their concerns (McBride and Mazur 2010; 
Ray and Kertweg 1999). It is the more encompassing term, “women’s movement” 
that is the focus here.  
I rely on McBride and Mazur’s definition of gendered discourse by women 
representing women throughout this chapter because it is narrow enough to capture 
activity that is specifically gendered with a goal beyond simply gathering as women, 
yet broad enough to include potential cultural differences. To uncover evidence of a 
women’s movement in the four case countries, I rely on the indicators provided in 
McBride and Mazur’s classification. When analyzing discourse they state that it must 
show “identity with women as a group,” in terms that are “clearly and overtly 
gendered,” and on the terms of “women representing women as women.” They 
further define collective activities as formal and informal organizations apart from the 




voluntary and absent external coercion (McBride and Mazur 2010). If such evidence 
is found, the level of adherence and general recognition of legitimacy of such 
discourse gives an indication of strength and institutionalization.  
East European Regional Experience  
During the communist era, there was no enduring (institutionalized) movement 
separate from the state, with the exception of the GDR, that actively mobilized 
women to advance their concerns as women. While pockets of women in various 
countries attempted to organize as women, nothing became engrained. For example, 
in the early 1960s women in Czechoslovakia mobilized briefly to end, what some 
considered, an over-reliance on overnight nurseries. In the same decade in Romania 
women wrote letters to protest Ceausescu’s abortion ban. These had the potential to 
develop into organizations and even to lead to a women’s movement. However, these 
did not cause great enough attention to supersede the threat of state retaliation or the 
focus on issue of human (rather than women’s) rights to develop into a wider 
women’s movement. In both of these cases, much of the gendered opposition was 
done via very loosely organized letter writing, with no real organization of women 
that could have led to a greater realization of joint female concerns. In the end, these 
and other small instances were short lived and women returned to their daily 
activities.   
There were some organizations of women that claimed to represent women’s 
concerns, however these were controlled by the state and therefore would not classify 
as part of a women’s movement (see next section). With few exceptions, the political, 
economic and social structures of East European countries under communism did not 




movement, many of the women of Eastern and Central Europe were without a venue 
for their gendered concerns. There were few resources dedicated solely to the 
advancement of women’s issues, nor was there a progression of female leaders who 
advocated for women over time (Jacquette and Wolchick 1998). Therefore, a crucial 
entity of female efficacy creation was missing in many countries of the region prior to 
the transition. 
Studies have shown that it is easier to redefine the mission of an organization or 
movement rather than to create a new one (Keohane 1984). In post-communist 
Europe, the general lack of a women’s movement meant there was no institutional 
structure in place that could have adapted to women’s post-1989 challenges. 
Additionally, there was a lack of experience fighting for gender rights and for female 
equality. This makes sense from a historical institutionalist lens (see Chapter 1). As 
people develop organizations with a specific goal and purpose in mind, they chose an 
initial path and structure. This creates the framework upon which an organization or 
broader movement exists. As new issues, concerns and goals arise, this institutional 
framework becomes a reference point for additional choices and paths. If it is to be 
persistent, the building blocks must be sturdy, yet flexible enough to adapt to 
changing situations. There were likely those who were inclined to stand up for greater 
attention to gender concerns in the early transition years, but no such venue to air 
their gendered grievances existed, nor were the institutions in place that could have 
harnessed female potential at a pivotal time. A Polish woman who has been involved 
in one of the early, now defunct, women’s organizations in the early 1990s, lamented 




not have enough confidence that they could make a difference or enough experience 
organizing “from which to grow” (Interviews 2007-2008).  
Many of the rights granted communist women, such as employment and social 
protection, were “given” from above  (O’Connor 1993; Hašková 2005). The historical 
lack of fighting for equality from below meant that women in the post-communist 
transition did not have many past experiences to draw upon, nor perhaps the 
inclination to think that such rights and guarantees would be rescinded after 1989 
(Offe 1997; Interviews 2007-2008). The result contributes to the low levels of female 
LIP in much of the ECE region. Hašková and Křížková explain that, “[i]n the first 
half of the 1990s, … women’s civic groups lacked experience, expertise, wider 
recognition, and contact with state bodies, politicians and other social actors” (2008, 
156). Part of the problem was simply a lack of organizational skills, but 
accompanying that, many I spoke with indicated that they just did not feel like they 
knew what they were doing and many quickly came to think that their actions were 
not making a significant difference. As female friendly social policies retrenched 
during the initial transitions period, women I spoke with, said it was more difficult to 
think that mobilization made an impact (Interviews 2007-2008).  
With the exception of East Germany, there is no evidence to suggest that an 
institutionalized woman’s movement existed during the communist era in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Though, as elsewhere in Europe and North America, women’s 
movements were developing in the ECE region before World War II, the introduction 
of communism halted those efforts and dismantled remnants of their existence for 




through the manipulation of communist doctrine and by way of the intrusive nature of 
communist governance that united citizens against the State, hence diminishing social 
cleavages, such as gender, that might have led to the creation of women’s movements 
and a corresponding inclination for political participation after 1989.  
Theoretical Implications of a Women’s Movement:  
A women’s movement can have direct implications for women’s political 
participation. Theory based on research conducted around the world, suggests that the 
existence of a women’s movement is often linked to the desire of women to be 
politically active, especially in democratic societies. Nelson and Chowdhury (1994) 
explain that women’s organizations often determine the degree to which women 
participate in political life. After all, a women’s movement is one means by which to 
fill the space between the home and the government – sometimes called the realm of 
civil society (Eihorn and Sever 2003). In fact Waylen (2007) argues that a women’s 
movement (coalition) is specifically needed to advance women’s issues during a 
transition period. She explains, “[i]t is impossible to envisage positive gender 
outcomes without the efforts of an organized women’s movement” (Waylen 2007, 
523). This occurs because women’s organizations provide a foundation for 
mobilization. They also provide valuable financial and social resources as well as 
female leadership. Women’s organizations also actively pursue the political 
engagement of women, which studies indicate has been rather successful. For 
example, in her investigation of women’s participation in Ghana, Fallon (2003) 
discovered that when members of a women’s organization contacted women those 




also found that women, more than men, need to be recruited and asked for their 
participation (Ibid). A women’s movement can serve this function.  
The Value of a Woman’s Movement 
During the later part of the 21st century, women in countries around the world 
pushed to have their voices heard in times of transition. In perceived conservative 
countries like Spain and South Korea, women fought to make changes that would 
better their newly democratic lives.95 Out of these struggles came milestone 
legislation promoting equal wages, fighting gender discrimination, and assuring 
representation through gender quotas. Around the world, women who fought for these 
changes saw democratization as an opportunity for greater gender equality (Baldez 
2003, Rakowski 2003). 
Specifically examining the situation in Latin America, Baldez (2003) determined 
that one of the significant reasons women rose up during Latin America’s Third 
Wave transitions, was because prior to regime change, an active and institutionalized 
women’s movement existed. A degree of institutionalization was in place that could 
be built upon and mobilized when opportunities presented. Therefore, when space 
opened during the times of political transitions in the region, it was a matter of 
mobilizing the various women’s organizations to push for greater change. What is 
particularly remarkable is that in many of these cases, women did not conform to 
North American and Western European feminist ideas rather they organized on their 
own terms – often as mothers. In South America women’s organizations pushed for 
enhanced rights and protections, yet they did so in a way that respected the idea of 
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be more religiously grounded or socially conservative. Countries like South Korea and Spain are not 




womanhood from their perspective. Hence traditional values were not a barrier to 
these women (Baldez 2004; Gray 2003).  
A women’s movement provides a known venue for the airing of grievances. With 
an established women’s movement, generally encompassing a number of women’s 
organizations, there is an avenue for women’s concerns. Women know of various 
groups that specifically seek to address issues relevant to the female population, 
which they can seek out for assistance. This helps alleviate feelings of isolation and 
expands the voice and concerns of women beyond the private sphere. The 
institutionalization of the movement, its existence and organization, means that the 
venue is known and legitimate. It also provides a collection of people that can be 
mobilized when necessary. 
The resources, both financial and intellectual, that a women’s movement gathers 
are also significant. Intellectual resources, such as experience organizing, advocating 
and pushing governments to change can be learned when one is part of such a 
movement. Women gain knowledge of how to mobilize as women and for women, as 
well as the tactics that are most effective. This experience is invaluable during times 
of upheaval or when opportunity structures change and greater activity is possible. 
Resources also include internal networks of women that provide able bodies to 
mobilize and spread communications. Additionally, international network resources 
allow women’s organizations to learn from groups around the world, to disseminate 
information abroad, and to solicit foreign financial aid for programs and other 
activities. The existence of a women’s movement can provide these resources and 




the movement negatively affects female efficacy and can, and in many cases did, lead 
to limited overall female political participation and low LIP.  
Beyond providing institutionalization and resources, developing skills is also a 
means of efficacy creation for women. This is perhaps especially the case in more 
traditional societies where women might not learn organizational or leadership skills 
that can prove beneficial in other areas of their lives. The efficacy creating potential 
provided by a women’s movement may lead to continuing participation with 
organizations of women, but also in the public realm in general. Research suggests 
that activists are more likely to stay involved throughout their lifetime (Jaquette 
1994). There is a clear correlation between women who participate in the 
organizations that make up the women’s movement and female political participation 
at the grassroots. For example, Jaquette discovered researching in Latin America that, 
“[w]omen in movements often speak of how their participation has changed their 
lives, expanded their awareness of the unjust structures of society, and given them 
new self-esteem – even when their involvement brings them into conflict with 
husbands, children, and other family members” (Jaquette 1994, 225).  
 “Us versus Them”  
Under an oppressive regime, people often see the joint suffering inflicted by the 
state. In communist Europe, many citizens knew that they and those around them 
were mistreated. They were the victimized “us” and the state and the Communist 
Party was the “them” inflicting injustices on the population. The common enemy 
united the citizenry. In this way, communism did create a sense of equality among the 
population. It was an equality of “have nots” and of suffering. The result was a 




networks for fear of state action or incursion (see Chapter 4). Several people I spoke 
with in the region stated that there was a realization fairly early on that all people, 
men and women, were mistreated in the communist system.  
This meant that although women did experience communism in ways differently 
then men, and had concerns that were specific to their sex (maintaining the double or 
even triple burden for example), they tended not to see or at least not to bring 
attention to those differences. As noted Czech sociologist Jirina Siklova phrased it, 
“[a]s women we were suppressed not by men as such, but by a political system that 
lacked distinct sexual characteristics” (1996, 77). This is not to say that racism and 
sexism did not exist, assuredly they did, but communism masked these issues due to 
the larger concerns of material want and political oppression (Interviews 2007-2008; 
Huland 2001). In her discussions with women across the region in 1990, Drakulic 
noted, “[i] realized we don’t blame men easily, as if we don’t have the heart to do so 
even if it would be good for our self-esteem” (109). She continued, “[i]t is hard to see 
them as an opposite force, men as a gender, hard to confront them as enemies. 
Perhaps because everyone’s identity is denied. We want to see them as persons, not as 
a group, or a category, or a mass” (Drakulic 1991, 111).  
The unifying effects of a “common enemy,” are well articulated (e.g. Olson 1966; 
Axelrod 1988). In situations where people perceive a common threat, citizens often 
overlook differences that might separate groups, people, or countries. This can make 
it difficult to mobilize people according to class, race or gender because these 
cleavages are blurred. For many in communist Europe, the State served the function 




region during the communist era (organizational dissent waxed and waned throughout 
the decades) centered on issues that affected all citizens. The struggle was one of 
human rights where women’s rights seldom entered the conversation. People 
perceived the advancement of women’s rights as frivolous, considering that 
oppression affected all people in these societies.  
Women in many ways did not have the luxury to think of their concerns or to 
organize as women. Those who were active, in the dissident movement for example, 
seldom thought about how the system specifically hurt them as women. In Poland, 
Romania and the Czech Republic, women old enough to remember those times, stated 
without fail, “we didn’t think in those terms,” or “we were part of something larger 
than ourselves.” Speaking about her activities in the underground culture, Siklova 
commented that, “[w]e women simply did things in cooperation with men as a sort of 
voluntary duty. We did not know anything about feminism” (Siklova 2000, 266). 
Another former dissident explained that men were being hurt and mistreated as well, 
and in many cases, she claimed, “emasculated” and “castrated” by the communist 
system. She argued that women felt sympathy for their men at that time and they 
worked especially “hard to help them.”  
In places like Poland, the us-versus-them mentality was especially engrained. 
During centuries of predominantly German and Russian occupation, Poles ardently 
fought for their independence and the advancement of the Polish culture, though with 
few successes. During times when those struggles intensified, women were heavily 
involved in the national resistance, as they would be in the 1980s. However, as also 




bolster their male compatriots. The Polish image of the ideal woman emphasized the 
role of motherhood (Mother Poland) and the self-sacrificing behavior of women to 
advance not just her family, but also the national cause of the Polish state. The 
communist government used this image to advance its own notion of the position 
women should play in Polish society. The imposition of communism by force rather 
than choice furthered the image of a common enemy throughout the last century, and 
women’s concerns remained secondary to the greater issue of independence (Penn 
2003).  
Alternative Organization 
Although underground activities occurred to varying degrees, which should 
properly be labeled as political, they were thought of in different terms. Whereas 
communist politics was seen as “dirty,” involvement in what became known as “anti-
politics” in Poland and Czechoslovakia was a moral inclination and a social activity 
(Rugluska 1997, 86). Dissent activities exemplified this us-versus-them feeling.  
In Czechoslovakia for example, “dissent” centered in large part in the urban 
centers of Prague and Bratislava. Though few considered themselves dissidents, a 
significant number of intellectuals, religious leaders, artists, and average citizens 
worked in various ways to first ameliorate and then end the communist system. In 
Havel’s words, some began to “live within the truth.” By the mid 1970s, this 
culminated in the creation of the VONS organization, the drafting of the famous 
Charter 77 declaration, and the network that took the same name: Charter 77.96 In all 
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minor hierarchy. Rather it was a loose collection of people that aligned themselves with the cause of 
changing the communist system from within. This was often done by writing letters to those in power 




of these, women were present, and in many cases visible. Significantly, 20% of 
signatories to the original Charter 77 document were women, and from 1978 until the 
early 1990s, one of the three spokespersons for the loosely organized movement was 
a woman. Women also formed the majority of the VONS organization, which 
monitored and reported on judicial proceedings (Siklova 1997). Among dissident 
activity, there was minor mention of gender. In some of the documents that followed 
the original Charter 77 declaration, the leadership did address gender wage 
disparities, as well as the need to continue to protect women from being mistreated by 
police. However, these issues received only short shrift. Additionally, there was never 
a branch of women within Charter 77 (Haskova 2005).  
Though short lived, in 1980 women in Poland formed their own branch of 
Solidarity and pushed for inclusion of gender consideration in the union’s demands 
from the government. They created the Leagues Extraordinary Congress to advance 
their goals. Martial Law in 1981 not only pushed Solidarity underground, but also 
squashed this attempt at female advancement (Fuzara 2005). Though gender rights 
were not a salient issue in Poland during the period of Martial Law, it is significant 
that it was women associated with Solidarity that went into hiding and covertly 
operated to keep the movement alive when the government jailed the male leaders. A 
small group of women published an underground newspaper (and series of Samizdat-
underground literature) that informed the population about the activities of the 
government against its citizens (Penn 2006; Einhorn and Sever 2003). However, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
often sign their names to these documents, which was quite dangerous, but it signified their personal 




before, women undertook these activities, but they were not explicitly gendered in 
nature.  
Finally, in Romania there was not only little female dissent, there was little 
dissent at all. As elsewhere in the region, many Romanians I spoke with referred to 
the seemingly unanimous distaste for the communist government, generally 
encapsulated in the persons of Nikolae and Elena Ceausescu. In a previously 
mentioned instance, in1967 women became active by writing letters of protest to the 
government when the Ceausescu administration officially banned abortion. However, 
there was no real mobilization, nor organizations in place to create any influence as 
citizens or as women (Interviews 2007-2008). The us-versus-them mentality was an 
important reason why so few institutionalized women’s movements developed in the 
ECE region during the communist era.  
Women and Communist Doctrine  
The us-versus-them mentality was significant in preventing the creation of a 
women’s movement in the region during the communist era and hence eliminating the 
opportunity for a women’s movement to be the motivator of female LIP after 1989. A 
contributing factor blocking the development of such an organization was the usage 
of communist doctrine to stall the progress of women’s organizations before World 
War II and to pacify women under communism. Early communist and socialist 
parties attempted to address the issue of women and their proper role in Marx’s 
egalitarian society. Marx’s proletariat, after all, was comprised of workers, those who 
had become the means of production and had lost control over their output; this 
included both men and women. While ideology dictated equality of workers, it did 




social externalities of such policies. Under communism in practice, women in Eastern 
and Central Europe represented a group that was both protected and severely 
constrained by the State.    
The Women’s Question 
Marxism appealed to many women in the early years of the 20th century, who saw 
the ideology as a means to achieve greater gender equality. It was not uncommon to 
link Marxists and feminists both ideologically and politically. Marx, and especially 
Engels, discussed the position of women, calling them the most abused group under 
the capitalist system. Engels blamed the oppression of women on the introduction of 
private property (Engles 1884; Evans 1981, 766). The quandary of how to bring 
women out from under the “yoke of capitalism” famously became known as the 
“women’s question.”  
For many communists, the answer to the women’s question was the emancipation 
of women through the labor market. The theory espoused by Marx and Engels 
explained that once women were able to work and control their own labor, they 
would be liberated and would by extension attain personal fulfillment. In an interview 
with German socialist Clara Zetkin, Lenin addressed the situation of women in a 
similar vain stating that, “[t]he women must be made conscious of the political 
connection between our demands and their own suffering, needs and wishes. They 
must realize what the proletarian dictatorship means for them: complete equality with 
man in law and practice, in the family, in the state, in society; an end of the power of 
the bourgeoisie” (Zetkin 1920, page unknown). Five years later, Trotsky articulated 
an analogous point of view: “[j]ust as it was impossible to approach the construction 




impossible to move to socialism without freeing the peasant woman and the woman 
worker from the bondage of family and household” (Trotsky 1925 PNK). Throughout 
the communist era, women’s labor was the primary focus of gendered policies. Even 
prominent women in early communist movements, such as Rosa Luxemburg and 
Zetkin herself, did not focus much on the position and concerns of women in the 
private sphere (Fröhlich 2010 [1939]; Corcoran 2008). 
Following the guidelines of Marxist doctrine, during the 1920 Soviet women were 
encouraged to enter the labor force in large numbers. There was a corresponding 
attempt to create neighborhood laundries, daycares, eating counters, and other 
initiatives that would contribute to more communal living and free women from the 
perceived constraints of the home. Here the focus was on the economic position of 
women, heavily favoring their positions as workers (Evans 1981). As occurred some 
20 years later when communism spread throughout Eastern and Central Europe, 
communist ideology coupled with the demographic and economic needs of the State 
motivated the emphasis on female labor force participation. In the Soviet Union after 
World War I, and later in communist Europe after World War II, labor shortages were 
rampant, and women’s employment was a solution to this demographic problem.   
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the image of the ideal Soviet woman changed 
again (Evans 1981). Lenin had died, Leon Trotsky, a strong advocate for women in 
the labor economy, was in exile, and Joseph Stalin was taking the Soviet Union in 
new directions. Whereas Lenin had focused the women’s question on employment 
and communal living, by the 1930s Stalin declared Lenin’s gender policies a success 




image of the ideal Soviet mother and worker (Racioppi and See 1995, 821). As 
Racioppi and See explain,  “[t]he Leninist state’s image of woman as worker was 
soon modified by the Stalinist regime to create a new ‘superwoman’ image that 
combined woman as worker with woman as mother” (1995, 822). This meant 
encouraging women into vocational areas often associated with male labor such as 
manual labor in factories, mines and agriculture. It also meant a renewed focus on the 
family and the role of women as breeders of new communists. Fidelis suggests that, 
“[t]he Stalinist system offered women a set of multiple, yet limited, identities: women 
could be workers, mothers, wives, labor heroines, or political activists (2004, 303). 
Hence, women bore the mantle of economic and biological producers. However, 
during the Stalinist era, there was also a retrenchment of many of the communal 
initiatives and programs put into place a decade earlier, making the actualization of 
these communist superwomen difficult.97 Whereas with Lenin the pendulum may 
have swung too far from the hearth, Stalin created an idealistic view of women that 
few could meet.  
During the Stalinist era, in the Soviet Union and later in Eastern Europe, Party 
officials made great efforts to portray the communist superwomen (Chylinska 1965). 
In 1935, a column in the Soviet publication Robotnitsa read,  “‘One of the most base, 
disgusting, bourgeois legends is that it is impossible to combine motherhood with 
equal rights for women and their participation in political and social life’” (cited in 
Evans 1981, 765). Propaganda was pervasive. The state often commissioned painters, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 These programs were abandoned for three reasons: 1) They were difficult to maintain financially. 2) 
It was taking some time for them to become commonplace. 3) Stalin’s Soviet woman also maintained 
the home. Therefore, there was a need to reestablish some of the elements of home life that the 




play-writes and even musicians to produce works that glorified the communist 
superwoman.98 This was an effort to create an image for women to aspire to reach. In 
particular in paintings and films, artists portrayed women on tractors, in the mines, 
and in factories. Women in these images were attractive, but also sturdy and 
seemingly contented in the work they were doing. Often children were also in the 
images, ostensibly demonstrating the successes of women in both the private and 
public spheres (Reid 1998).  
After Stalin, some of the superwoman expectations were removed, though this 
varied by country. The determinations about what constituted masculine and feminine 
jobs came from the Party. Acceptance of the classifications by men and women was 
never complete. Soon there were efforts to limit women in more physically 
demanding jobs, based on reports that materialized claiming the dangers to childbirth 
that such work could have on women.99 At this point, the state became more 
concerned with birthrates than they were with adhering to the letter of Marxist 
doctrine. In Poland, women who had enjoyed their employment in the mines fought 
the new policies, yet they received little support (Evans 1981; Heinen and Wator 
2006). While women did stay in some “masculine” jobs, many of them were 
encouraged into “feminine” jobs.100 Throughout the rest of the communist era, across 
the region, governments tried to find the balance of women’s position in both the 
economy and the home (Fidelis 2004). However, despite the various policies, in every 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Art was heavily monitored by the State in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. Work 
that was not deemed to represent the proper image of communist life was banned (Reid 1997). 
99 The validity of these reports is somewhat questionable. It is clear that Party officials (and perhaps 
some average men) created and used the reports as an excuse to dismantle some of Stalin’s policies 
encouraging women into traditionally male work. This allowed a greater emphasis to be placed on the 
home, though obviously working remained important. It was also seen as a means by which to create a 
more manageable social order between the sexes.  




country, there continued to be an expectation that women would work – it was a 
guaranteed right, but also a responsibility. At the same time, the role of mother 
remained essential.  
Despite what was occurring within communist Europe, the efforts to create a 
stylized image of communist women was successful beyond the region. Many outside 
of the communist sphere saw the region’s women, for better or for worse, as 
emancipated and independent. Feminists in the West were seeking many of the same 
rights and guarantees that women in Eastern Europe had already been granted. 
Therefore, there was not much of an effort on the part of western women’s groups to 
communicate or assist women in Eastern and Central Europe. As Siklova laments, 
“[t]he Iron Curtain was getting rusty in the 1980s, and through its openings we were 
receiving a lot of information and books from tourists and émigrés. We circulated, 
translated, read, and copied Orwell, Popper, Ahrent, Dahrendorft, von Hayek, 
Althusser, Eurocommunistas, punk, pop music, porno and so on. But feminists did 
not send anything!” (1997, 260).  
The communist governments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did attempt 
to find different means to create a balance with women’s work and family that 
adhered, at least on the face of it, to communist doctrine. They also adjusted the 
details of women’s double burden based on economic and demographic 
considerations. Even as they fluctuated, the result of these policies was that the 
official line was to claim gender equality. With the women’s question officially 
resolved, there was no need for women’s organizations, nor was there a role in 




(Siklova 2000, 266). Some women in Poland, for example, were vocal about their 
concerns, as Party policies displaced a number of women from the new occupations 
(traditional male jobs) that they had been encouraged into in the late 1940s. Women 
such as Ludwika Jurczak and Zofia Wasilkowska saw this change as a challenge to 
communist doctrine. These Party women spoke out, but despite the potentially 
effective communist theory framing, their concerns were not addressed (Fedelis 
2004). Debate on the issue dropped, and even women in the Party who ardently 
fought for greater attention to women’s issues eventually fell silent.  
Women’s Organizations Before and Between the Wars 
The weakness of a movement for the advancement of women at mid-century and 
through the 1980s was not inevitable. In fact, for some time it appeared as if the 
opposite would occur as in a number of places around the world at the turn of the 20th 
Century, there was momentum in favor of the development of women’s 
organizations. As far back as the nineteenth century and certainly the time between 
World War I and World War II, there was a noted rise in gender awareness across 
Eastern and Central Europe. Had events occurred differently, it is possible that these 
efforts would have continued throughout the ECE region eventually resulting in a 
mature and effective women’s movement(s). The groups of the 1920s and 1930s 
attempted to advance their causes, but war and politics effectively halted this 
momentum for at least two generations of women.  
Czechoslovakia: 
In Czechoslovakia, a young Republic elected a liberal-minded President who 
made female advancement in politics and business a platform of his administration. 




Garrigue Masaryk, worked to advance the position of all Czech and Slovak peoples, 
including women. Masaryk felt the influence of his American born wife, Charlotta 
Garrigue Masaryková, who until the time of her death in 1923, also fought for 
enhanced recognition of women’s rights (Nedvěová 2006, 308). In 1890 Masaryková, 
who had learned Czech, helped translate Mill’s famous piece, The Subjection of 
Women into Czech. She often wrote for American and Czech magazines arguing for 
women’s rights and suffrage. It is no coincidence that upon Masaryk’s election in 
1918, he fought for and won the inclusion of women’s suffrage in Czechoslovakia’s 
new constitution (Nedvěová 2006). Masaryková also actively participated in, and in 
some cases helped create, a number of organizations that sought to advance the 
position of women. She and others were involved in the Czech Women’s Club, the 
woman-friendly Czech-Slavic Social Democratic Party, the Central Association of 
Czech Women, the Association of Women and Girls Employed Along their Domestic 
Production and Work, as well as the Committee for Women’s Suffrage.  
Influenced greatly by Masaryková and her husband, Milada Horáková is another 
woman of significance in the Czech lands before and between the two World Wars. 
Horáková earned her law degree in 1923 and for some time provided legal council for 
the National Council of Women. She also worked with a number of local women’s 
groups and continued to lecture for women’s rights throughout her lifetime. Horáková 
often worked with Františka Plamínková, the head of what was a young but quickly 
institutionalizing women’s movement in Czechoslovakia in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Plamínková founded both the Czech Women’s Club and later the National Council of 




International Alliance of women for Suffrage and Equality Citizenship (IAWSEC) 
and the International Council of Women (ICW). Quite notably, she also served as a 
popular Senator in the Czechoslovak National Assembly (Hendrychová 2006). 
Plamínková and Horáková, along with Charlotta Masaryková, are responsible for 
much of the enhanced social awareness of the position of women in Czechoslovakia 
during the first part of the 20th century.  
However, when the communists came to power in 1948, the organizations that 
flourished prior to the war were disbanded. Additionally, much of the leadership of 
those groups had died. By mid-century, three of the country’s most ardent supporters 
for women’s rights, Plamínková, Horáková and Masaryková, were gone. Masaryková 
died of natural causes in the early 1920s, though her husband continued to advance 
her causes until the Nazis occupied the country in the late 1930s. In 1942, the Nazis 
executed Františka Plamínková for her continuing activities to advance Czech culture. 
A decade later, Milada Horáková, despite her early participation in the 
Czechoslovakian Socialist Movement, fell victim to the purges of the 1950s when she 
too went before the executioner.101 With Horáková’s death the chances to build off 
the inner-war framework all but disappeared. 
Poland 
There were over 80 groups working to advance the position of women in Polish 
society by the time World War II began (Fuzara 2005). In fact, as early as 1840, there 
existed a Polish group operating solely to advance women. By 1918, women received 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 It is rather ironic that Horáková, an avowed Marxist who had worked for many years supporting the 
Communist Party, should find herself before the communist firing squad. Even more ironic perhaps, is 
the fact that it was a female judge, a woman of the Party and of the communist controlled Czech Union 





the right to vote with the declaration of an independent Poland; this occurred in large 
part due to the activities of a number of dedicated Polish women.  
Before and between the wars, such groups as the Union of Equal Rights for Polish 
Women, the National Council for Polish Women, the Progressive Women’s Political 
Club, and the Women’s Association for Civil Labor, among others, sought to advance 
the cause for greater gender equality. By 1930, the Women’s Association for Civil 
Labor boasted over 30,000 members.102 The high membership is evidence of the 
importance and strength of the organization. Of additional notoriety, the Union of 
Equal Rights for Polish Women earned the distinction as the “most radical feminist 
organization of the period” (Ibid). Famous women in Polish history, such as Zofia 
Dasźyńska-Golińska, Paulina Kuczalska-Reinschmit, Theodora Męczkwska and 
Justinya Budzińska-Tylicka led these groups. Dasźyńska-Golińska is significant 
because she served in the Polish Senate between the wars. Budzińska-Tylicka, a 
medical doctor, was famous throughout Europe for her work, which included the 
opening of the first Polish birth control clinic (Ibid).  
Due to some of the activities of these women and many others, during the 
interwar period, the Polish parliament passed significant legislation aimed at assisting 
women, particularly mothers. There were laws put in place that protected pregnant 
and nursing mothers from working in heavy industry and provided all women 
extensive social services. “Indeed, the conviction that women and men should 
perform different kinds of labor was so strong in Polish society that all interwar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 This figure indicates the significant involvement of women in this group. However, finding 
membership numbers is especially difficult for these early organizations. However, based on the fame 
and popularity of many of their leaders (not to mention political position of some) and the success of 
their activities (female suffrage for example) it is reasonable to assume that they had some level of 




women’s organizations vigorously supported protective labor legislation measures for 
women workers as a group. Unlike in the West, no strain in the Polish feminist 
movement argued that the index of prohibited jobs was in any way discriminatory to 
women” (Fidelis 2004, 308-309).103 Before 1945, many of the smaller women’s 
groups willingly joined to form the Women’s League.104 The goal of the organization 
was to encourage and promote professional women, provide assistance with children 
and increase education (Fuzara 2005, 1,063). However, it was not long after that the 
communists disbanded the group and established one in its stead that was firmly 
under the Party’s control and influence.  
Romania 
One of the biggest advocates for Romanian women before World War II was 
Princess Alexdrina Cantacuzino. Princess Cantacuzino was involved in the formation 
of no fewer than five women’s groups, she became the early movement’s 
international representative, and she was one of Romania’s delegates to the League of 
Nations. Much of her success came from blending nationalism with the advancement 
of women’s rights. She argued that it was a duty for Romanian women to advance 
themselves, and it was their important role in society to protect Romanian culture, the 
glory of the state and their political voice (Cheşshebec 2006). To this end, she argued 
not just for enfranchisement, but also for greater female education and a larger female 
presence in the public sphere. In this effort, she worked alongside Calypso Botez, 
Maria Baiulescu, and others (de Haan et al., 2006).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 This is an example of where the definitions of feminist organizations and women’s organizations 
diverge. While the activities of these organizations might not be considered feminist by western 
standards, there is every indication that they identified as women and spoke for women as women.  
104 This league is not to be confused with the groups of the same name, which were under the control of 




Despite being a predominantly agricultural society, with deeply held traditional 
and religious values emphasizing the role of Romanian women around the hearth and 
family, a number of these women joined and supported important and influential 
women’s groups (Magyari et al 2001). Eugena de Reuss Ianculescu founded the first 
suffrage association, Women’s Rights, in 1911.105 Other organizations dealing with 
suffrage and gender equality also existed. Among these were the National Council of 
Romanian Women, the Union of Romanian Women, the Association for Civil and 
Political Emancipation of Romanian Women, and the powerful National Orthodox 
Society of Romanian Women (de Haan et al., 2006). Princess Cantacuzino co-founded 
this last group in 1910 and it functioned under her leadership from 1918 through 
1937. Cantacuzino also conceived and served as the first president of the Little 
Entente of Women (LEW), which brought together women from Poland, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, and Greece to address common concerns (Cheşshebec 2006, 91).  
Romanian democracy was not long lived. By the end of the 1930s, King Carol II 
retook power and reinstated the Romanian monarchy. For the next decade, he led the 
country as an authoritarian ruler. The role of the women’s groups that had thrived 
during the 1920s began to diminish under King Carol’s dictatorship. The 
Communists, who came to power in 1947, first under Soviet rule and then Romanian 
control, would eliminate almost all traces of what had been a small but important 
Romanian women’s movement during the early parts of the 20th century (de Hann et 
al., 2006).     
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Despite these efforts, women in Romania did not win full suffrage until 1948. In fact, it was only 
once the Communists came to power, that full suffrage extended to women, which further strengthen 




Organizations of Communist Women 
When the Communists came to power in Eastern and Central Europe, one woman 
I interviewed described it as, “a practical liquidation of the women’s movement.” In 
the 1940s and 1950s, the communists subsumed feminist organizations and women’s 
groups, which as explained above, had grown substantially in number in Eastern 
Europe between the wars. Party-controlled organizations, often called the Women’s 
League or Union of Women, replaced the women's groups that existed prior to World 
War II. These leagues became quite important for advancing women within the party, 
and in some regard, they did provide a place for women to meet socially.  
Haskova remarks that in the Czechoslovakian case, members of the Czech Union 
of Women wielded some policy-making power, especially when it dealt with issues 
relating to motherhood (Haskova 2005, 1,081).106 This was the only state-recognized 
organization of women, and it considered itself a branch of the Party. It was also from 
this organization that the Party found women to fill communist party electoral quotas 
(Siklova 2000, 266). However, across most of  the region, these groups never filled 
the role that their predecessor groups did in seeking to gain political and social 
advances for women. 
Current recollections of these women’s groups are extremely negative, as was 
apparent in two interviews from the Czech Republic. An elderly woman who never 
joined the Czech Women’s League, yet interacted with them in her experiences as a 
newspaper reporter, vehemently decried the organization – which interestingly has 
continued since the Velvet Revolution. She explained that many women felt forced to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 For sometime there was a Czech Union and a Slovak Union of women. They merged and separated 
at various time throughout the communist era. Yet, they essentially served the same purpose when 




join the group, and that it was nothing more than a means of “mind control.” With the 
possible exception of the leadership during the Prague Spring, the women who ran it 
“betrayed their sex,” and sought only to advance their own political goals. According 
to this woman, many considered the women in the leadership “single minded, evil, 
easily manipulated by the Party, and deranged.” A 25-year old female Czech student 
writing her Masters Thesis on the organization echoed these remarks. In referencing 
the current Women’s League, she said they are a “bunch of old, angry women who 
complain that communism is gone.”107 Women I spoke with in Poland and Romania 
made similar comments about the former women’s unions of the communist era. The 
perception of these organizations is certainly negative.     
Despite the existence of these groups, it would be inaccurate to claim that they 
represented East European women’s movements. The women’s organizations did not 
meet the definition of a women’s movement as articulated by McBride and Mazur. 
Specifically, the women’s leagues did not constitute a women’s movement because 
they were not organizations separate from the State, nor were they women engaging 
in gendered discourse as women. Under the communist system, these organizations 
were not even part of civil society, rather they were a state apparatus organized to 
influence and control the position of women in communist society.  
Though they varied across countries and through time, the communist parties of 
Eastern Europe claimed early on to have answered the women’s question and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Although the comments of this young women refer in some part to women of the current Women’s 
League, it is interesting that the old perceptions of the group have persisted and in some regards been 
passed down to women of the post-communist generation. In fact, as will be seen in Chapter 7, there is 
a socialization process that is occurring where the values and view points of mothers and grandmothers 
(especially regarding work, family and politics), developed under communism, are being transmitted to 




encouraged women to be both mothers and economic laborers. At the same time, they 
vilified feminism and decried it as not just unnecessary, but a bourgeois ideology. 
Hence, the communists took away issue space that in other circumstances might have 
allowed women to form groups that were representative of a women’s movement 
(Busheikin 1996, 16). Removal of this issue space coupled with the internalized us-
versus-them mentality, there is little evidence of a an institutionalized women’s 
movement in the region. Without a women’s movement, the region’s women were 
without an institution that could have guided them, as women, through the 
uncertainties of the early transition. As it was, women did not necessarily know how 
to organize nor did they have the bases or leadership continuity upon which to build 
and become politically active, even at the LIP level, during the early 1990s.  
Women’s Movement and Female LIP in Post-Communist Europe 
A women’s movement is important because it can provide a venue for women to 
voice their opinions and concerns, it develops and enhances resources and it 
cultivates female leaders. These are all factors that can enhance female efficacy and 
lead to greater political involvement. In the post-communist transitions of Central and 
Eastern Europe, women may not have envisioned the opportunity to mobilize as 
woman, and if some did (and surely, some did) women did not act in great number. 
The lack of women storming the stage after 1989, and certainly the absence of 
women organizing as women for women, is related to the weakness (or in most cases 
relative absence) of women’s movements in these countries during the communist 
era. In large part, this occurred because women did not have experience, personal 
resources and in some cases a sense of efficacy to draw upon, something a woman’s 




the time or skills to fight” as women (Interviews 2007-2008). East European women 
during the uncertainties of the early transition seldom had the venue, connections, 
experience, or female leadership to push for gendered causes.  
As previously explained, the us-versus-them attitude that prevailed in communist 
Europe and the attempt by the Communist Party to answer the woman’s question 
affected the development of a women’s movement in many of the region’s countries. 
Authors argue that issue salience is crucial; there must be an issue that arises that is 
serious enough to diminish the importance of other identities so as to unite women as 
women (Baldez 2003, 254).108 However due to the us-versus them mentality, 
differences were obscured and there were few issues that arose that women could 
mobilize against. Likewise, the capture of women’s rights by the Communist Party 
further precluded much possibility of women organizing as women in support of 
women throughout the communist era.  
The events of 1989 created a critical juncture where economic, political and social 
upheavals created space for new paths for the countries of the ECE region to take. 
Admittedly, the challenges were difficult, and would have been with or without a 
women’s movement. However, without one there was no institution in place that 
unified women as women and could help mobilize them to protect their interests as 
their countries began transitioning toward democracy. There was no female 
leadership that could provide continuity through the uprisings of the late 1980s and 
into the instability of the early transition. Without a women’s movement prior to 
1989, women in much the region were without a potential avenue for gendered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 In Latin America, Baldez argues, the important cleavage was class conflict. This allowed for the 




efficacy building, and in large part failed to think that their input was valuable. At 
that time it was common to hear women say they felt that they were not able to affect 
policy decisions, that they did not think that women’s issues mattered (Jaquette and 
Wolchik 1998; Interviews 2007-2008). This too contributed to the rather low LIP 
numbers evidenced during the initial transition years. The path chosen during the 
critical juncture of 1989 and 1990 did not heavily consider women as having 
specifically gendered concerns. Having made those decisions at that moment, it was 
and continues to be difficult to change course.  
A True Women’s Movement: East Germany 
Because of the manipulation of communist doctrine and the nature of governance, 
which eliminated cleavages and pitted the average citizen against the state, the 
creation of a women’s movement in communist Europe was extremely difficult. 
However, in the GDR in the 1980s, a women’s movement did arise. This occurred, 
because of the complex nature of German communism after 1945, which in many 
ways diluted the us-versus-them mentality that prevented a woman’s movement from 
developing elsewhere in the region. The country also retained greater international 
(Western) connections than the rest of the region, due to some degree of proximity. 
The political and geographic history of East Germany juxtaposed to both the Nazi 
past and the East-West separation, arguably made the country more conducive to the 
creation of a woman’s movement, which in turn provided the basis for women to 
participate politically in higher numbers in the GDR.109 Dissimilar to the rest of the 
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intriguing question. While I make reference to some possible links, answering this question is beyond 
the scope of my research. What is significant, is that a women’s movement started in the early 1980s, 





region, the existence of the women’s movement in the GDR in the 1980s laid the 
foundation for female political activity during the early transition and beyond. 
Before and Between the Wars 
In the early decades of the 20th Century, Germany, like the rest of the region, saw 
the advent of a number of attempts to improve the lot of women. This primarily came 
in the form of advancing the right to vote to women and increasing their labor force 
participation. Women won suffrage in 1918 and by the end of the 1920s, women also 
made up a sizable share of the German labor market.110 In fact, at that time, female 
unemployment rates were lower than the rates of German men. At the same time, 
women were entering educational institutions in large numbers - resulting in a 
number of female lawyers, educators, professors,111 dentists and physicians (Pauwels 
1984). The entry of women into these fields was advanced by a number of women’s 
organizations, which had begun advocating for gender equality throughout the first 
decades of the 20th century. As elsewhere, women activists of the time were drawn to 
socialist parties. For example, Clara Zetkin was a highly influential woman who 
helped create the German Communist League (KPD) and pushed for the creation of 
International Women’s Day, which is today celebrated on March 8th in various 
locations around the world. Between the wars, especially, German women made 
significant strides to advance their sex. 
When the Nazis came to power in 1933, they moved to quiet the growing 
women’s movement. In fact, the Nazis generally advanced a more conservative 
ideology that sought to clarify the proper roles of men and women: men as protectors, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Having formally unified the German flag in 1871, these statistics represent a unified, though rather 
young country. In fact, by 1989 Germany had been historically a united country only 30 years longer 
than it was two countries.  




women as mothers. Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels went so far as to declare 
National Socialism a “masculine movement” (Pauwels 1984, 11). Hitler summed up 
his position on women stating that “ [a] woman must be a cute, cuddly, naïve little 
thing — tender, sweet, and stupid” (as quoted in Pauwels 1984, 3). Nazis argued that 
women in the 1920s were “...neglecting their ‘natural’ duties to ‘the race’ — marriage 
and motherhood. They had yielded to the siren call of the emancipation movement 
and were increasingly involving themselves in such ‘unfeminine’ activities as 
employment outside the home and university studies” (Pauwels 1984, 16). Therefore, 
upon gaining power, significant steps were taken by the Nazis to return women to the 
private sphere.   
The Nazi Party promoted masculinity and sought to redefine what had become a 
rather liberal feminine identity. In this effort, the Nazis removed women from 
institutions of higher learning and took steps to encourage women to leave the labor 
force. In fact, Nazi policy forced married women, no matter their background, to 
leave their employment and return to the home (Evans 1981). Additionally, many of 
the groups that organized for women’s rights at that time had ties to the communists, 
a party the Nazis had violently engaged in the streets of Germany for much of the 
previous decade. Given this history and the focus of the Communist Party, it is not 
surprising that they disbanded these women’s organizations upon coming to power. 
When the communists took over after the war, as in the rest of the region they 
claimed that the women’s question was answered and therefore differences between 






The GDR Women’s Movement 
By the 1980s, the peace movement had taken hold, and strengthened under the 
roof of the Protestant Church, where the Communist Party permitted gatherings 
(Joppke 1995).112 In 1982, when the issue of female military conscription came to the 
fore, concern arose that affected and united women as a group separate from men. 
Women around the country rallied to oppose the proposal for female military 
conscription. Issue salience was strong enough to unite women and to start the 
region’s only institutionalized women’s movement under communism. Soon, it 
became apparent to a number of these women that they had other concerns that 
affected them specifically as women. They also realized that these problems were 
largely ignored not just by the state, but also by the peace organizations of which 
many were members.  
That year, 1982, Bärbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe founded Women in Peace.113 
This was followed by a number of similar organizations across the country. Suddenly, 
it seemed that women were meeting for a number of causes pertaining to their unique 
role in the GDR. There were a number of chapters of Women in Peace in cities 
throughout the country and meetings and large-scale gatherings took place to discuss 
women’s issues. For the first time, lesbians were also forming groups to have their 
voices heard (Ferree 1994). The increase in female activity corresponded with new 
publications, women’s art shows and women’s political clubs. What this meant, was 
that there was a foundation upon which to build and mobilize women. These groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Whereas dissent in much of the rest of the region focused on human rights and the actions of the 
governments against their people, in the GDR dissent was centered on the peace movement and on 
internal reforms that could strengthen the socialist state.  
113 Bohley, often called the “mother of the revolution,” continued her political activity in the unified 
country. She recently died in the fall of 2010. Poppe too maintained a political presence. She married 




also broadened social networks to some extent and brought important issues to the 
fore.  
Many of the active women, and the groups they represented, joined other groups 
to form New Forum, which was one of the organizations pushing the events of 
October and November 1989. In fact, it was two other women who are often credited 
with escalating the Montags Demos (Monday Demonstrations) at St. Nicholas Church 
(Nikolaikirche) in Leipzig that swelled in number throughout the month of October 
and eventually led to the better-known events in East Berlin on November 9, 1989. 
Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, women formed the Independent Women’s 
Association (Unabhängiger Frauenverband or UFV) to bring together women’s 
groups during 1990. Women in the UFV spent considerable time working to educate 
the population about possible retrenchment of female friendly policies. However, 
with unification taking precedence in the minds of many voters (including a number 
of female voters) and the voter exhaustion that seeped in with the seemingly endless 
Volkskammer elections throughout 1990, the UFV lost momentum. Additionally, a 
number of the former activists went their separate ways throughout that year. There 
were established parties from West Germany, like the Social Democrats (SPD) and 
the Greens that attracted a number of these women (Ferree 1994). The established and 
institutionalized parties had few links to the Eastern women’s movement (Beckworth 
2000). This broke up the peace activists and it also dispersed members of the GDR’s 
women’s groups, making gender a less unifying political identity. Ironically, the 




after 1989 led to further splintering of identities.114 Despite the decreasing role of the 
East German women’s movement after unification, it did not disappear but rather was 
altered to an extent by the unification process. However, the efficacy, organizational 
skills and institutional memory continued to influence how women viewed their 
political position even in the new, unified, Germany.  
It is anyone’s guess how women’s groups would have fared without the prospect 
for unification and the incursion of West German politicians and their resources. 
What is clear is that there was an East German women’s movement, which in many 
ways provided a means for mobilization. It also developed experience and enhanced 
the efficacy of its participants to be active, to work as women for women. This 
background and the resources provided by the women’s movement filtered down and 
encouraged women to take part in LIP in significant numbers. At the basic level, 
these women remained relatively engaged throughout the early transition. In fact, as 
World Values Survey results indicate (see Chapter 1), women in the eastern German 
states continued to be politically active at the grassroots, LIP, during the early 1990s.  
The East German women’s movement gained strength during the final days of 
1989, but began to lose its influence by the time of unification between East and West 
eleven months later. There was notable frustration on the part of those women who 
participated in the UFV and women activists elsewhere were saddened to see what 
appeared to be female marginalization in the GDR during unification negotiations. 
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movement underwent a transition itself. It did suffer some set backs and its membership did splinter in 
different directions to a degree. The movement also had to reconcile its aims and goals with the 
women’s movement, which developed in West Germany during the years of separation. This was a 




Other concerns took significant time away from activist women, but it did not mean 
that women ceased their participation or no longer cared (Ferree 1994).  
These losses aside, women in the GDR have stayed more political active than 
many of their eastern neighbors. In fact, they also look different in this regard when 
compared to their sisters in what was West Germany. At the LIP level, women in the 
GDR and later the NBL were involved in higher numbers than those in Romania, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic, despite their marginalization during unification. A 
significant reason for this is the fact that the country had a women’s movement in the 
1980s, in which women learned how to organize, how to fundraise, and how to spread 
their message. These women had the attributes of a known venue, resources, and 
continuity (to some degree) of leadership. Women in the NBL were more 
participatory at the LIP level in the 1990s because they knew how to be. The 
existence of a women’s movement in the GDR, created a sense of female efficacy, 
that continues to be tested, but which sustained a sense of “voice” among a number of 






Labor Force and Political Participation 
 
Introduction:  
In propaganda, the communist woman is an impressive, stylized figure. The 
images portray strong, powerful women expertly conducting their work in the fields 
and factories. They are attractive women, with bright eyes, and flashing smiles who 
appear not only able to do the work before them, but happy to contribute to the glory 
of their country and the Party. The post World War II emancipation of women into 
the labor force became a significant feature of communist Europe’s economic 
development. Though it varied across country and time, a large majority of the 
region’s women worked for a salary outside the home during their lifetime (Gal and 
Kligman 2000; Reuschmeyer 1998d). In fact, labor force participation was a right and 
duty of communist women. In many instances, this female obligation was equal only 
to the expectation that women become mothers. As discussed elsewhere in this 
manuscript, governments took great strides to encourage and assure that women met 
both of these duties (burdens for some) accordingly.   
The dissolution of communism and process of economic restructuring caused a 
rapid and deep plummet in available employment across the ECE region. Before 
1989, the countries of the region enjoyed near full employment, but seemingly 
overnight, unemployment became a serious concern. Layoffs and large-scale industry 
closures affected everyone. However, women were especially susceptible to 
economic fluctuations because their jobs were often the most tenuous and yet they 
retained responsibility for the care of children and elderly parents. As Kligman (1998) 




vulnerable. Once laid off, solid data indicate that women are more likely to remain 
unemployed for longer periods than are men; women are less likely to be retrained 
first and they are more disadvantaged in the search for new employment” (Ibid 75). 
This pattern was evident across post-communist Europe (Morgan 2008; Posadskaya-
Vanderbeck 2000).  
The alteration of available employment for the region’s women affected their 
willingness to participate politically. In the labor force one can gain efficacy, develop 
confidence and learn skills that can be utilized in other venues: potentially the 
political world. The economic situation for women before and after 1989 presented an 
irony. Employment opportunities existed under communism, creating enhanced 
socialization and to some degree skill development for women. It had the potential, 
and as my interviews show, did undoubtedly create confidence and efficacy among 
some women. However, due to the authoritarian, non-democratic nature of 
communist rule, there were often few avenues of political life where citizens could 
channel their experiences from labor force participation into political participation. 
When communism ended, and the political situation opened up creating more space 
for such activities, the economic structures were overhauled and women left the labor 
market (by force and by choice), thus largely eliminating the possibility of a 
participatory link between women, labor and political participation.  
The large-scale departure of women from the labor force also meant they fewer 
women were able to learn organizational skill or to socialize at their place of 
employment any more. This was a process that occurred over time, yet as more 




efficacy that might have been created on the job diminished. One woman lamented, 
“if I can’t even find a job, what good am I to anyone else” (Interviews 2007-2008).   
In this chapter, I round out my dissertation argument by exploring the effects of 
what I call “gendered job displacement” on female LIP in the post communist region. 
This term encapsulates the idea that there was a significant shift in not just the 
number of women unemployed in the region, but also in the percentages of women in 
the labor market as a whole. Gendered job displacement did not simply occur when 
communism ended. Rather it was the result of choices made to respond to the new 
system of competition after 1989. To understand the depth of the importance of 
gendered job displacement, we must look at those factors that led to the alteration in 
female labor force opportunities.  
In the following pages, I contend that the economic reaction of individual 
countries and the specific elimination of feminized jobs are largely responsible for 
gendered job displacement in the early transition period. The government decisions 
regarding economic restructuring after 1989 often determined how painful and 
extensive the process was going to be. To be competitive with the newly opened 
West, countries of the region downsized dramatically. Most quickly to go were 
factory jobs, which were by that time “feminized jobs.” Related was an increase in 
private sphere responsibilities as communist policies that operated to provide a social 
safety net for women was removed at the same time that jobs, in general and 
especially for women, became more scarce. In many cases, the continued double 
burden of eastern women without government social coverage made finding 




with young children who suddenly had few daycare options and yet needed to work to 
meet the basic survival needs of their families. These three factors: economic 
reaction, elimination of feminized jobs and the increase in private sphere 
responsibilities are the substantive dimensions responsible for gendered job 
displacement in the region during the 1990s. Gendered job displacement contributed 
to a loss of female efficacy, or in some cases the prevention of future efficacy 
creation, therefore, playing a role in the low female LIP experienced in much of the 
region during the early 1990s.   
Gendered job displacement produced mechanisms that discouraged a number of 
the region’s women from political participation during the 1990s. First, as mentioned 
above, a venue for potential socialization, information sharing and efficacy building 
disappeared for many women as jobs became scarce. Secondly, there were emotional 
repercussions to the loss of employment. Finally, due to extensive female labor 
redundancy, women’s priorities turned toward seeking and maintaining employment, 
a challenge that was largely new to them. Immediate needs dominated women’s lives 
and it was difficult to see how political action would help alleviate such concerns. All 
three of these mechanisms were more strongly felt the longer the delay in wanted 
employment. These three results highlight why gendered job displacement is a critical 
variable in explaining the low female LIP experienced throughout much of the region 





All countries of the ECE region suffered from great economic fluctuations, and in 
all cases restructuring disproportionately affected women through layoffs and factory 
closures. However, the Czech Republic’s economic fluctuations were less severe than 
elsewhere in the region and they were the first country to economically rebound to 
some extent (Mickiewicz and Bell 2001). Therefore, in this chapter, the Czech 
Republic is the divergent case. Because of the shorter duration of gendered job 
displacement, the effects of the other variables (communist legacy of distrust and the 
lack of an institutionalized women’s movement) lessen to an extent, helping to 
account for the moderate (above average) level of female LIP in the Czech Republic.  











Level of Female 
LIP During Early 
Transition Period 
Czech Rep. Yes Yes No Moderate 
GDR Yes No Yes High115 
Poland Yes Yes Yes Low 
Romania Yes Yes Yes Low 
 
In the next sections, I lay out the terms for analysis. I then more fully present my 
argument that gendered job displacement limited socialization and efficacy building 
for women on the job and hence has limited their desire, experience and availability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 As will be seen in this chapter, the NBL faced very tough gendered job displacement after 
communism. As discussed in Chapter 5, there was a women’s movement in the GDR before 1989, 




for low intensity participation. In doing so I look at the economic responses, the 
structural elimination of feminized jobs and explore how gendered job displacement 
has changed the responsibilities of the double burden in the region. Specifically, I do 
this by exploring three of my case countries, the NBL, Poland and Romania, which 
have experienced significant and persistent gendered job displacement. I then explore 
the theoretical underpinnings that inform my argument connecting labor force and 
political participation. From there, I address the situation in the Czech Republic 
where gendered job displacement was shorter lived. Finally, I also aim to examine the 
job displacement variable as it relates and interacts with the other two variables 
advanced in this dissertation.  
Terms:  
In this chapter, it is important to clarify the terms; gendered job displacement, 
labor force participation and unemployment. Though sometimes conflated in the 
literature, labor force participation and unemployment are varying measurements. 
Labor force participation relates to actual engagement in the labor force. It is 
generally the percentage employed out of a given population. On the other hand, 
unemployment looks at those seeking or available for work (often recorded by a state 
agency). The unemployment measure is important, but it often only captures those 
that fill out necessary paperwork (for benefits) or those that officials record as 
seeking employment. If someone is laid-off and decides not to re-enter the labor 
market, unemployment figures do not account for them. A further complication is the 
varied methods countries utilize when counting the unemployed. Additionally, 




markets or those that may be too embarrassed to register as unemployed (Economic 
Survey 2003). 
Both of these terms are helpful in this assessment, and I use them where 
appropriate. Labor force participation rates of women clearly indicate the drop in the 
percentage of women in the ECE labor markets after 1989. On the other hand, 
unemployment figures show the percentages of women registered as seeking 
employment during the initial transition period. Both rates show the gendered nature 
of employment restructuring in post-communist Europe. Therefore, to capture both of 
these ideas as they relate to the ECE region post-1989, I use the term “gendered job 
displacement.” This includes both the dramatic change in women’s involvement in 
the market economy as well as the large increase in unemployment figures during the 
early transition. These numbers do not correlate perfectly. Female labor force 
participation dropped at a more significant rate than female unemployment rose. This 
occurred due to the aforementioned reasons of early retirement, purposeful 
withdrawal and black market “employment.” Therefore, while I employ the term 
gendered job displacement to include both of these occurrences, where necessary to 
differentiate between the two, I do so.   
Women’s Labor Force Participation Under Communism: 
In rhetoric, the emancipation of women under communism evidenced the practice 
of genuine equality for all citizens, per the communist doctrine (see Chapter 5). 
Today, much of the literature calls this communist encouragement of women into the 
labor force, “forced emancipation” or “emancipation from above” (Nagy 1994; 
Molyneux 1995; Matland and Montgomery 2003). The state, not women themselves, 




Many of these jobs were in light-industry, education and medicine (Jaquette and 
Wolchik 1998).  
Scholars often use the concept of forced emancipation to differentiate this type of 
“equality” from the motivations of Western women’s rights activists who have argued 
that increasing opportunities for female employment outside the home are a critical 
step toward female empowerment. The term forced emancipation seems to suggest 
that women did not want to work. Some women I interviewed insist that this was not 
always the case, pointing to the fact that early female communists were instrumental 
in pushing for more women in the labor force. These interviewees explained that 
despite other negative features of communist governance, the Party’s motivation to 
have women in the labor force derived primarily from ideology resulting in some 
positive demographic externalities (Interviews 2007-2008). For other women in the 
region and some scholars, women’s encouraged entry into the work force en mass 
was negative as it increased the responsibilities of women who retained their duties in 
the home.116  
Regardless, what is clear is that across the region, with only slight variation, 
women entered the public arena in extremely large numbers after World War II. For 
example, in Czechoslovakia, in the 1930s, women made up 30% of the labor force, by 
1967 they made up 46%, almost half of the entire labor market (True 2003, 31). In 
fact, with minimal deviation, women represented well over 40% of those employed 
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Western Europe, to keep up with the needs of the home while entering the labor market in significant 
numbers were not available in communist Europe. Whereas a woman in the late 1960s in New York 
could more efficiently maintain her home by using washing machines, driers, fancy vacuum cleaners 
and prepackaged frozen dinners, only the most affluent women in communist Europe were personally 




across the region. From 80% to almost 100% of available women were working 
outside of the home (Claussen et al 1993). 
In the early years of communism, there was a concerted effort to encourage 
women into more traditionally male labor, yet this altered some across the region and 
through the decades of communism. In general, “[i]n the 1980s, women in the Eastern 
Bloc countries were much more likely to be highly skilled professionals, specialists 
and technical workers than women in Western Countries” (True 2003, 31). However, 
despite early attempts at greater distribution, certain labor became “feminized.”117 
Women were generally in industry (textiles, glass), food processing, health, education 
and social services (Ibid. 32). What is remarkable is that these same women were 
having children, sometimes many, as those figures also reached beyond 80% of 
women in childbearing years. Women in communist systems did not have to decide 
between work and family, rather they were heavily encouraged to pursue both. 
Ideology aside, after World War II there was a definite need for female workers 
across the region. In a system that did not have a great deal of immigration, initially 
lower numbers of males after two deadly wars and a new Cold War to wage, 
women’s roles as workers and mothers were important to communist society. To 
encourage women into the labor force, the State implemented a series of social 
protections aimed at easing women’s responsibilities in the home.118 From 
exceptionally generous maternity leave to financial assistance for single mothers, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Here the term “feminized” is meant only to indicate that these jobs were populated primarily by 
women.  
118 Though these services were generous and in some ways likely did ease some of the household 
responsibilities of women, there was very little attempt to encourage men to take on more 
responsibility in the home. The State also created a situation where the region’s women became 




there is no doubt that women in communist societies relied on state “benevolence” to 
a larger degree than men did. This state “protection” assured that women carried out 
both sides of their double burden. Females were valued under the communist regimes 
as workers helping to build the communist countries and also as breeders of the next 
generation of communists. This was perhaps most evident in Romania, where women 
received special recognition, and even medals for having large numbers of children 
(as many as eight and ten).  
In many ways, what some could perceive as an egalitarian role of women under 
communism is misleading, and intentionally so. As explained in detail in Chapter 5, it 
was beneficial for the Party to show female laborers as vital members of the 
communist workforce. This fed a discourse of the superiority of communism. It was 
also a tactic to present an example for women to follow. Kotzeva wrote that, [t]he 
image of a socialist woman was elaborated to reinforce the unique mission of a 
woman to sacrifice herself in order to assist in the establishment and further 
development of the system towards a ‘shining future’” (1999, 85).  
Women were set apart from men, and though they received a number of social 
benefits, the personal costs of such protections were high. This included an 
expectation that women would return to work after having children, that they had 
little assistance running the home, and that they be reliant on the state run nurseries 
resulting in significant time away from their children. In Czechoslovakia, for 
example, in the early years it was not unusual for women to put their children in 
overnight childcare facilities where they would only see them during weekends 




development of a relationship that centered on women and their duties to the state, 
rather than their relations with each other or their husbands (Ashwin 2000, 13).  
Communist Employment as Efficacy Creator 
It is difficult to determine if women’s substantial role in the labor force created 
genuine efficacy and a desire to participate during the communist era. As explored in 
Chapter 4, during communism there was a real sense of fear that discouraged group 
mobilization. There were many structural barriers in place that prevented the true 
expression of employment created efficacy. Yet, despite this, it is possible that such 
efficacy did develop.  
It may seem counterintuitive that in a society, which heavily encouraged female 
labor force participation and the employment of women into what many might 
consider undesirable jobs could create a system where women did in fact develop a 
sense of pride in their labor. However, a number of the older women I interviewed, 
those who worked under the old system, did describe an empowerment that came 
with employment (any employment) during communism. An interviewee in Romania 
focused on the stability that employment of the old system created explaining that, 
“[u]nder communism people were forced to work, but they had that job for life, which 
created security.” A Polish woman I spoke with recalled that, “[s]alaries were low, 
but at the same level we found our work rewarding” she went on to say that, “[w]e 
could be independent to a degree and we learned skills.” As one woman I interviewed 
in the NBL said, “political participation at work was limited, but it made me feel 
full.” In general, my interviews corresponded with Einhorn’s observation that, 
“[i]ndeed there are many voices which suggest that women’s self-esteem and even 




(Einhorn 1993, 140). These statements, and similar ones I heard elsewhere, suggest 
that even though the work women performed during communism was arguably 
mundane, it did provide some benefits in terms of personal well being and confidence 
building. 
In interviews and published works, women also recall socialization and 
information sharing that occurred at work, even during communist times. True 
explained that, “… women workers made special efforts to socialize their workplaces, 
‘making them more like home.’ They sought to infuse the public, state-controlled 
elements from the private, thus subverting the real production with the activities and 
symbols of social reproduction” (True 2003, 32). Women learned coping mechanism 
and developed the resources for activity (especially adverse to state power) on the 
job. Contributing to this, there is little doubt that citizens socialized to a degree and 
shared information at the worksite, which often bolstered dissident activity.119 It is not 
surprising that Solidarity began as a Union supporting employees of Poland’s 
shipyards, or that Charter 77 members in Czechoslovakia often had professional 
connections (Interviews 2007-2008). This suggests that having women in the labor 
force likely increased women’s chances of hearing such information and taking part 
in different forms of dissident involvement. There were a number of women who 
participated in large and small ways in dissident activities. I was able to talk with 
some former female dissidents in the region. They explained specifically that the 
skills they learned on the job became invaluable in their dissident efforts. Knowing 
how to disseminate information discreetly and to large groups of people, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Due to the fear of state power, information sharing was done carefully and likely much less openly 





communication were valuable lessons. For example, a number of those that 
distributed Samizdat literature actually learned printing and editing skills at their jobs. 
This type of dissident organization was often quite informal, yet it was voluntary and 
was quite dangerous.  
Evidence shows that despite the limits of communist life, positive externalities 
that could affect political participation derived from female labor force participation 
before 1989. Even in the most banal job, women under the communist regime learned 
how to multi-task, communicate with others, organize their time and share 
information, from the trite to the extremely important. At least in some instances, it 
also appears that employment created efficacy among women. Based on interviews 
and literature, a number of women valued their contribution to their families and 
valued the independence that employment afforded them.120 The efficacy created at 
work did not always have an external avenue, such as politics, in which to extend. 
However, the basis was there. After 1989, the barriers to advancing efficacy into 
other realms diminished. The pool of employed women declined and the potential for 
employment as an efficacy building mechanism for women decreased due to 
extremely high rates of female labor displacement.  
Gendered Job Displacement:  
The transition from a planned economy to a capitalist system had immediate and 
lasting effects. The industrial infrastructure of much of Eastern Europe was outdated 
and its citizens were untrained in new technologies. This corresponded with 
inconsistent foreign direct investment. The result was economic instability and a steep 
drop in labor force participation (“Wages in Eastern Germany” 2007; Stein 2004; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 In fact, with significantly high divorce rates and rather inconsistent and unenforced alimony and 




Fleishman 2004). If one considers that these countries had all enjoyed near full 
employment, the decline is even more dramatic (Rellin 2005).  
TABLE 6.1 
Labor Force and Employment Changes for Some Post-Communist States 
 
Labor Force 1985-2001121 Employment 1985-2001 
Male  Female  Male  Female 
Czech Republic  1.8  -5.6  -5.2  -15.2 
Estonia   -7.9  -27.1  -19.8  -36 
Hungary  -22  -32.1  -26.9  -35.4 
Latvia   -10  -29.5  -22.9  -37.7 
Lithuania  1.6  -11.7  -18.4  -24.2 
Poland   -1.9  -10.9  -18.4  -28.6 
Romania  5.6    11.2  -1.9    4.6 
Slovenia  7.7  -10.4  -13  -16 
Russian Fed.  1.5  -11.7  -7.9  -19.2 
Source: Economic Survey of Europe, 2003 No. 1 
 
Table 6.1 shows the dramatic decline in both labor force participation and 
employment from 1985-2001 for both sexes. The table indicates that this occurred in 
all cases except Romania. However, the numbers for Romania are somewhat 
misleading. The country was industrializing from a primarily agricultural society 
throughout the 1980 and into the 1990s, which skews the figures during the 
timeframe presented in the table. Pases Harsanyi wrote during the early transition that 
in Romania, “[l]ittle has changed for women, except for now there is unemployment. 
Most of the unemployed are women- 60% of the unemployed in 1992 were women” 
(Pases Harsanyi 1995). Reviewing the table, it is significant that the effects of 
economic transition were still largely visible in 2001, an entire decade after the fall of 
communism. The table also shows the gendered nature of unemployment and labor 
force participation. Across the region, women’s employment and labor force 
participation took a more drastic decline than that of men. Though not included in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




table, labor force participation of women in eastern Germany fell from 89% in 1989 
to just 58% twelve years later in 2001 (Matysiak and Steinmetz).122 
With unemployment soaring, women lost their jobs in large numbers, and others 
willingly left the workforce. The Economic Survey reported that “[c]ombined with 
the erosion of real wages this reduced further the economic value of women” 
(Economic Survey 2003, 199). Employment figures are likely even more stark than 
the available data suggests. Many women were never included in unemployment 
figures, because they took early retirement or decided not to search for a new job after 
the initial employment upheavals (Economic Survey 2003, 200). In many of the 
countries, there was also an effort by the new governments to encourage older women 
to retire early with rhetoric explaining that in harsh economic times women, 
especially older women, needed to leave jobs for men (Interviews 2007-2008; Gal 
and Kligman 2000). The exit of women from the labor force in most of the countries 
of Eastern and Central Europe, often for an extended period of time, affected LIP by 
removing a means of meeting with other citizens, learning valuable skill and sharing 
information, be it general or political. It also eliminated an avenue for female efficacy 
building, which research shows can affect one’s willingness to participate in other 
arenas, such as politics.  
Gendered job displacement is an important component in understanding low 
female LIP in the ECE region. The elimination of a number of jobs held by women 
was driven in large part by the choices made by policy makers in the individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 This is a 31% drop in the labor force participation: a significant decline. Some, though certainly not 
the bulk of this, can be explained by the migration of women from the NBL to the western states of 
Germany. It is worth noting that migration and emigration from the NBL has had a gendered, indeed a 




countries. How governments decided to deal with the economic restructuring of the 
1990s had an impact on female political participation. Gendered job displacement 
was also specifically due to the redundancy of certain job fields, specifically textiles 
and manufacturing, that disproportionately employed women. Of my case countries, 
the New German States, Poland and Romania have all dealt with deep and long-term 
gendered job displacement. 
Economic Reaction:   
Shock Therapy or Gradualism123 
Economic restructuring is a difficult and in many ways painful process. A short 
discussion of the case’s approaches to economic transition is included here to provide 
context for the larger discussion of gendered job displacement. There are two 
common ways that a country generally accomplishes economic restructuring: through 
gradualism or shock therapy. Governments that opt for gradualism institute a series of 
smaller reforms over a period of time. While this may take a longer time to reach the 
desired goals of a competitive and growing economy, the hope is that the changes 
will be small enough as to keep the hardships for individuals and companies to a 
minimum. The opposite philosophy is shock therapy where a massive program of 
changes is implemented in short order. The “objective is to take decisive steps to 
ensure that existing structures and interest cannot derail reform” (Murrell 1993, 113). 
Murrell explains that steps often include privatization; price deregulation; removal of 
barriers to institutional change; bank restructuring; tax reforms; credit allocation; job 
retraining among others. Utilizing this prescription generally means that the hardships 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 It is not my intent to delve too deeply into the various and complex series of policies put into effect 
during this time. Rather the goal here is to show that economic restructuring had consequences, some 
positive and some negative, which had an effect on employment rates of both men and especially 




of restructuring are intensive, but hopefully the new economic goal will be reached 
quickly. It is this latter option that the majority of countries of post-communist 
Europe chose, though as will be shown later in this chapter, the Czech Republic 
employed a more moderate form of shock therapy.   
Poland was one of the first countries in the region to implement policies of shock 
therapy. The effects were immediate, painful and much more long-term than officials 
had originally forecast (Poznanski 1993). In fact, experts estimate that shock therapy 
policies were responsible for a dramatic dip in the Polish standard of living, ranging 
from 15% to 30% (Murrell 1993). Poznanski reported that, 
At the end of 1992, the gross national product was more than 20% below the 1989 
level and way above the 5% target spelled out in the government’s 1990 program 
(while industrial output fell approximately 30% below its 1989 level) Rather than 
incur a 4-5% rate of unemployment, for which the government was originally 
prepared, the country registered 12.5% at the end of 1992 (with some regions 
exceeding 25%) (1993). 
  
The Romanian government also, with the help of an IMF bailout, eventually 
attempted to enact the policies associated with shock therapy in the mid-1990s. 
However, Grinda (1997) argues that for Romania, the process of shock therapy 
operated to reduce industrial and agricultural production dramatically, concurrently 
contributing to the high rate of unemployment.   
For the NBL, unification with West Germany dictated the path of economic 
restructuring. There too, the government implemented a process resembling shock 
therapy, as West German financial systems rather quickly became the institutions of 
the unified country. Within short order, the Deutsch Mark was implemented as the 




guidepost for financial crediting and lending in the eastern half of the country 
(Dornbusch and Wolf 1994).  
Foreign Direct Investment 
One means of strengthening a national economy, especially one in transition, is 
through an influx of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI can be defined as 
“…establishing a majority or minority ownership in another country’s business 
entity” (Jermakowiez 1995, 70). Such investment helps to put more money 
circulating throughout the local economy, and it also signals to others that this is a 
desirable destination for their investment capital. It is felt that this type of investment 
was crucial for advancing economic growth after the fall of communism. Zloch-
Christy points out that “…on the macro-economic level it [FDI] can positively affect 
the introduction of new business standards, the creation of a new business ethic, and 
the urgently needed education of Eastern European managers…” (1995, 4). There 
was significant FDI in the region, primarily from Germany (West), the United States, 
France, Great Britain, and to a lesser extent Austria. However, it was inconsistent and 
the results were somewhat debatable (Zloch-Christy 1995).   
For the New German States investment was somewhat slow.124 Whereas 
unification certainly provided a number of benefits, in terms of the labor market, it 
has proven to be somewhat challenging. Like the rest of the region, much GDR 
industry was inadequate and after 1989 factories quickly closed down. The newly 
unified government did attempt to prop up the eastern economy, specifically by 
systematically privatizing what had been “public” land and infrastructure. A 
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investment and rebuilding projects. However, even in these areas, there remain sections where 




Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency) took control of over 8,000 firms and millions of 
employees. However, this was met with resistance by many western Germans who 
felt they were paying the costs of restructuring, and by East Germans who saw the 
agency eliminate a substantial number of jobs. External investment was also rather 
slow in coming. Investors generally looked farther East to Hungary, Poland, and most 
recently Romania and Bulgaria where wages and living costs were lower and they did 
not have to deal with German rules and regulations (Ibid).  
Unlike eastern Germany, Poland and even Romania were more appealing for 
foreign investment.125 Facilities, land and wages were low in these countries. 
However, there were concerns about the abilities of eastern workers and it was not 
unusual for foreign employers to send a number of their own workers to retain most 
of the newly created high and medium level positions. The economies of both Poland 
and Romania, and much of the region, struggled throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s. For example, Poland had difficulty when it implemented its shock therapy 
policies, particularly regarding privatization, which helped create a deep and 
extensive recession in the country during much of the early transition period. 
Poland’s level of FDI grew after 1989 setting it behind the Czech Republic and 
Hungary in amount of investment. However, if one looks at it per capita, its level of 
FDI was average for the region (Jermakowiez 1995, 84). Romania too saw improved 
levels of FDI after 1989, but by 1993, those figures dropped. It is only recently, in the 
last decade, that Romania has legitimately made progress toward sustained economic 
recovery.  
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Elimination of Traditionally Female Jobs  
With the economic situation in mind, we now turn to the specific effect official 
economic reaction had on the region’s women. As mentioned, economic restructuring 
resulted in significant worker redundancy across the region. A noted majority of those 
jobs eliminated by the advancements of new economies were jobs that throughout the 
communist era had become associated with “women’s work.” Despite efforts, 
particularly early on when doctrine was still fresh, to encourage women into fields 
traditionally dominated by men (e.g. bricklayers or drivers), women still often ended 
up working in specific fields. For example, they were the majority of workers in the 
textile and shoe industries. They were also apparent in the more traditional female 
posts in education and healthcare126 (Brunnbauer 2000, 153). The gendered nature of 
communist employment continued into the post-communist era, but with so much 
redundancy, especially in areas where women generally worked, finding employment 
was difficult. Beyond that, Kligman noted that there was no attempt to hide the 
gendered view of employment. “Job availability is now gender explicit: many 
advertisements openly specify who may apply – attractive female receptionist and 
male managers” (1998, 75).  
It is clear that the number of women in the labor market dropped after 1989 across 
the entire post-communist region. Along with the elimination of a number of jobs and 
positions previously held by women, there was also a concerted effort to talk women 
into early retirement (Behrend 1995). Therefore, the number of women who were 
seeking to reenter the labor market dropped.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The Perceived Value of Employment 
 Women all across the region talked with me about the personal value they placed 
on employment, regardless of the inherent difficulties. For those that lost their jobs 
during the early 1990s, and the many that spent significant time out of the labor force 
despite their desire for employment, a job was (and often remains) important. For 
women especially, employment means financial independence. However, beyond 
financial considerations, the development of various skills, growth of personal 
confidence and a sense of self-worth can come with labor force participation. These 
attributes can serve women well in areas outside the labor market. On the other hand, 
the loss of efficacy creating employment, especially if the condition becomes long-
term, can have negative effects.   
The efficacy creating potential of female labor force participation during the 
communist era, discussed earlier in this chapter, remains open to debate. The negative 
feelings associated with loosing employment after the end of communism are clearer. 
All of the women I spoke with in the region, who were of an age where they were 
employed in the 1980s, discussed how awful they felt when they lost jobs during the 
economic restructuring processes of the early transition. For those that did not want to 
stay home, and there were many who did not or felt that they could not for financial 
reasons, the depression of persistent job loss was emotionally damaging. The women 
I spoke with that experienced this talked about the significant lack of confidence that 
resulted with losing those jobs. Many women I talked to felt a deep sense of 
demoralization. An elderly woman in the region recalled loosing her job as a doctor 
with visible embarrassment and disdain. She commented that she felt like she lost a 




her job. She explained that it is the only job she can find, but she says she would feel 
lost without it. In Poland I heard a similar sentiment when a woman suggested, 
“[w]omen see jobs as part of their identity.” Another Polish woman said that even 
now, “[m]ore and more women want to work, but can’t. Work means socialization, 
which is important” and in Romania an interviewee said, “[w]ork is also important for 
women here. It leads to self-confidence and independence in women.” 
The desire to work outside the home is especially evident among women in the 
NBL. This is likely due to the fact that women in what was West Germany, were 
much less accustomed to working especially when their children were young.127 This 
has changed somewhat in the last 20 years, as more western women are working, but 
female full-time employment is still not the norm.128 Unification has made this 
difference more apparent. A young man in Leipzig summed up the situation well 
when he stated, “women in the NBL want to work! Career is very important and a 
creator of identity, even more so than motherhood” (Interviews 2007-2008). A young 
woman also said, “[c]areer is often a female’s top priority, motherhood is just a 
bonus” (Interviews 2007-2008). In fact, none of my 35 interviewees in the NBL 
failed to mention the importance of work for the women of the New German States. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Because my focus in this project was specifically on women from the NBL, female LIP in what was 
West Germany has not been explored in depth and I did not conduct fieldwork relating to western 
German women. However, it should be noted that female LIP in the western states of Germany, was 
lower in the 1999 WVS than that of women in the NBL. For example, 8.8% of NBL women responded 
that they “would never” sign a petition whereas 17% of women in the western states said they “would 
never” do so. It is possible that labor force participation plays a role, but I am not prepared to make 
that declaration at this point.  
128 The nurseries system in the west was also much different than in the GDR and it was the western 
approach that became policy with unification. It is still unusual that day care facilities take children for 
full days, often only taking them for a half day. It is also especially difficult to find a nursery that will 
take children under the age of three. There is an institutionalized, western German norm that mothers 
should be with their children when they are young, or that they should only work a couple hours a day. 
From the perspective of social coverage regime type, West Germany (and in large part a unified 
Germany by default) represented a familial system, where as the GDR resembled a more social-




German author Martina Rellin heard similar responses when she visited with a 
number of Eastern women in the early 2000s to discuss the changes that had come 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Rellin explained in her book, and further 
expounded upon in a 2008 interview with me, lack of employment would inevitably 
enter the conversation (Rellin 2004; Interviews 2007-2008). One of those she 
interviewed put it this way, “‘I love and care for my children. However, I need to 
work for myself, for my self-fulfillment. Even if I had a million dollars, I wouldn’t 
stay home. It isn’t about the money, I need the confirmation that work provides, and 
the interactions with colleagues, the sense of citizenship’” (Rellin 2004, 255).    
Increase Private Sphere Responsibilities  
The end of communism did bring many benefits for women in Eastern Europe. 
Goods were in the shops and technology found its way East, which should have eased 
the carrying out of household duties. Yet the “burden” of taking care of the home and 
family not only continued to fall to the region’s women, but it in many ways grew 
heavier as they sought to find employment in the changing economy (Havelkova 
1997).  
The pressures of capitalism meant increased competition for jobs. At the same 
time, there was an increase in prices and work time (or time spent searching for 
work), yet most women received little additional help from their husbands or the 
fathers of their children.129 The end of communism did not ameliorate the double 
burden of the communist era, and in some cases, it got even heavier as needed 
employment grew scarce and material wants increased. A middle-aged woman in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129Though marking some improvement, many of the women I spoke to (even of the post-communist 
generation), commented that men still do very little to help out at home and still expect a great deal 




region recalled, “[o]ne thing that hasn’t changed [lessened] is the expectations placed 
on women.” As a young woman in Romania put it, “[t]he [only] men that stay home 
are the ones that are unemployed.” And, she lamented, “they still don’t help out.” 
Before 1989 there was an expectation that women be employed and contribute to the 
state-run economy. The maintenance of the home and family were important female 
responsibilities as well regardless of claims of communist gender equality. The 
private sphere, as in many cultures around the world, was “women’s domain” during 
communism and it retained that association during the transition period.  
Ripping the Social Safety Net  
The social structures that made the double burden somewhat manageable, 
retrenched to varying degrees across the countries of the region. State run nurseries 
closed, housing assistance diminished and policies significantly reduced childcare 
benefits, meaning that the responsibility and stress associated with women 
maintaining the home increased (Hempele 1997). Referring specifically to Romania, 
Magyari and her colleagues commented that, “[t]he ‘social safety nets,’ which were 
critical under the communist regime, became utterly inadequate during the transition 
to the market economy” (Magyari et al. 126). These comments described much of the 
region.  
The closing of a number of state-run nurseries across the region was (and 
remains) one of the most frustrating issues facing ECE women. Putting children in 
nurseries or daycare facilities, sometimes for several hours, was accepted practice 
during communist times and women came to rely on the assistance. This was 
especially the case in East Germany where only a few children did not at some point 




actually had one of the most well developed nursery systems in the world. A number 
of the women I spoke with in the NBL still consider it odd that some women in 
western Germany view nursery care in a negative light. Comments such as, “we went 
to them and we had no problem putting our children in them” were common among 
women I spoke with in the NBL as well as in the other countries I visited.130 
The closing of nurseries across the region had far-reaching consequences. For 
example in Poland, about 60% of childcare facilities closed in the early years. Those 
left were extremely expensive (Nowokowska 1996). In the NBL, a single mother in 
her late twenties talked with me about her decision to drive 45 minutes each direction 
to take her 3 year old son to daycare. She said that it is either this, as that was the only 
spot available, or she quits her job. She lamented the difficulty in the daily commute, 
but she felt it was important that she continue working for her own personal sense of 
accomplishment. A Polish woman explained that, “Nursery spots are [still] hard to 
come by.” This is one of the reasons young women in the region have, in many cases, 
put off having children and are having fewer children than their mothers before them 
(“Eastern European Population…” 2000).131   
Political Participation 
Having a job outside of the home has the potential to empower and train women 
to be active in other areas: politics for example. The lack of, or in the case of post-
communist Europe, removal of employment opportunities for women eliminates one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 It is unclear, and obviously debatable, just how well run communist nursery care facilities were. In 
many regards, it probably depended a great deal on location. Although some of the women I spoke 
with in the region admitted that nurseries were not the “fanciest” facilities, none of them indicated to 
me that the nurseries were inadequate, and a number of them brought up fond memories from time 
spent in such care (Interviews 2007-2008).  
131 The significant drop in birthrates across the country after 1989 has been the focus of interesting 
academic work. With small increases in recent years, there is concern that any rebound will be too late 




avenue for female efficacy creation. Correspondingly, the decrease of female labor 
force participation after 1989, due in large part to economic restructuring played a 
significant role by not providing a basis for political activity among women in the 
region. I heard it a number of times in my interviews, yet a woman in the NBL 
summed it up best when she stated that, “unemployment keeps getting worse, this is 
why more women are not political.” She went on to declare that, “[s]ocialization on 
the job is real and it is important!” When pressed further, she explained that she 
talked to people at work, learned new things and though always guarding against 
getting too close, she felt like part of something. She was referring to a sense of 
efficacy that was created through her labor force participation.      
“Women are mentally affected [by job-loss]” a German woman explained. Across 
the region, when I asked women about the transition away from communism and 
about their own political participation, the conversation almost always turned to the 
lack of employment opportunities. This was especially the case with the middle aged 
and older women I spoke with who had experienced the communist system. Yet, 
when I asked these women if they were politically active, specifically in LIP 
activities, during the early transition period when their jobs were disappearing, most 
responded that they were not. When I sought reasons for the non-participation, along 
with some of the other issues addressed in this section, I heard comments like “I 
didn’t feel it would matter” and “I was depressed without a job and was just trying to 
make due.” These feelings encouraged isolation rather than political motivation.    
Finally, in Poland one of the women I spoke with echoed sentiments that I heard 




the raising of the kids. Other help is expensive.” She went on to say the four words I 
heard over and over again when I asked women about their willingness to participate 
politically. Explaining that during the initial transition and still today, women did not 
have time to participate because they were looking for work and worrying about their 
responsibilities at home with little help from husbands or from the state as previously. 
She and so many others simply said, “Women are so busy!” The limits on time are 
related to efficacy in the sense that given time constraints, coupled with a feeling that 
their problems are unimportant or that their actions will have little effect, there is less 
of an inclination for women to be politically active.  
In sum, the disappearance of a number of jobs that could have provided a 
platform for female efficacy, along with the frustration and stresses associated with 
loosing employment deterred female political participation throughout the early 
1990s. Contributing to this, the double burden intensified to some degree with the end 
of communism. All leading to my Polish interviewee’s observation, that many 
women had little time, nor the efficacy to engage in LIP. These observations make 
gendered job displacement after 1989 an important component in addressing the low 
levels of female LIP recorded.    
 The Labor Force and Politics: A Theory of Efficacy Creation  
Gendered job displacement in the post-communist region created a situation 
where many women did not have the time, nor in some cases a source of continuing 
efficacy development, to be politically active. The potential participatory attributes of 
employment have a solid theoretic basis. Almost 50 years ago, Almond and Verba 
(1963) found that civicness was a behavior that could be learned and advanced in 




claimed that participation in the labor market instilled and encouraged a desire to 
participate in the political realm. They suggested that the skills (e.g. organizational 
and communication skills) learned at work were similar to those needed to participate 
in civic activities such as voting, demonstrating and joining parties. The connection 
was strongest for those that worked in jobs that allowed them decision-making 
capabilities, leadership opportunities or the ability to be creative and mold the final 
product outcome.132 The probable relationship between employment and civic 
involvement is now widely accepted (Almond and Verba 1963, Pateman 1995 
[1970]). Over the last half-century, researchers continued to investigate the nuances 
and dimensions of the participatory link (Verba et al 1995; Sobel 1993; Milbrath and 
Goel 1977). One branch of this research supports the significance of a participatory 
relationship between the labor force and politics specifically for women (Pateman 
1970; Norris 1987, Schlozman, Burnes and Verba 1999, Kenworthy and Malami 
1999, Pollert 2005, Morgan 2008).  
Studies have found that all forms of labor force activity significantly and 
positively relate to women’s political participation because the pool of women 
available for political activity increases. Essentially, that there are more women in the 
public sphere who are learning valuable skills and interacting with a large scope of 
people. Scholars argue that labor force participation provides an arena for enhanced 
confidence, skill development, socialization and efficacy (Almond and Verba 1963, 
Sobel 1993, Verba et al 1995, Schlozman et al 1999). This means that the number of 
women with transferable skills increases and the potential for on-the-job recruitment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 This and further studies led to a research boom, especially in regards to the development of 




grows. Kenworthy and Malami (1999) found that working outside the home can have 
important externalities such as skill development and personal confidence building 
that significantly enhances the likelihood that a woman will then also choose to be 
politically active.  
All forms of work have the potential to create female efficacy. However, not 
surprisingly, some studies have found that the link between labor force and political 
participation is strongest for women in management positions where they have the 
ability to make important decisions.133 Although the correlation is slightly weaker, 
studies confirm a link between non-managerial work and female political 
participation as well. At a basic level, the value of labor force participation for other 
forms of participation is a process of socialization, networking and skill development, 
the simple occurrence of a woman being out of the home and at a job means that a 
least some of these benefits could accrue. However, there is no guarantee that this 
will happen.   
Sobel too argued that, “[o]ne learns to participate by participating” (1993, 239). 
He further explained that the hierarchy of formality is important and that the roles one 
plays at work prepare one for participation in similarly structured environments such 
as politics. Therefore, if one is in a managerial position, they are more likely to take 
part in high intensity political activity, such as running for office. If someone works 
in a factory, this level of employment would encourage workers to participate in 
lower intensity politics, such as joining a party or attending a demonstration. From 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 The direction of causation regarding women in management is somewhat unclear. It is possible that 
having the ability to make important decisions and to control work place functions will result in a 
corresponding desire to engage in the political realm. It is also plausible that those women who are 
motivated and driven to reach the higher echelons of their chosen profession, are likely predisposed to 




assessments done around the world, it is also evident that the benefits of work on 
other forms of participation (e.g. political participation) are greater for those that 
work fulltime (Schlozman et al 1999). Because there tend to be fewer women in the 
labor market and because women of childbearing years often leave their employment 
for various lengths of time, women are more likely than men to miss the socialization 
process that employment facilitates.134 Women outside the labor force are often also 
outside of social groups and information sharing that can lead to greater political 
involvement. Exploring the issue from the other side, Schlozman and his co-authors 
(1999) determined that globally, “stay-at-home” wives and mothers face considerable 
isolation, which further removes them from political processes and interactions. Gurin 
also argued that staying home reinforces traditional gender roles (Gurin 1986, 177). 
This can bolster the position that women should not play a role in the public sphere 
(political activity), but should focus their energies in the private realm. 
The Positive Externalities of Employment 
The ability to socialize with others at work, with varied experiences and 
backgrounds contributes to a greater exchange of ideas and points of view. It also 
allows for the development of skills, such as time management, organization and 
communication that transfer well to politics (Nelson and Chowdhury 1994, 
Schlozman et al 1999, Burns et al 2001). This does not mean that all people who 
work are inclined toward political participation, rather it suggests that there are 
benefits derived from employment that have the potential to encourage people toward 
greater political participation. Verba, Schlozman and Brady refer to one of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 In truth, there are not a lot of part time jobs available to women in the ECE region. It is not a 
common practice. Nor is the option of working from home and teleconferencing in to meetings. This 
may change as technology and businesses continue to evolve. This could improve the situation for 




externalities as the development of resources in the sense that one gains personal 
skills on the job that facilitate political participation (Verba et al 1995).  
Carole Pateman (1970) found that through socialization, the workplace creates 
political efficacy. This can occur because people interact with one another, work on 
projects together and form relationships that bolster self-worth and confidence. The 
knowledge that one is contributing to the family income creates a sense of worth and 
value. For women in particular, an income means self-sufficiency and independence. 
On the job, the ability to produce a product or provide a service often creates a feeling 
of accomplishment. These feelings increase as one gains expertise, or advances in the 
company. Confidence has a spillover effect empowering some women to become 
politically active (Campbell et al 1954; Pateman 1970; Verba et al 1995).  
Related to learning and greater socialization, the workplace is a significant means 
of disseminating information (Schlozman et al 1999). From gossip to politics, new 
bands to recipe ideas, employees exchange all kinds of information at the proverbial 
office water cooler.135 This is especially important in regards to LIP. Social 
relationships established on the job put women in situations for recruitment in 
political activity, and provides a place to discuss and learn about political 
opportunities such as petitions or rallies. Even in instances where employers 
discourage this type of discussion, employees will often find ways to exchange 
information. Hence, on the job networking can lead to political recruitment. This 
might be especially relevant in oppressive regimes, as work becomes a means of 
passing dissident information (Siani-Davies 2007).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Considering the confidence building and possible efficacy creating externalities of 
female employment, the elimination of employment can have harsh psychological 
effects. Just as employment enhances one’s sense of value, unemployment can result 
in depression and diminishing confidence. As efficacy relates to a desire to be 
politically active, the lack of confidence that results in the elimination of a job or the 
inability to find employment can have the opposite effect: a lack of efficacy and 
hence less political involvement (Almond and Verba 1963, Sobel 1993, Pateman 
1995, Clavero and Galligan 2005).  
The psychological effects of job loss and unemployment on men are well studied 
(e.g. Kasl and Cobb 1970; Topel 1990). However, little literature looks at the effects 
joblessness has on women – especially long-term unemployment. This absence is not 
because women do not feel the effects of job loss, rather it is because men have 
traditionally made up a larger portion of the labor market and hence have received 
greater academic and sociological attention. Only more recently have scholars sought 
to explore the effects of job loss on women (e.g. Farber 1997; Kendler et al 2001).136 
Women who cannot find work do not have the ability to influence or control policies 
within an important environment such as the work place and they can lose the 
“contributor” identity that studies show employment provides for many women 
(Einhorn 1993, Rueschemeyer 1998b, Titkow 1998). As evidenced earlier in this 
chapter, for a number of the women I spoke with in the ECE region, this indeed 
appears to be the case. This is not to say that women can only feel empowered 
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different. Men are more likely to exhibit physical responses such as high blood pressure, enhanced 
chances of heart disease and diabetes. This can lead to negative behaviors like alcoholism and 
domestic violence. Women too experience severe depression and agitation, resulting in weight-loss or 




through employment. I explained in Chapter 5 that activity within a women’s 
movement can also lead to a sense of accomplishment, which can likewise create 
externalities conducive to political participation. However, it is clear that female 
efficacy can result from employment and can encourage women to be more 
politically active.   
The Czech Republic: Mediated Gender Job Displacement 
As presented in Chapter 1, the Czech Republic displayed moderately high levels 
of female LIP after the initial transition period. One of the contributing factors is the 
intensity of gendered job displacement, which affected women and their willingness 
to participate elsewhere in the region. Gendered job displacement was not as drastic 
or long lasting in the Czech Republic as elsewhere. While labor force participation 
levels of women did drop more than men’s in the early years, the economic situation 
has not been as dire. Therefore, there were still a number of Czech women who 
retained or found new employment during the 1990s. While the increase in the double 
burden was similar in the Czech Republic as the other cases examined, many women 
did not have the added pressure of job hunting or long-term unemployment.137 Hence, 
there continued to be women socializing on the job and for some employment became 
the efficacy creator that theory suggests it has the potential to be.  
Economic Reaction 
Unlike Poland, Romania and the NBL, the Czech economy has shown relative 
resilience and strength after some initially trying times in the early 1990s. The Czech 
Republic was slightly ahead of the curve when the transition came. They continued to 
maintain their favorable position throughout the early transition by closely monitoring 
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ended. In Czechoslovakia in1989 there were 78,555 nurseries care spots for children under the age of 




the effects of economic reforms and by successfully enticing direct foreign 
investment. These two features of the Czech economy in the 1990s are in large part 
responsible for the country’s ability to rebound after 40 years of Communist Party 
rule. In the early transition, Czech government officials acted on the philosophy that 
they should get market rules straight and the rest will come (Sacks 1993). 
Czechoslovakia, and then the Czech Republic, was not immune to the difficulties 
of economic restructuring. As elsewhere, after 1989, unemployment numbers soared 
in the Czech Republic and it too witnessed massive layoffs and factory closures. 
Again, as elsewhere, the features of that economic downturn had a gendered nature. A 
Czech academic I spoke with described it as “structural unemployment of women” 
with many of the factory jobs that women filled disappearing.  
Economic restructuring was necessary after the events of 1989, but by then the 
country was already in a better position than many of the other countries in post-
communist Europe. “In 1989 Czechoslovakia had the greatest proportion of capital 
goods exports to the West and did not suffer either from the high inflation or a foreign 
debt crisis as did its Central European neighbors” (True 2003, 11). Zemplinenova and 
Machacek (2003) agree that when compared to the rest of the region, the Czech 
Republic was in an enviable situation when communism ended. The country enjoyed 
a relatively high rate of industrial activity and they were producers and exporters of 
agricultural and industrial goods within the communist region, and with the West to 
an extent as well. 
In Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic, the government advanced a 




public and the Parliament supported (Mejstrik 1995, 39). However, in the Czech 
Republic, governing elites tempered shock therapy policies into what Sacks (1993) 
calls a “modified path” that included some features of gradualism. Realizing that 
shock therapy would be difficult, the government attempted to make preparations to 
limit the hardships restructuring would have on citizens. True explained that, 
“[b]etween 1990 and 1992 a package of social policies was crafted to cushion the 
worst consequences of the liberalization of the economy and to ensure public support 
for reform” (True 2003, 12). One aspect of the Czech approach that was unique was 
its use of a relatively cheap voucher system to assist in the privatization process. 
Citizens were enthusiastic about the program, as were international entities that were 
also allowed to buy in. In large part due to the voucher system, “…by the end of 
1991, small privately held firms accounted for 41.3% of retail sales” (Sacks 1993, 
191).  
The influx of investment dollars from abroad provided a significant advantage for 
the Czech Republic and functioned to establish a financial basis for the country’s 
development and growth throughout the first decade of transition. Foreign direct 
investment went from $600 million in 1991 to $1,200 million a year later (Mejstrik 
1995, 39). Jacqui True wrote that, “[t]he Czech Republic has received the most 
foreign direct investment per capital among those former Soviet Bloc countries since 
1994” (True 2004, 84). Through the privatization process, the government was able to 




and Gamble and Nestlé to name a few. This provided large amounts of foreign capita 
coming into the country (Zemplinenova and Machacek 2003, 219).138  
In regards to Czech women, the state played a key role in the design and delivery 
of newly fashioned welfare measures. As noted, unemployment, though quite high 
in1990 and 1991, rebounded and stabilized soon after. Even with these lower figures, 
women remained the majority of the unemployed. In fact, ten years after the Velvet 
Revolution, True (2003) points out that more women than men registered as 
unemployed. She argues that this is an indication of not only the gendered nature of 
unemployment, even at low rates, in the country but also a strong desire of women to 
find employment.  
There were initially policies that aimed at encouraging, somewhat successfully, 
older women to retire early. As a result of this and some women opting to stay home, 
labor force participation rates altered and stayed low since the end of communism. In 
1988, 73.7% of Czech women were in the labor market, in 2006 that number was at 
64.4% despite a good economy (UN Stats). The women who chose early retirement 
or to voluntarily leave the labor force have often assisted their daughters and sons 
with childcare (True 2003, 12).  Yet it appears that a significant number of women in 
the Czech Republic wanted to work and sought out opportunities to do so. Jaquette 
and Wolchick reported early survey data from 1990, where only 7% of Czech women 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Although the entire country has seen this investment, the country has been fortunate to be home to 
the city of Prague, which has reaped both investment and tourist dollars. In the 1990s, Prague quickly 
became a tourist hotspot and tourist-draw for western tourists; a role it continues to play. Already by 
1993, Czech tourism brought in an additional $1.3 billion in revenue (Grinda 1997). Today, Prague 
remains full of European, American and Australian visitors. Prague is but one bright spot among many, 
yet the entire country has benefited from investment in the city. Additionally, infrastructural 






questioned indicated that they wanted to “stay at home permanently” (1998). 
Fortunately, for those women jobs, often in tourism or with some of the new forging 
companies that flocked to the country, were more available than they were for women 
elsewhere in the region. While many surely did lose their jobs in the early years, the 
depth and longevity of unemployment for these women was not as extensive as in 
other ECE countries.  
Effects on Political Participation 
Given the low female unemployment rate in the Czech Republic, especially in the 
population center in Prague, theory would lead us to believe that political 
participation among women should be relatively high. In regional comparison, this 
appears to be borne out. For many of the same reasons women elsewhere in the 
region lamented not having jobs during the 1990s, women in the Czech Republic 
recognized the importance they placed on their employment. For example, an early 
survey taken by the Sociological Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences 
in 1992, found that Czech women wanted to be in the labor force for reasons beyond 
the need for a dual-income. Many questioned indicated that employment brought 
independence and self-fulfillment (Cermáaková 1995). Because unemployment 
spiked for only a relatively short period of time after 1989 (and then again for a short 
period in 1997-98), fewer Czech women faced the long-term unemployment 
frustrations than elsewhere in the region.  
A number of the Czech women I spoke with recognized the link between their 
labor force participation and LIP. Many acknowledged that in the 1990s, and even 
now, they heard information at work about all sorts of things from the banal to the 




in the fall of 2007 there were a series of rallies opposing the US plan to build a 
missile base in the country, and another protest in reaction to a proposed neo-Nazi 
interruption of events planned to mark “the Night of Broken Glass.” I attended a 
number of these and asked people how they knew about them and why they were 
there. Some responded that they happened to be walking by and others said they saw 
fliers. However, the majority of the people I asked said they heard about it at work 
(Interviews 2007-2008). Clearly there are other ways to inform people, but work 
continues to be a means to disseminate information.   
Finally, while it would be inaccurate to say that Czech women have more time 
than other women in the region and therefore participate more in political activities, it 
may be fair to say that their priorities are different. Most women who wanted to work 
or needed to work were able to find employment in the 1990s. Czech women in large 
part were able to stay involved in the labor force and a number of those were involved 
in political activities as well.  
Variable Interaction 
Efficacy creation and skill development are important for political activity. In this 
chapter, I have argued that one way for women to gain these is through involvement 
in the labor market. Therefore, with gendered job displacement in the ECE region 
after 1989, this possibility lessened, playing a role in deterring many of the region’s 
women for LIP during the initial transition away from communism in the 1990s.  
However, based solely on the intensity of gendered job displacement, NBL 
women should not produce high numbers of LIP. In fact, considering the extent and 
duration of female unemployment in the NBL we might expect women there to be 




was the GDR were especially active in LIP activities in the early 1990s. The 
explanation comes from exploring all three of the factors presented for explaining 
why the region’s women, in general, were not politically active.  
I have argued throughout the last three chapters that three variables (communist 
legacy, lack of an institutionalized women’s movement and gendered job 
displacement) are important factors for understanding the low regional female LIP 
statistics. These three factors were strong and intense during the initial transition 
period leading to low LIP throughout much of the post-communist region, and 
certainly in two of my case studies: Poland and Romania. My other cases, the NBL 
and the Czech Republic lack intensity in one of the factors resulting in higher rates of 
LIP.  
An institutionalized women’s movement can also be a valuable tool for the 
advancement of women. Therefore, I argue that one of the contributing reasons for 
why the NBL has not followed the pattern of much of the rest of the region is because 
it had a women’s movement prior to 1989 (see Chapter 5). Despite the fact that 
women in the NBL are extremely frustrated with the economic situation that makes 
employment difficult and nurseries spots scarce, they continued to participate in low 
intensity political activities throughout the 1990s in large part because they have a 
known venue for airing their grievances and the institutional foundation from which 
to do so. In fact the severity of their economic circumstances may have actually 
prompted them to even greater activity. Women in the country have a history of 
organizing, and doing so specifically as women. This appears to mediate the negative 





In conclusion, gendered job displacement is part of an explanation for low female 
LIP in the post-communist region. Labor force participation is a known creator of 
female efficacy, which has the potential to encourage women into greater political 
participation. In the ECE region, women worked in large percentages and made up a 
significant (nearly half) of the labor force. Although it remains debatable if this 
employment created efficacy, some scholars and a number of the women I 
interviewed indicated that it did. Though the ability to transfer that efficacy into the 
political realm was limited to a degree by the communist system, though it did 
advance dissent organizations where women became active, the potential existed. 
With the economic transformations of the early 1990s, women disproportionately lost 
their jobs in large number, and in much of the region remained unemployed for long 
periods of time. Job loss meant less possibility of efficacy creation on the job. It also 
meant for a number of women a significant decrease in efficacy and devaluation of 
their self-worth as many struggled to find new employment opportunities. At the 
same time that a number of women were losing their jobs and feeling that their 
concerns and opinions were unimportant, the responsibilities of the double burden 






A Generation Later 
 
Introduction 
In all four cases explored in this project, I had the opportunity to speak with 
young women in their twenties.139 These were women who have little, if any, memory 
of life under communism. In large part, what they know of that time comes from the 
recollections of their parents and from media portrayals. A few remember the last 
days of communism. One NBL woman in her early 30s fondly remembered some of 
the sights, sounds, and tastes from her childhood in the late 1980s. However, she 
explained that due to the westernization of many East German products most of the 
items, from candy bars to toys, which characterized her formative years, are only 
found today in museums.140 Other young women have vague memories of the early 
1990s, and they talked with me about some of the difficulties that their parents faced, 
but also the excitement everyone felt when new products, such as bananas, oranges, 
Coke a Cola, and Levis were suddenly available.141 This group of women experienced 
the end of communism and the beginnings of democratic transition as young children. 
Today, they are finishing their studies, seeking employment opportunities and making 
decisions about when to start their families.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 The women I interviewed are broken down into three categories. The first are the 43 interviewees 
that I often refer to as young or younger women. These are females in their twenties and early 30s who 
represent the first generation of women to come of age after the end of communism. The second group, 
the middle generation, are women I interviewed who are in their mid-thirties to mid 50s. These 35 
women were young adults during the early transition period. Finally, the third classification is the older 
generation of interviewees who were in their late 50s or older. This group of 50 women is made up of 
women who came of age in the 1960s or 1970s who were middle aged in 1989. I also spoke with 5 
men in the region from relevant organizations: NGOs, political parties and academia.  
140 There has been a bit of a resurgence of communist items, like Kofola soda, recently.  
141 The influx of “western” goods continues, and is reaching further eastward. During the summer of 
2008, I was surprised to see two Starbucks Coffee shops in the city of Cluj-Napoca, Romania, which 




This first generation of post-communist women, face a number of new challenges 
such as rising food prices, sexist employment practices, and expensive childcare. 
Despite the existence of these issues, which could unite and mobilize post-communist 
women, few of those interviewed indicated that this was occurring. Additionally, few 
felt that society or government fostered their political involvement at the high or low-
intensity levels. Regionally, some women interviewed were quite adamant that the 
apparent lack of female political involvement is a missed opportunity for women, 
especially younger women, to voice their concerns. Others simply stated that their 
participation was unwanted and that it “would not make a difference.” Twenty years 
of democratic transition has brought many changes, despite some positive signs of 
female social and political involvement, as will be seen, there are still a number of 
women in the region who refrain from even low intensity political participation.   
In this dissertation, I have argued that the communist legacy, the weakness of an 
institutionalized woman’s movement before 1989, and gendered job displacement 
after, together helped produce a situation where women were less inclined to 
participate in low intensity political activity during the initial transition away from 
communism in Europe. Yet, now it has been two decades since the Berlin Wall fell 
and a new generation, a post-communist generation, of women has come of age. 
Therefore, this chapter explores the effects of 20 years of post-communism on 
women (of the new and older generations) in the ECE region and on female LIP in 
general.  
This chapter is broken into three topics. First, I explore the opinions and 




post-communist region by analyzing responses to my three country telephone 
surveys. This provides a quantifiable measure for examining female LIP in the region 
today. This data shows mixed results, as in almost all instances there is an increase 
from 1999 in both the number of respondents who might consider LIP activities, but 
also an increase in those that said they “would never” participate and a drop in those 
that indicate that they already have done so. In the second section of the chapter, I 
explore how the eastward expansion of the European Union and the NGO sector, two 
processes that have resulted in major changes in the region, are affecting women’s 
willingness and ability to be politically active. To do this, I address the evolution of 
these processes from the 1990s till today and suggest the potential for, yet to date 
unrealized, increases in levels of female LIP. In the last section I return to the original 
argument of this dissertation regarding female LIP during the initial transition period, 
and assess the importance of the contributing factors today. In doing so, I determine 
that the communist legacy, the weakness of an institutionalized women’s movement, 
and gendered job displacement continue to be relevant factors affecting women’s LIP 
in post-communist Europe. Finally, I conclude with a brief summation of the 
dissertation project and present some questions for future analysis.  
Regionalism 
In my research design (see Chapter 2), I explained that it is appropriate to 
consider the formerly communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe in the early 
1990s as a region and in doing so to acknowledge country differences, but to focus 
heavily on their similarities. Despite obvious geographic, demographic and cultural 
differences, in 1990 all of the countries were emerging from 40 years of communist 




economic systems and in many ways, due to physical and political isolation, citizens 
in the region had rather similar worldviews as well. Now, 20 years later, while it is 
still proper to refer to these countries as a geographic region, which does retain 
aspects of its communist legacy, the individual countries have traversed varying 
transition paths. Today, it is fitting to highlight the growing differences among 
countries in the region. The countries of the region have chosen various economic 
paths, political structures and in some ways have seen a rebirth in their own national 
identities since 1989. It is interesting to note that this has occurred at the same time 
that the individual countries sought and achieved membership in the EU, and 
organization that requires some level of economic and political convergence. In 
regards to women in the region, it is also true that while they have some similar 
concerns and challenges as their neighboring eastern sisters, there is a larger degree of 
divergence now than there was a generation ago. As one of the Polish women I 
interviewed pointed out, “[w]omen were previously more homogenous, now they are 
more separate – [there are] more options.”  
Participation and Opinion a Generation Later 
In Chapter 1, I used results from the World Values Survey as evidence to discuss 
the informal political participatory attitudes of women in the ECE region. The data 
showed that the average LIP activities of those in the ECE region were notably lower 
than the average for responses to the same LIP questions asked in Western Europe, 
the United States and Canada. Breaking statistics down by individual country, LIP 
related questions showed that within each country (including what was East Germany 
and what after 1993 became the Czech Republic) there was a gendered pattern of 




participated in these activities. Conversely, women were significantly more likely to 
respond that they “would never” do so. Although the gendered nature of this finding 
remained consistent throughout the ECE region, the WVS indicated that women in 
the NBL and, to a lesser extent, women in the Czech Republic were more likely to 
participate than women in other countries of the region. Only 8.8% of women in the 
NBL and 16.1% of women in the Czech Republic indicated that they would never 
sign a petition, whereas the 1999 regional average was 42.8%. Likewise, in regards to 
participation in a lawful demonstration, 23.2% of female respondents in the NBL and 
34.7% in the Czech Republic said they would never take part in such an activity, 
below the 49% regional average. My other two cases represented opinions below 
regional averages. Women in Romania responded at 63% that they would never sign 
a petition and in Poland the figure was 54%. In terms of willingness to attend a legal 
demonstration, 54% of female respondents in Romania and 67% of women in Poland 
answered that they would never do so (WVS 1999).    
In 2005, the WVS released an updated, though abridged, survey round. Poland 
and Romanian were both included in the sample, although the NBL and the Czech 
Republic were not. Statistics comparing responses to the petition and demonstration 
question from 1999 to 2005 indicates even greater numbers of Romanian women that 
claim they would never participate in either activity. For example, in 1999, 63% of 
female respondents said they would never sign a petition. By 2005, 72.3% of women 
asked provided the same answer. A similar story arose for women and demonstrations 
in Romania (54.4% to 70.9% in 2005). In Poland, the statistics were more favorable. 




percentage was down to 49.2%. Likewise, for willingness to demonstrate the figures 
for women in 1999 was 67% and in 2005 it was 64.9%. While the situation in Poland 
seems to have improved slightly, the WVS still shows that around 50% or more 
women in the country say they would never take part in these two forms of low-
intensity political action (WVS 1999; WVS 2005).  
In an effort at contemporary comparison, I commissioned research institutions to 
conduct telephone surveys in the NBL, the Czech Republic, and Romania. In the 
surveys I asked questions related specifically to types of LIP (e.g. “would you sign a 
petition”) as well as questions that can help inform decision about LIP (e.g. “what is 
your biggest worry?” and “do women support women?”). These questions allude to 
obstacles to female LIP. For example, as seen in Chapter 6, if women are worried 
about finding and keeping a job, the labor force and participatory link of enhanced 
efficacy may not be strong and hence we would expect low female LIP. Related to 
this, if a majority of women in the country feel that having a job is important or they 
seek to be employed full time and jobs are not available, this too could damage 
confidence and efficacy that might affect a woman’s willingness to be politically 
active.  
The information gathered from these surveys highlights the current level of 
female LIP among the sample populations in these three cases, as well as the patterns 
of difference between these countries. Although the statistics are quite helpful in this 
assessment, it is always difficult to compare statistics across sources. Moreover, I 
purposely sampled only women. Therefore, the statistics from my surveys do not 




data, we know that female participation rates continue to be lower than men’s in the 
post-communist region. Additionally, the individual surveys are representative of 
women’s opinions in the three cases, but they are not necessarily representative of 
women of the entire ECE region. The inclusion of the NBL survey, the area showing 
the highest level of female LIP in the 1999 WVS, and of Romania, which had quite 
low returns on female LIP, does however, provide some range of context for the 
region.   
An effective way to compare survey question responses from different countries 
is to merge the data into a single dataset and then to compare the results using factor 
analysis. By determining a number of factor components, I can see which questions 
“hang together.” This indicates that there is some underlying value or reason 
compelling people to answer groups of questions similarly. This process does not 
indicate responses to the individual questions, but rather what questions fit together.  
Running all of my questions through the factor analysis, the results indicated that 
the ideal component number is three.142 This number is selected because it provides 
the best categorization for the questions, allowing for the most substantial explanation 
of response variance.143 With the addition of a 3rd component and beyond, as 
represented by a scree plot, the added amount of variance explained was minor and 
therefore unhelpful. In the end, factor component 1 accounts for the greatest amount 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 This was done using Principle Component Analysis (PCA), a type of factor analysis. This was run 
using SPSS software.  
143 The purpose of factor analysis is to find a limited number of factors (latent variables) that drive 
question response. There are likely a large number of these variables, but it is most useful to pick out 
the ones that explain the most significant amount of response variance. Examining the component 
matrix and the degree of variance (eigenvalue) there is a point at which the added variance becomes so 
small that its inclusion is unnecessary. This is visible in a scree plot where the line connecting 




of response variation at 17.7%. The second factor component represents an additional 
11.7% of variation with component 3 displaying 8.9% of variation.  
FACTOR COMPONENT 1: PARTICIPATION 
Survey Question Factor  
Interest in Politics .676 
Willingness to sign a petition .671 
Willingness to work at an NGO .648 
Willingness to attend lawful demonstration .618 
Having women in politics is important .587 
 
The factor comparison from these five questions, particularly the first four, return 
high similarity statistics. This means that those that responded a given way to the 
question about their interest in politics, correspondingly had similar responses when 
asked about petition signing, demonstrating and so on. Therefore, we can surmise that 
those who are interested in politics are also willing to participate in lawful 
demonstrations. Likewise those that are not interested in politics are also likely to 
have indicated that they would not participate in a demonstration. The underlining 
value here is the importance, or lack thereof, placed on political participation.  
Q 1: Are you interested in politics? 
 Very Somewhat  Not Very Not At All 
Czech Rep. 11.5% 52% 23.8% 12.7% 
NBL 9.6% 34.7% 47.1% 8.7% 
Romania 4.8% 36.6% 32.2% 26.3% 
 
Q 2: Would you sign a petition? 2008 (WVS 1999) 
 Have Done Might Do Would Never Do (1999 WVS) 
Czech Republic 22.8% (57.4%) 72.1% (26.5%) 5.2% (16.1%) 
Germany (NBL) 14.3% (60.6%) 47.3% (30.6%) 38.7% (8.8%) 
Romania 5.1% (9.2%) 50.8% (27.8%) 44.1% (63%) 
 
Q3: Would you work for an NGO? 
 Have Done  Might Do Would Never  Don’t Know 
Czech Republic 16.7% 41.8% 31.0% 10.5% 
NBL 13.6% 42.4% 43.3%% 0.7% 
Romania 2.5% 35.6% 61.9% ----- 
 
Q4: Would you participate in a lawful demonstration? 2008 (WVS 1999) 
 Have Done  Might Do Would Never Do 




NBL 28.2% (44%) 34.4% (32.8%) 37.3%  (23.2%) 
Romania 4.3% (11.4%) 38.1% (34.2%) 57.6%  (54.4%) 
 
Regarding the question asking respondents about their interest in politics, both the 
NBL and Romanian samples indicated that a larger percentage of them are either “not 
very” or “not at all” interested. Women in the Czech sample were much more 
inclined to answer that they cared about politics.  
Exploring the two questions (petition signing – Q2 and demonstrating – Q4) with 
comparable data from 1999, there are mixed results. In both petition signing and 
demonstrating, the number of respondents from the 2008 surveys, answered much 
less that they had participated in such activities. The figure for women demonstrating 
in Romania was low in 1999 at 11.4%, but in the more recent survey it was lower yet 
at just 4.3%. Although the “have” participated statistics declined in all cases, there 
was an increase in all cases of respondents who said they “might do” such activities. 
This may indicate an availability issue in which respondents have not had the 
opportunity to take part in such forms of LIP. Having not participated, these “might” 
responses indicate that for a number of women, the possibility at least exists. 
However, just as there was an increase in “might do” responses, there was also an 
increase in “would never” responses. Again, with the exception of Czech petition 
signing, in the petition signing and demonstrating questions, over a third (and 
sometimes well over a third) of women asked said that they “would never” take part 
in these LIP activities. The fact that there is an increase of “would nevers” in the NBL 
in both questions, and for demonstrating in the Czech Republic suggests that this may 
be a negative trend, as these are the two cases in the region that in the past exhibited 




Assessing NGO work, it is notable that over a third of respondents in each case 
replied that they have or would work for an NGO. Given that there was no 
comparable question in the WVS 1999 survey, it is difficult to compare these 
numbers to earlier times. However, the fact that in all three cases a third of 
respondents also claimed that they “would never” work for an NGO might suggest 
that there remains some stigma attached to NGO activity in the region. This is borne 
out in my interviews, as many noted the legitimacy of NGOs (see next section). For 
Romania the returns, with 61.9% of female respondents replying that they would not 
work for an NGO is likely due in part to the exclusion of an “I don’t know” option as 
well as the shorter existence of NGOs in Romania when compared to her neighbors.   
Q5: How Important is it to have women in formal politics? 
 Very Important Somewhat Important Not so Important Not Important 
Czech Rep. 39.3% 53.4% 5% 2.4% 
NBL 38.9% 46.4% 12.2% 2.4% 
Romania 27.5% 48.5% 16% 8% 
 
For those that advocate for increased numbers of women in formal political office 
holding, the results for the question “how important is it to have women in formal 
politics” are promising. In each of the three cases, at least 75% of female respondents 
indicated that it was either “very” or “somewhat” important that women hold political 
office. This is especially positive in Romania. While the numbers of women in formal 
office remain quite low there, the fact that a sizable portion of the female population 
at least sees the role that such women could have is notable. This could be the first 
step toward more women at least being willing to take part in LIP activities, as argued 
earlier the most enduring path toward greater HIP, though the data indicates that this 




It is interesting that the responses for these five participation component questions 
all show respondents from the Czech Republic as more participatory in general. 
Based on these questions, women in the Czech Republic are more interested in 
politics, more likely to agree that women in office are important, and are more willing 
to work for NGOs or participate in the LIP activities assessed. My surveys suggest 
that women in the Czech Republic are now more engaged in LIP activities than 
female respondents in the NBL, where women were significantly more participatory 
that women elsewhere in the region in the 1999 WVS survey.  
The gendered job displacement variable (see Chapter 6) likely plays a role. The 
depth and extent of gendered job displacement in the NBL has affected a significant 
number of women there. Not a single woman I spoke with in the NBL failed to 
mention the on-going worries of finding employment opportunities. In fact, when 
asked about their worries today (see subsection on additional questions), women in 
the NBL were almost three times as likely to mention employment concerns as 
women asked in the Czech Republic and even Romania. The fact that Czech women 
have not dealt with such extensive gendered job displacement and have with a few 
exceptions (the early 1990s, and 1997-98) had relatively stable economies has meant 
that these women are learning valuable skills on the job and as will be discussed in 
the final section of this chapter, are beginning to see the link between their position in 
the labor market and their potential voice in politics.     
FACTOR COMPONENT 2: GOVERNMENT AND FEMALE IDENTITY 
Survey Question Factor 
How well does the government represent women? .706 
Level of trust for politicians .665 
Women in politics represent the interests of women in general .480 





The above factor component questions also link together. Specifically, the 
communist legacy and lack of an institutionalized women’s movement are both at 
play, leading respondents to have similar responses to these four questions. As 
explained in Chapter 4, trust in government in the ECE region is especially low due to 
the history of repression under the communist governments. Although during that 
time women were held up as examples of the communist ideal and were given 
significant social benefits, there was and remains a skepticism about political 
motives. Additionally, the last two questions deal with how women perceive 
themselves and how they perceive each other.    
Q6: How well does government represent women? 
 Very Well Somewhat Well Not Very Well Very poorly 
Czech Rep. .8% 14.5% 43.3% 41.5% 
NBL .9% 26% 64.2% 8.4% 
Romania .7% 19.4% 47.4% 32.5% 
 
Q7: How much do you trust government/politicians? 
 Completely Somewhat  Don’t know Not Much Not at all 
Czech Rep. 2% 26.2% -----* 33.5% 38.3% 
NBL .2% 22.2% 6.4% 50% 21.1% 
Romania .6% 12.7% 39.9% 46.8% -----** 
* “Don’t know” was not an option in the Czech Republic 
** “Not at all” was not an option in Romania 
 
Women in these three cases are not very trustful of government and they do not 
view government as very effective in representing women. The sense of government 
distrust inherited from the communist era and perhaps strengthened during the 
uncertainty of transition is evident here. Additionally, the recognition, in all three 
countries, that their governments are not doing enough to represent women is notable. 
Whereas women in the Czech Republic and NBL are involved in female LIP, and 




between their involvement and governing effectiveness exhibiting both low trust and 
low participatory numbers.  
Q8: Do Women Support Women? 
 Yes No Don’t Know 
Czech Rep. 54.4% 35.3% 10.3% 
NBL 68% 26.7% 5.3% 
Romania 58.8% 24.3% 16.9% 
 
The answers to this question on female support runs somewhat counter to the 
interview data I collected. In the course of my fieldwork, particularly in Romania and 
Poland, but in the Czech Republic too, I very often heard that women were not 
supportive of other women. The discrepancy here could be a specificity difference 
between the question(s) I was asking in person, and the wording of the telephone 
survey question. When I spoke with women in the region I was able to clarify that I 
was inquiring primarily about female support of other women who engaged in formal 
or informal political activity. Reevaluating the survey forms and the translations, the 
question appears to have been asked in a more general sense. Therefore, the results 
might not necessarily contradict one another. Here the indication is that a majority of 
women asked think that women supported each other. This could be more in terms of 
helping each other on the job or as neighbors or assisting each other with childcare. 
Unfortunately, due to this specificity issue, this remains unclear.  
Q9: Do Women Have Specific Concerns? 
 Yes No Don’t Know 
Czech Rep. 45.6% 28.4% 26% 
NBL 74.7% 22.7% 2.7% 
Romania 46.5% 31.8% 21.7% 
 
The results for this question are rather mixed. In all three cases, at least 45% of 
the female populations surveyed feel that women have unique concerns as women. 




Romania (52.8%) responded “no” or “don’t know” indicating that in those countries 
there remains a number of women who do not recognize the issues that they face 
specifically due to their sex. The near 75% “yes” statistic in the NBL and the 10% 
larger “yes” response in the previous question asking if women support women also 
stands out. This is likely related to the women’s movement variable. The women of 
the NBL have experience unifying along gender lines and have at least seen forms of 
gender mobilization for thirty years now.144  
FACTOR COMPONENT 3: PARTY MEMBERSHIP 
Survey Question Factor 
Do you belong to a political party? .582 
 
One common LIP activity is party membership. In the ECE region party 
membership requires slightly more time and commitment than in the United States 
where one just joins, yet it is not an activity that is as time consuming as HIP 
activities such as running for office or being in party leadership. The level of party 
membership in the entire ECE region is low for men, and even more so for women. 
Forced party membership under communism, part of the continuing legacy, has left 
many wary of joining a party and skeptical of what such membership will mean. In 
particular, women were encouraged to be in the Communist Party and were often 
placed in token positions that were viewed by many citizens negatively. An added 
complication is the newness of political parties, as well as the often large numbers of 
parties, and the unclear platforms of some parties. The survey responses to the party 
membership question are not displayed here because, as with similar findings from 
the WVS, the figures were so small. My 2008 surveys confirm that, at least in these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 A larger discussion of the on-going importance of an institutionalized women’s movement is 




three cases, the number of women claiming to belong to political parties is miniscule. 
In each case no fewer than 95% of respondents answered “no” when asked if they 
belong to a political party.  
Additional Questions of Interest 
Finally, although not within the factor components, two additional questions 
about women’s concerns in the region, and about whether women would rather work 
outside the home, are insightful. The results seem to confirm our assumption about 
the relationship between financial difficulties and the desire, or in some cases need, 
for women to be employed outside of the home. Responses to these questions also 
highlight the role of employment and the gendered job displacement variable and the 
labor force and participatory link to LIP explored in Chapter 6. 
Q10: What is your biggest worry today? 
 Money Family Having things Employment Politics 
Czech Rep. 41.4% 29% 4.8% 12.6% 12.1% 
NBL 19.6% 41.3% .2% 32.9% 5.9% 
Romania 42.5% 37.1% 4.3% 13.9% 2.1% 
 
What is apparent in the responses to the above question, asking women to pin-
point their biggest concern today, is that the NBL sample focused on family and 
employment in much higher numbers than respondents in the other surveys. The 
documented depth and persistence of gendered job displacement in the NBL is 
evident in these responses. The double-digit number of Czech respondents (12.1%) 
that answered that their biggest worry was about politics is significantly higher than 
the other two cases. Whereas the German respondents high concern for employment 
likely is contributing to less female LIP than seen in 1999 in the NBL, the fact that a 




women in the Czech Republic that political processes matter, as evidence by their 
correspondingly higher figures of female LIP seen throughout this data section.     
Q11: If you had a choice, what would your ideal work situation be? 
 Full-Time Out of 
House 
Part-time Out of 
House 
No Employment No 
Preference 
Czech Rep. 43.3% 18.7% 29.8% 17.3% 
NBL 43.1% 34.9% 13.1% 8.9% 
Romania 52.5%% 10.3% 6.9% 30.3% 
 
The responses to this final question run contrary to those that argue that women in 
the ECE region genuinely want to stay home. Surely some of them do, but in each of 
the three cases, when asked about their ideal work situation, a significant number of 
women stated that they would prefer full-time employment in the labor market. The 
rather low responses by women in the Czech Republic and Romania who said they 
would like part-time employment as opposed to the higher number for the NBL 
sample, may have something to do with the fact that part-time work is much more 
common in the NBL (and Germany as a whole) than in the Czech Republic or 
Romania. Therefore, that response may be more about familiarity than rejection of 
part-time work.  
Demographic Indicators 
Taking the three surveys as a whole, it is possible that there might be some 
additional indicators that may affect responses. Since the rise of behavioralism in the 
United States during the middle of the 20th century, there has been a great deal of 
literature attempting to understand individual motivations for political participation. 
Most famously is The American Voter (Campbell et al 1960) and the V.O. Key 
response, The Responsible Electorate (1966). Those seminal pieces, and other early 
work on political participation, which examined electoral politics in the United States, 




early studies and those that followed, highlight a number of demographic variables 
that have become commonplace in analysis of political participations. Conway (2000) 
lists the most important of these as age, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, income and 
education. Size of community, and more recently family status, have also become 
variables of interest in participatory studies (Conway 2000; Parker 2007) Therefore, 
for each of the participatory questions asked in my telephone surveys, I ran a simple 
linear regression followed by a series of crosstabulations to determine the impact of 
demographics I included in the questionnaire: age, educational attainment, marital 
status, number of children and urban or rural residency. In most instances, the 
relationship between these variables and question responses were not statistically 
significant beyond the customary <.05 mark. However, in a few cases, the 
demographic variables were important.145 
Marriage 
The most significant demographic variable was whether the female respondent is 
single, married or divorced. Some research has been done that explores what is often 
termed a “marriage gap” in political participation. However, the results are mixed. 
Looking specifically at voting, studies suggest that married people are more likely to 
go to the polls. The reasoning behind this is to emphasize “the role of marriage in 
encouraging stability in one’s personal life and in fostering integration into one’s 
community” (Stoker and Jennings 1995, 425). However, in looking at voting rates in 
the United States, Kingston and Finkel found that there was indeed a marriage gap in 
terms of voting, but that when other forms of LIP were observed, single people were 
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more likely to participate than those that were married. They found no indication that 
there was a gendered dimension to this finding. Stoker and Jennings determined that 
the marriage gap is not simply about if someone is married, rather who they have 
married. For women, they found that that the values and beliefs of the spousal partner 
was significant, especially during the early years of marriage and specifically for 
women who were previously highly politically active. This was based on the fact that 
there is a confluence that occurs and a sorting out and setting of priorities that 
happens when people get married (1995).  
Regarding the participatory questions (petition signing, attending demonstrations, 
voting and working for an NGO), asked of women in my three case countries, the 
respondents marital status did matter. Marital status was not statistically significant in 
regressions run on the other questions. While some of the participatory response 
options varied, in each of the three questions, single women were the most likely to 
say that they “have” or “would” participate in such activities. This relationship could 
be a time issue. Women who are married or divorced may have additional 
responsibilities (and often children-see below) that prevent them from having the time 
to pursue low intensity political participation. This finding corresponds with Kingston 
and Finkel’s observation that single people are more likely to participate in the 
referenced forms of LIP.  
Children: 
Unsurprisingly, having children appears to effect women’s willingness to engage 
in political activities. In the questions asking about petition signing, demonstrating 
and NGO work, women without children were more likely to indicate that they had or 




was not an indicator was voting. This very likely has to do with the confines of time. 
Brady et al (1995) suggest that time is an important indicator of willingness to 
participate in civic activities. Voting is one of the least time consuming LIP activities, 
whereas demonstrating and working with an NGO may require more of a 
commitment. Signing a petition also is fairly quick to accomplish, yet perhaps there is 
a feeling that one is committing to something and that there may be some follow up if 
one signs a petition.  
Education: 
As addressed in Chapter 3, educational attainment is often a variable linked with 
political participation. With more education, theory suggests that women have greater 
efficacy and are more willing to act to advance their goals. However, women in the 
ECE region were and continue to be well educated. Therefore, perhaps not 
surprisingly, this demographic variable was not significantly related to responses 
about different forms of LIP.  
Where education level was significant was in regards to trust in government. 
Those respondents who had gone to school longer, were more likely to view 
government and politicians in an optimistic light. Also, in the question about 
government’s attention to women in the individual countries, more educated 
respondents were again more willing to say that government was positively assisting 
women. Those with more education were also more likely to state that NGOs are 
political in nature. These women may have a more realistic or nuanced vision of what 
democratic governance is and therefore, what is can achieve. This could account for 
the more positive views of government in the two related questions. Additionally, it 




to learn about the role of NGOs and therefore may be more willing to suggest that 
they are indeed political. Finally, the one activity that was significant was in voting. 
The most educated respondents were slightly more likely to vote than those with less 
education.    
Rural or Urban: 
Theory regarding the role of rural or urban settings is contradictory. For example, 
Milbrath (1965) determined that in the Untied States large cities are more conducive 
to political participation. Fischer (1995) also found this to be the case. He argued that 
it is because large cities produce many sub-cultures around which to mobilize. On the 
other hand, Almond and Verba (1963) in their examination of f countries, found no 
such geographic link. Looking again at the United States, Conway (2000) determined 
that rural communities actually exhibit more participation. He argued that this is 
because there is a closeness between citizens and seats of power and hence more of a 
sense that participation matters in rural settings.  
In my ECE surveys, the rural or urban variable was statistically important in the 
questions about voting, petition signing and defining the work of NGO ‘s as political. 
Regarding petition signing, the data supports Milbrath and Fisher’s conclusions that 
those in urban areas were more likely to say that they had signed a petition. There 
simply may be more opportunities for women in population centers to sign petitions. 
However, contrary to Milbrath and Fisher, in terms of voting, survey returns suggest 
modestly higher incidences among those in rural areas. It is odd, that the rural or 
urban variable was not significant in the other two participatory questions 
(demonstrations and NGO work). Contact may also account for the statistically 




Those respondents from urban settings more often answered “yes,” whereas those 
from rural areas indicated in large numbers “do not know.” Again, this may be an 
issue of familiarity.  
Age 
Polling data has shown that young people tend to be less inclined toward political 
participation. As one ages concerns coalesce (such as pension protection) and 
participation becomes more likely (Dalton 2002). In the European context, Gallego 
(2007) found age to be one of the most important indicators of participation. In 
confrontational activities, such as protesting, young people were more inclined to be 
involved. In other, less confrontational forms of participation like voting, young 
people were a minority.   
In my analysis, age was not an important factor in responses to a number of the 
questions explored. The two areas where it was important are petition signing and 
voting. In both instances the youngest category was the least likely to participate, 
where as women from older categories tended more toward such participation. This 
confirms past research on the patterns of age and political participation, at least in 
these two questions. However, the fact that age was not significant in questions about 
demonstrating counters Gallego’s findings that young people are more attracted direct 
political participation.    
Data Summation 
The data presented here provides mixed results. On the one hand in the Czech 
Republic there appears to be an increase in LIP, whereas in the NBL and Romania, 
there is a noted decrease in the willingness of women to engage in informal political 




concerns, and many feel that women are important in formal politics. At the same 
time there is some consensus among respondents in the three cases that government is 
not to be trusted and that in particular it is not benefiting women. The enduring legacy 
of communism helped instill this distrust. Plus, the fact that women’s groups are new 
and that a women’s movement has not yet fully developed in most of the region 
would explain why many women are feeling that they are not being heard or 
represented by their governments, yet they are not mobilizing in large numbers yet to 
alter the situation.  
Also of note, are the high statistics in all of the cases that women, given the 
choice, would rather work full time outside of the home than stay at home. This result 
speaks to the relationship between the desire for work, and the challenges of 
economic transitions in many of the countries of the region. In those instances where 
women want to work, and it is unavailable the ramifications on efficacy and 
confidence can be substantial.  
Finally, the statistics indicate that there are also a couple of demographic 
indicators of significance. Specifically, marital status and motherhood appear to effect 
respondent’s willingness to participate in LIP activities or to work in conjunction with 
an NGO. It is notable that some of the other theoretically driven demographics, such 
as age and education level, were not nearly as significant as one might assume given 
past studies of political participation. 
Women and EU Eastward Expansion 
This next section explores the role of the EU’s eastward expansion into the post-
communist region as well as the influx of a large number of NGOs in the area. 




matter, but the sequence of events is important as well. Those events that are most 
recent generally have more immediate effects (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). At the 
same time, as juncture points and historical moments become more distant, the 
influence of those events begins to lessen. While the communist legacy, the weakness 
of an institutionalized women’s movement and gendered job displacement help 
explain why women were not politically active, even in low intensity politics, during 
the early transition years, more recent events could play an even more important role 
in explaining female LIP today. In particular, the eastern expansion of the European 
Union and attempts by the organization to include gender policies (specifically on 
wage equality and gender mainstreaming) in membership accession processes has 
greatly affected the overall position of women in the region.  
EU membership processes could positively relate to increases in female LIP. The 
requirements for membership might provide legitimacy to new women’s groups in 
the region that might bolster their activities, creating a foundation where women’s 
rights and protections are acknowledged. This could lead to an enhanced sense that 
women are a vital part of society and result in more desire to participate in the public 
sphere.  
My research suggests that EU expansion has brought funding eastward, helped 
legitimize the need for a focus on the challenges faced by women and has led to the 
creation of a number of laws and ministries dedicated to the advancement of women. 
However, despite these positive developments brought on by the EU membership 




the reason that this link has not yet formed, is because in many instances the changes 
have not been accompanied by genuine political, or even significant public, will.  
Incentivizing Greater Gender Equality  
One of the biggest factors influencing the economic and political transition 
processes in the post-communist region has been the candidate incentive structure and 
recent realization of membership for many of the formerly communist countries of 
the Warsaw Pact into the European Union. The desire to join the economically 
prosperous Union resulted in speedy responses from the ECE countries when the 
possibility was first presented in 1992. In 2004, the EU welcomed eight formerly 
communist countries including the Czech Republic and Poland. In 2007, Bulgaria and 
Romania also acceded to the Union.  
Over the past twenty years, the European Union has attempted to advance the 
economic, social, and political positions of women among all of its member states. In 
its 2001-2005 Community Framework Strategy, the European Commission went so 
far as to declare a strong link between democracy and gender equality, stating 
explicitly that where gender inequalities exist, democracy is lacking (Weiner 2009, 
303-304).146  
Previous efforts focused primarily on gender and the labor market, but in recent 
years, policy has expanded to also include the effects of globalization and trade on 
women (Gender Equality). The articulation of this new vision is through what 
officials commonly call  “Gender Mainstreaming.” This is the practice of examining 
all policies and their potential ramifications for women, as well as men, recognizing 
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that often policies will have different effects on people based on their sex (Lombardo 
2003, 162). Arguably one of the most important EU agreements on gender is the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. Although lacking in specificity, 
it solidified equal opportunities for both sexes as a main goal of the organization, 
requiring member states to take gender considerations seriously in social, economic 
and political policymaking (Röder 2004; Gender Equality).147  
Relating specifically to the accession process, among the mandated social reforms 
for aspiring EU candidates are the acquis requirements. These are a grouping of 
human rights (including gender rights) principles (Röder 2004). Beveridge describes 
them as “the existing body of Treaty provisions, directives and European Court of 
Justice decisions on equal pay, equal treatment, and maternity and parental leave 
which is binding on member states” (2007). These acquis requirements are also 
somewhat vague, yet it is clear that they require candidate countries to make an effort 
to deal with gender issues. This has meant the creation of new governmental 
institutions to oversee issues of potential gender inequality, and it has led to new laws 
and increased funding for gender-related projects.  During the accession process, the 
EU attempted to assist the aspiring countries through partnerships with current 
members and by providing financial assistance for projects viewed as enhancing 
gender issues (Anderson 2006; Beveridge 2007). Therefore, particularly through 
membership requirements, the EU has played a significant role in attempting to 
advance the position of women among its new and aspiring members of the ECE 
region. 
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Women, the EU and the Case Countries 
The EU accession process, and the adherence to the gender requirements, was 
different in each of my cases.148 For the Czech Republic, it was a matter of garnering 
political will, whereas in Poland EU, membership sparked debate on the controversial 
abortion issue. In Romania, the need to further industrialize and weed out government 
corruption was a primary concern. Yet, the first two in 2004 and the last in 2007 all 
eventually reached their membership goals.  
Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic officially applied for EU membership in 1996 (Anderson 
2006). When Czechoslovakia, and after 1993 the Czech Republic, worked on 
establishing its constitution and building democratic institutions. This process drew 
focus away from other issues, such as women’s social coverage and rights. While 
there was an antidiscrimination law in the communist constitution, the democratic 
constitution that replaced it provided no such guarantee. However, in the late 1990s, 
government officials started putting into place legal protections for Czech women. 
These included antidiscrimination laws, and more recently, important legislation to 
protect women from domestic violence. It is no coincidence that this legislation 
corresponded with the Czech Republic’s EU accession process. In fact, though there 
was little political will to take such actions, the Czech Republic instituted EU 
requirements relating to gender with little opposition due to strong political desire 
favoring membership (Haskova 2005).    
Despite a late start, once the Czech government moved toward gender equality, it 
did so with remarkable speed. Officials determined that the Czech Republic had met 
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almost all of the EU gender requirements by 2000. Two years later, the country added 
a ban on indirect discrimination, further enhancing their membership bid (Anderson 
2006). 149  
Poland 
In Poland, there were few laws that addressed gender, equal rights, or equal 
opportunities throughout the entire 1990s. In fact, up until 2000, it was legal for job 
postings to include gender requirements. Even the possibility of EU membership did 
not lead to an immediate inclusion of gender-related policies.  
Poland was one of the first ECE states to apply to join the EU. The Polish 
government submitted the necessary paperwork in 1994 and pushed forward in its 
attempt to meet the membership requirements (Anderson 2006). Though starting two 
years earlier, Poland took much longer to implement the acquis gender requirements 
of the EU than neighboring Czech Republic. The gender requirements were quickly 
linked to the controversial abortion issue. During the 1990s there was an effort by 
some groups (newly formed women’s groups, liberal political parties-many of them 
with international support) to legalize abortion. Abortion had been legal under the 
communist regime, but after 1989, one of the earliest new laws in the predominantly 
catholic country was a ban on abortion. The struggle to repeal the law brought out a 
number of those in favor of legalization, but it also mobilized some people (many of 
them women) against abortion rights. There was short-lived mobilization of women 
on both sides of the issue. However, even something as controversial as abortion did 
not prove sufficient to keep significant numbers of women involved in political life. 
Perhaps had there been a stronger women’s movement in the country during the 
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1990s, female mobilization against the anti-abortion law could have been larger and 
could have sustained. Correspondingly, conservative elements dissipated and the anti-
abortion fight did not serve as the basis for continued mobilization of “conservative” 
women either. The ban, with some considerations, is still in place (Puhl 2010).    
Despite the desire to join the EU, it was difficult for Poland to push forward on 
gender mainstreaming legislation. Though a difficult process, Poland did eventually 
legislate for greater gender equality passing anti-discrimination and equal pay laws. 
Though some doubt remained, EU officials indicated that Poland had made sufficient 
progress on gender issues by mid-2001, and the process for membership continued 
(Anderson 2006).    
Romania 
After Poland and Hungary, Romania applied for EU membership in 1995. 
However, Romania’s path toward membership was longer than many of its neighbors. 
The corruption, poverty, and slumping economy of the 1990s slowed the reform 
process. Though missing the 2004 round of admissions, after additional reforms and 
with a warning that there was still much to accomplish, Romania (along with 
Bulgaria) joined the EU on January 1, 2007.  
Given the long path necessary for economic recovery and the country’s recent 
history, which associated politically active women with the much-despised Elena 
Ceausescu, it was unlikely that Romania was going to advance female friendly 
policies. However, EU membership forced the issue. It was only once Romania 
became serious about EU membership, that politicians began to pass laws and 
policies to alleviate gender discrimination and provide other protections for women. 




Opportunities and Treatment for Women and Men. This law was important because it 
was one of the first notable efforts by the post-communist government to declare, on 
paper, that men and women be treated the same in education and in the labor force. 
As membership drew closer, the government also added sexual harassment to the 
Criminal Code (Oprica 2008, 31). 
After Membership: Female LIP 
The “carrot and stick” approach to EU membership provided sufficient incentive 
for the Czech Republic, Poland and eventually Romania to take steps toward greater 
policy equality between the sexes. Significantly, the process added needed legitimacy 
to those arguing for more attention to women’s concerns. However, once admitted to 
the EU, the incentive structure altered. Today, many debate the depth of gender 
friendly policies and institutions created to aid the candidate country’s membership 
goals. The process helped make important strides for women, but after membership 
the extent of waning political will was more evident. This has limited the ability of 
the EU membership process and eventual partnership in encouraging women’s LIP to 
date.  
Female citizens and representatives of women’s organizations I spoke with in 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania all agreed that the EU accession process 
led to significant changes in their countries, including greater attention to gender 
issues. After 1989, gender differences became more apparent, yet despite the 
important contributions of small groups of women, gender remained an under-
discussed topic. In many ways, it was not until the EU accession talks began in the 
mid to late 1990s, and it became clear that gender policies would be a membership 




domestic violence, sex trafficking and other areas of female concern (Interviews 
2007-2008). Most people I interviewed said that without the EU there would not even 
be the minimal reforms associated with compliance.  
The EU process bolstered the position of those working to advance women and 
encouraged their public involvement. Because the EU required these changes, there 
was an external source of legitimacy. Hašková and Křížková “argue that preparation 
for the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU was the most important legitimizing 
force to help promote gender equality in the country” (2008, pnk). An academic at the 
University of Warsaw suggested that “EU membership creates the right atmosphere” 
No longer were a small group of women trying to bring gender issues to national 
attention and facing the predominant anti-feminist culture, but a respected 
organization was mandating change (Hašková 2005; Lohman 2005). EU activities 
also created and strengthened networks of women’s organizations, again often with 
international organizations, so that the young groups in the ECE region began to learn 
from groups working elsewhere (Regulska and Grbowska 2008). Additionally, the 
accession process brought financial support for important projects (Hašková 2005; 
Röder 2004). Women I spoke with felt that these were significant steps, which will 
provide the basis for more genuine policy changes and they hope greater female LIP, 
in the future.   
Despite these effects, many of the steps aspiring EU countries took, were done 
simply for political reasons, not due to a genuine sense that more laws and institutions 
were needed to promote women in the individual countries. With membership 




some backsliding. One example is in Poland where one of the new ministries, created 
during the accession process, aimed at enhancing greater gender equality quickly lost 
funding after membership was assured. Many of the women I spoke with argue that, 
gender mainstreaming is now only a minor consideration. In the course of her 
research in Romania, Elaine Weiner found a similar situation. A number of the 
female activists she talked with felt that the Romanian government acted on gender 
policies only with EU membership in mind. Beyond that, these women told her, there 
was no true political desire for the changes to gender policies and the supposed 
dedication to the issue was waning after the 2007 entry of the country into the Union. 
As one of her interviewees explained, it was “an issue of compliance not 
commitment” (2009, 308). There is real concern that with membership achieved, 
there is little further incentive to maintain the focus on gender that candidacy 
required.  
A few women I spoke with suggested that there might even be some sort of 
“back-lash” since political will was lacking in many instances and the general public 
was not overly supportive of gender policies. They felt that it was viewed by some in 
their countries as “EU imperialism” and aspects of external dictates. Therefore, the 
EU membership process may have created the basis from which enhanced female LIP 
may eventually develop, yet the dearth of political and public will so far has not led to 
a surge in female LIP in the region.  
Of my cases, the one place where there really appears to be an increase in female 
LIP is in the Czech Republic, where the figures from 1999 were already higher than 




laws, once EU membership was an option, there was no substantive resistance to the 
legislation either. This could indicate that perhaps the process of accession has had a 
positive effect on female LIP in the country. However, the more likely situation is 
that there was already an underlying atmosphere that made Czech women more 
accepting of such policies to begin with. I have argued in this dissertation that the 
moderate levels of gender job displacement in the 1990s and the relative stability of 
the economy was significant during the early transition period, and I would argue that 
it remains an important factor for explaining female LIP today. The fact that Poland 
began the EU membership process earlier and witnessed little in the way of increased 
female LIP during that time frame suggests that the accession process, at least in 
these cases, has only had limited effects on LIP to date.   
Non-governmental Organizations in Post-Communist Europe 
An influx of international NGOs and the birth of local NGOs have accompanied 
the post-communist transition. Discussed throughout this dissertation (see Chapter 5 
in particular), there was a noted absence of a women’s movement, a known creator of 
female LIP) in much of communist Europe. The same can be said of NGOs in general 
and in particular those that dealt with women’s issues prior to 1989 – there were next 
to none (Huland 2001). After 1989, hundreds even thousands of NGOs seemed to 
develop almost overnight. NGOs in the ECE region, in many ways attempted to fill 
the space left by the state. Some NGOs have organized to guard the environment, 
such as the Polish Green Network others to provide healthcare and education (e.g. the 
Center for Development and Innovation in Education in Romania). A few NGOs 
specifically aim to enhance the position of women. One such organization is Forum 




that there were few female role models in formal politics or in business, founded this 
NGO. They made it their goal to educate girls and women, to socialize and link them 
so that they might some day reach their goal of 50% women in the political and 
economic arenas (Interviews 2007-2008).  
Participation with any of these NGOs has the potential to create efficacy for 
women, and some of their work can classify as LIP. NGOs might provide the 
opportunity to provide an alternative to participation in formal politics. In this section 
I address the evolution of NGO activity in the ECE region, specifically as it relates to 
women. I conclude that the sector is providing some new opportunities for women 
and it has allowed for the institutional expression of many new ideas, many advanced 
by women, in the region. However, similar to the situation with EU expansion, NGO 
development in general does not appear to be corresponding with greater levels of 
female LIP. Research suggests that third sector legitimacy and funding issues are 
largely responsible for the lack of a significant link between NGO growth and female 
LIP.  
Over the last decade, scholars observed a trend among a number of NGOs that 
surfaced in the post-communist region.150 Many of the people working in these non-
governmental organizations were women. This is what many have now termed the 
“feminization of NGOs.” In my interviews, I asked people why they thought women 
were particularly drawn to NGO work. Many women I spoke with felt that the effects 
of NGO work were more direct in that they could see programs develop at a much 
quicker rate than timely formal political process where “politicians just argue and 
accomplish nothing.” They also often stated that the work was often in their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




communities. As one woman explained, “[w]omen often don’t mind working the 
lower rungs, even of NGOs, because they feel they are making a concrete 
contribution.” Respondents also pointed out that often times these jobs were low 
paying, and therefore women might be more willing to take them than men. Some 
also commented that it was the fact that there were not a significant number of men in 
these jobs that made them appealing; there were opportunities for advancement. 
There was also the notion that this was a natural continuation from some of the 
dissident work women participated in during the communist era, which focused not 
on gender, but rather on human rights issues. NGOs, some explained, provide a new 
means by which to work to help people locally and in troubled areas around the 
world.151 Some are quick to point out that at the leadership levels, women are not 
nearly as prevalent as in the sector as a whole. They also suggest that many of the 
women who are in leadership work, are in NGOs that deal specifically with women 
and family. Yet, the fact remains that there are a significant number of women 
involved in or working with NGOs. Hence, a basis exists for female efficacy creation 
and additional participation in LIP activities.   
Despite the presence of women in NGOs and some of the positive benefits they 
provide, there remain obstacles limiting, so far, their relationship to higher rates of 
female LIP in general. Much of this is the questioned legitimacy of NGOs, a new 
phenomenon in the region. Additionally, funding fluctuations and restrictions have 
made it difficult for small NGOs, often created by women, to flourish.  
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First, the NGO structure in much of the region is arbitrary and was previously 
largely unmonitored. Although the number of NGOs appears staggering, a 
representative from one of the Czech NGO brokers who educates such organizations 
about grant availability, cautioned that the numbers are often misleading. He 
explained that there were officially over 1,000 NGOs registered in the Czech 
Republic at the end of 2007. However, he noted that roughly a couple hundred of 
those were actually operating as intended. A politically active woman in Romania 
explained a similar situation claiming that despite the apparently large number of 
NGOs in her country, “only about 100 are active.” Though the laws are under review, 
up until that time, the requirements for registering as an NGO were rather minimal 
and the tax benefits and potential for grant money were inviting. Therefore, all sorts 
of groups were trying to claim the benefits of an NGO classification.  
Related to this, many in the region are uncertain about the role of NGOs in their 
countries. It is unclear what their function is and how they relate to politics in general. 
NGOs currently lack legitimacy among many in the region. A young Czech woman 
who works in an NGO commented that, “NGOs could save politics from the apathy 
and negativity it creates in the general public,” but that in many governments these 
organizations face an uphill struggle as they receive little attention from the 
institutions of formal power. For example, Czech President Klaus has adamantly 
declared his dislike and distrust of NGOs and his government provides these NGOs 
only minimal funding and even less political voice. This is not just the case in the 
Czech Republic. A Romanian women I spoke with who works for such an 




ministries.” Explaining that the influence of NGOs at this point is limited. A noted 
and respected academic at the University of Warsaw explained that while NGOs, 
even some dealing with women’s issues, have become more commonplace, in Poland 
they remain “very politically contentious – tensions are high.” Another women I 
spoke with in Poland declared that, “NGOs are not popular in Poland. In rural areas 
especially, people do not see NGOs as avenue for change.”  
Finally, the funding structure has altered, in large part due to EU membership, 
leading to a professionalization of NGOs that favor large, often international, 
organizations that tended to be more inclusive of several opinions and goals. Czech 
sociologist Hana Haskova has written about the professionalization of NGOs in post-
communist Europe. In her work, and in talks with me, she explained that there was a 
great influx of money to help establish NGO work during the 1990s. Funding came 
from organizations in the United States, like the Soros Foundation. During that time, 
money was directed at broad, sweeping, thematic projects. This meant that a project 
funding call might simply state that funders were looking to fund work dealing with 
social development or something similarly broad where the organization could remain 
somewhat flexible in how they interpreted the call.  
Over the last decade, however, US funding has dissipated and gone to projects 
further east. The European Union has stepped in to fill the void, but the restrictions 
placed on much of today’s funding are more specific than previously. The result was 
that NGOs shifted their missions toward much more specific, and in many instances 
“shoe horned,” objectives to meet funding requirements. This means that small 




diverse projects, most of them operated by women, are losing out (Haskova 2005). 
One woman explained, that at her organization they spent at least six months out of 
every year writing and reviewing funding grants in the hopes that they will be able to 
piece together enough money to continue their work, which has been a huge 
frustration. In conversations with this woman after the initial interview, she explained 
that she had left the NGO sector because she felt “too much time was spent finding 
money, and not enough doing the real work.” The new structure benefits NGOs that 
have strong international ties, if not mostly international leadership, and those few 
groups that are established.  
Therefore, as with EU membership, while new organizations are being created 
and some of them do seek to assist women, the increase in the numbers of NGOs 
across the ECE region has not had a corresponding effect on female political 
participation. None of the women I spoke with indicated that NGOs were 
encouraging them to participate. Those that were involved with NGO work, referred 
to their activity in terms of employment and career as opposed to political activity. 
Additionally, while such employment could eventually lead women to develop skills 
and efficacy for participation in more traditionally political areas, those I interviewed 
did not feel this was happening yet. 
In sum, the EU policies and development of the NGO sector in the ECE region 
since 1989 have both had the potential to create efficacy among women that could 
result in encouragement toward engaging in more LIP activities. However, to date the 
possible links between the EU and NGOs with enhanced female LIP are largely 




funding concerns (NGOs). Despite the important work done to improve the position 
of women in a number of ECE societies, it does not yet appear to correspond with any 
notable increase in female LIP. Therefore, in the next section, I revisit the original 
argument to determine the current day relevance for female LIP in the ECE region.       
Communist Europe: A Generation Later   
In the preceding chapters, I argued that three factors help explain low statistics of 
female LIP across much of the post-communist region during the early transition 
years. The communist legacy, the weakness of an institutionalized women’s 
movement before 1989, and gendered job displacement after communism, 
contributed to a situation where many women choose not to participate in low 
intensity political activities. When one of these factors was not present or was less 
intense, such as East Germany where there was a woman’s movement, and the Czech 
Republic where gendered job displacement was limited, female LIP was evident in 
higher numbers than elsewhere in the region. These variables help us understand low 
LIP during the early 1990s. Here I reexamine my argument in the current context and 
once again explore the three related variables to determine their continued relevance. 
Ultimately, I determine that the variables are still significant for understanding female 
LIP in the region today.  
Communist Legacy: 
Forty years of communist rule continues to have an important effect on how 
women in the ECE region view their roles in society and in the political world. As the 
transition began and the formal institutions and structures of communism 
disappeared, a number of informal practices, which developed during communism, 




meant that after 1989 women in large part discarded the official policies that 
“encouraged” women into politics. At the same time the negative image of political 
women, which was unintentionally vilified under communism due to these policies, 
became even more entrenched. Concurrently, the informal survival strategy of 
forming close-knit networks that often placed women and the private sphere at the 
center persisted and recalibrated to a degree after 1989.  
Twenty years later, the communist legacy continues to influence how women in 
the region view themselves and their role in the political world. Specifically, the 
communist system created distrust and resulted in a situation where people did not 
view their own civicness as a public good. In many democracies, women tend to 
spend significant time volunteering their time. Yet, there appears to be no culture of 
volunteerism in the ECE region. Also, efforts at reconciling with the past have been 
sparse in some areas, which in some ways allows for the continuation of the 
misperception that female political participation is linked to communism. Related to 
this, the supposed female political role models created by communist tokenism have 
yet to be replaced by new, positive, images of female political participation. These 
factors derived from the communist legacy continue to influence female decisions 
about LIP activity a generation after the transition began.   
Lack of Volunteerism 
In communist societies, where spying was commonplace and the state often 
intruded into the lives of its citizens, people were suspicious of one another and did 
not easily trust those they did not know well. The result of this was the development 
of the social networks discussed in Chapter 4. Trust in government and in politicians 




developed under the communist system. It was common to hear about the dilapidated 
buildings and the many public spaces that few saw as public spaces worth their effort 
to maintain. This has continued to some extent. Either there is an expectation that 
others, maybe the state or an NGO will work to maintain public spaces or to provide 
needed services. This appears to particularly be an expectation of women, who 
received social care benefits from the communist governments and who in large part 
still expect those services to be provided, although in many instances they are not 
(Interviews 2007-2008; Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln 2007).  
Even with the boom of NGOs in the region, officials in such organizations lament 
the dearth of volunteers and the lack of donations of time and money from the 
public.152 When asked about volunteerism, a young woman from the NBL agreed 
with the operation stating that, “[t]he loss of certainty and loss of stability makes for a 
focus on the self.” In the Czech Republic, an NGO official commented, “our heritage 
of communism remains a roadblock…even today there is no habit of volunteerism.” 
The consequence, in some cases is not only a lack of volunteerism, but of LIP as well. 
Based on my interviews, there is little sense, especially among women in states with 
lower female LIP, that political action is beneficial.  
Reconciling the Past 
 Part of the reason that the communist past continues to have such a deep and 
powerful undercurrent is because many of these countries have not addressed the 
realities of their communist history, nor have they sufficiently explored how 
communism and the post-communist transition have affected gender relations in the 
region. Doing so could provide an opportunity to examine the true nature of women’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 As explained earlier, many of these NGOs are such in name only meaning that this contraction may 




lives under communism, and could help dispel the notion that women in politics and 
those working to advance the position of women in society are not linked to 
communism.  
The degree of reconciliation varies significantly. On the one hand, is the German 
case, where officials opened Stasi records and undertook an official process of 
lustration during the early 1990s. There are also a number of archives, museums and 
some public lectures that allow people to explore East German communism. The 
NBL were likely encouraged to reconcile this past by the process of unification. West 
Germany had experienced a similar period when it went through the years of de-
Nazification after WWII. Additionally, likely given the fact that there was an active 
women’s movement in the 1980s, the issue of gender relations before and after 
communism was and has been explored to some extent (Interviews 2007-2008). 
On the other hand, is Romania, where twenty years later many files remain closed 
and especially tightly guarded (Tismaneanu 2003; Interviews 2008).153 Archives are 
rare and often incomplete. When I scoured Bucharest in search of a museum or public 
archive where I could study Romanian communism, I found few possibilities. At one 
point I was told, “[w]hy would we have such a thing? We have spent two decades 
trying to forget communism.” A Professor at the University of Bucharest echoed the 
sentiment explaining that there is little attention focused on the past because elites 
fear what might be uncovered and the public would “just as soon forget.” A male 
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party official explained that many top officials have old communist links, which they 
work hard to suppress. Tismaneanu (2003) agrees, noting that in Romania the break 
with the past was the least complete in the region. Another young woman at the 
University in Bucharest lamented the fact that there was so little discussion among 
the public and even academics, about what communism was in her country. In this 
context, the specific influence of the Ceausescu regime regarding women and gender 
relations, although mentioned, has not been analyzed to any great extent within the 
country (Romanian Interviews 2007-2008). 
Poland and the Czech Republic fall somewhere between the NBL and Romanian 
cases. Neither have fully reconciled with their past, and certainly not in terms of 
gender equity. An elderly Czech woman explained, “...communism was a national 
trauma, it is hard to look back.” In Poland and the Czech Republic, political 
considerations may also have been significant in decisions about post-communist 
lustration. During my time in Poland there was a scandal surrounding former 
Solidarity Leader and President Lech Walesa. Serious accusations arose about the 
exact nature of his interactions with the communists in the early 1980s or his attempts 
to limit access to possibly damning information about that relationship during his 
presidency in the 1990s (Puhl 2008). In the Czech Republic, minor attempts at 
“remembering” the past also occurred when there was a potential profit. There exists 
a rather campy, though entertaining, communist museum in Prague and tourists with 
enough money can overnight in the room where the police once imprisoned Vaclav 
Havel.154 However, much of this is arguably superficial.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 These instances are not confined to the Czech Republic. A similar hotel exists in the NBL on the 




In general, respondents stated that there was not much to address or truly learn 
from the past. This is especially the case among younger people in these countries, 
many of whom have rather unclear ideas of the region’s history. There is little 
mention of communism in textbooks and most people I spoke with explained that 
they learned very little about the communist era in their schooling. In fact, in a 
current Romanian middle school history textbook I read, the discussion of World War 
II was more extensive and insightful than the few pages that glossed over forty years 
of Romanian communist history. Interviewees throughout the region, even in the 
NBL, explained that this is rather common. There is often much more attention paid 
to dissent and “revolution” than the communist period. The difficulty of reconciling 
the past with the present is clear and understandable. However, an investigation of 
what communism was and what it meant for women and for how women viewed the 
political realm before 1989, could create new opportunities for reshaping the image of 
political women today.  
Female Role Models 
In the ECE region today, there are still few positive female role models. One 
woman that many in other areas of the world might assume serves as a female role 
model for eastern women is Angela Merkel. Merkel was raised in the GDR and 
studied physics at the University of Leipzig. She became the German Chancellor in 
2005, serving as the country’s first female Chancellor and its first from the NBL. 
Today, Chancellor Merkel is one of the world’s most powerful individuals, and 
arguably its most influential woman (Langguth 2007). Oddly, however, none of the 
NBL women I interviewed during my fieldwork thought of Angela Merkel as a 




research, noted Merkel’s political achievements and lauded the “glass ceiling” she 
broke for German women. Yet based on my interviews this does not appear to be a 
strong sentiment among women from the new German states. Women I spoke with 
further east did not see her as a role model either.  
Part of the explanation may come from the fact that Merkel represents the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the party of unification, but also a more 
conservative party with waning support in the NBL (Ibid). As one German woman I 
interviewed said “Angie does not give much attention to Eastern issues or to women.” 
Another important factor could simply be that Merkel does not attempt to represent 
the NBL or to represent women and therefore few think of her as doing so. While no 
one I spoke with suggested that Merkel was an especially negative role model, no one 
interviewed felt that she, or any other woman, had filled the “negative” space of past 
political women such as Elena Ceausescu in Romanian or Margot Honecker in the 
GDR. The legacies of these two women and the destructive image of political women 
they presented during communism, has dissipated over time, however the lack of 
current female role models in political life leaves young women in the region without 
a positive image of politically engaged women.     
Women’s Movement 
In Chapter 5, I explained the importance of a woman’s movement (defined as 
gendered discourse of, by, and about women) for efficacy building potential and an 
institutionalized basis geared towards female political participation. A women’s 
movement in democratic societies is known to be a creator of female efficacy and 
LIP. In communist Europe, however, with the exception of East Germany, there was 




was a result of the appropriation of women’s issues and the “women’s question” by 
the communists and the us-versus-them mentality that the communist governments 
created, which situated average citizens against the state apparatus. The universality 
of suffering obscured societal cleavages, which might otherwise have been a means to 
mobilize women along gender lines. Women seldom thought of their gendered needs, 
but rather they thought of their particular family needs or of human rights in general.  
East Germany did see the development of a women’s movement in the 1980s, 
which helps explain the NBL’s above average numbers of female LIP. Over the past 
20 years, there have been some issues reconciling the West German and the East 
German women’s movements since unification. Despite these difficulties, a women’s 
movement has persisted in the NBL. Women I spoke with in the new states often 
mentioned the women’s movement or specific women’s groups as important entities 
operating to represent women. Therefore, despite the many issues of unification, 
particularly the long-term and gendered nature of post-communist unemployment, 
women in the NBL have continued to stay rather engaged and to take part in LIP 
activities. This was evident in the statistical section where NBL women, more than 
Romanian and Czech women, acknowledged that women have specific concerns and 
that women support women.  
In the rest of the region, today there are signs of the nascent phases of a women’s 
movement in many ECE countries. However, women’s organizations are still 
attempting to define themselves in “eastern terms,” which address female concerns 
relevant to the communist and post-communist experiences. Trying to from a 




communist theory and manipulated to their benefit by communist government, while 
disassociating from that era is difficult at best. At the same time, some women, 
especially those hoping to develop a women’s movement in their countries, feel that 
Western women’s groups are taking Western values and experiences and pushing 
them onto Eastern women with little regard for the context of the formerly communist 
region.  
Women from the West and those from the East have divergent concerns. For 
example, western groups emphasize the goal of increased labor force participation as 
a means toward greater gender equality. Eastern women do not view their 
employment as a political maneuver. They have been employed in significant 
numbers for years, and now are more concerned with finding jobs to feed their 
families. This process of figuring out how to work for gender equality will likely take 
some time. Siklova wrote, “[p]lease realize that our rejection of many of the ideas 
supported by feminism is primarily a reason of our own recent past, as well as to the 
indoctrination we were subjected to for decades” (1996, 77). Perhaps, as one woman 
suggested, “sisterhood is not universal.” 
The difficulty in aligning Western and Eastern women is additionally 
compounded by the fact that some see Western groups as controlling and 
imperialistic. For example, a Polish woman explained to me that, “Western feminists 
were welcomed early on because they brought new ideas, but it was also a negative 
experience. Westerners did not understand Eastern context. They [western feminists] 
were elitist and pushy.” Finally, there are those that see western groups as 




both as important. These differences have made it difficult for convergence 
(Interviews 2007-2008).155  
Although it has been 20 years, activities associated with advancing women’s 
rights have retained a communist association among large segments of people. 
Initially, women’s rights were a bourgeois ideology that had no place in communist 
society. During forty years of communism (and longer in the Soviet Union), due to 
the formal policies that provided social services to women and placed women in 
political offices, female advancement was no longer seen as bourgeois, but as 
communist. This association continues to be difficult to bridge. 
Feminism: A Four-Letter Word 
One of the issues hindering the development of an institutionalized women’s 
movement in many ECE countries, and hence limiting one of the largest known 
mobilizers of female LIP, remains an aversion to the word feminism. This is a label 
that groups associated with women are given, even if they are not overtly feminist in 
nature. In regards to the term “feminist” a young man in the region exclaimed, “I 
don’t like feminists! They are man hating witches!”156 A number of women I spoke 
with made similar comments. One said, “[w]e had a role and a place and we didn’t 
need them [feminist organizations].” A middle aged Romanian woman told me that, 
“Romanian women are not feminists. A woman who asks too much is weird.” The 
distaste and misunderstanding of the very word is prevalent. An older Czech woman 
relayed a story about her 19-year-old granddaughter, explaining that she was very 
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excited about a new club she and friends had developed meeting once a week to allow 
young women to gather and talk about concerns and issues. She hoped that her 
granddaughter might join the club as well, but was not shocked when her 
granddaughter responded, “no way, women’s groups are lesbian groups.”  
Part of the aversion to western feminism comes from the idea that to advance 
women’s rights, women must “make the private public.” Still today, many women in 
post-communist Europe have difficulty speaking about their personal or female 
concerns. The reconciliation of private and public life is still quite difficult for women 
who previously found security only in the private sphere and to an extent, their 
private networks. This again is rooted in the communist experience where the private 
sphere was a shelter from the government and was almost sacred. Young women I 
spoke with suggested that they have learned this behavior from their mothers, and that 
they too have difficulty talking about private issues. 
I also discovered first hand that even representatives of women’s NGOs, who 
clearly advocate for feminist ideals, such as working to advance more women in 
politics and business, equal pay for equal effort, and abortion rights services, were 
very careful not to label themselves as “feminist” organizations. In private, they 
would admit that they personally were feminists and that their organizations certainly 
were.157 However, they explained that to get any respect from the population and to 
best do their work, they shied away from the label “feminist.”158  
When I asked Siklova in person about the Czech women’s movement she 
commented, “movement, what movement? There is still only the very beginning of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Using the very basic notion of feminism as the belief in equal opportunities for men and women. 
158 Obviously, despite their reticence to embrace the feminist label, some of the activities of these 




movement here.” A young Romanian woman suggested that the women’s “(struggle) 
remains in its infancy” in her country. Siklova herself stated confidently, “it will take 
time, but it will happen.” Given the communist legacy and the interactions with 
western feminists, it may seem surprising that women’s groups have developed at all. 
In this, the role of external funding cannot be underemphasized, nor can the role of 
the EU in legitimizing such efforts. With even just the beginning of such movements 
across the region, the potential positive effects that participation in such groups could 
have for women are increasing. As a result, today, the region is more conducive to 
female political participation. 
It is possible, though not inevitable, that these women’s groups will get stronger, 
stabilize and eventually institutionalize into a functioning women’s movement. If this 
occurs, the efficacy building and participatory lessons associated with a strong 
women’s movement could contribute to greater female LIP. For now, the general 
weakness of such movements remains relevant for explaining why many countries in 
the region still exhibit low female LIP rates twenty years after the end of 
communism.    
Gendered Job Displacement 
Gendered job displacement is the final contributing factor that helps explain low 
female LIP during the initial post-communist transition years in Eastern and Central 
Europe. The economic overhaul of the transition was widely felt by all citizens, but 
especially by women. In almost all cases, women were among the first to loose their 
jobs and they often remained unemployed for longer periods of time than their male 
counter parts. In some cases, women willingly left the labor force, only to discover 




had psychological consequences for women who sought to provide for their families 
(especially considering the concurrent retrenchment of social coverage policies) and 
the numerous women who viewed their employment, even in the most menial of 
positions, as an important component of their identity. Gendered job displacement 
also meant that many women were no longer gaining organizational skills or 
developing work-place efficacy that could potentially affect their willingness to act in 
the political world.  
Today, in some regards, the economies of the post-communist region finally show 
signs of growth and there appears to be hope for continued progress (cite). The EU 
accession process has undoubtedly contributed a great deal in this regard, as many 
Union resources have specifically targeted developing labor force opportunities for 
both men and women. However, despite some positive economic indicators, women 
continue to represent a significant and generally disproportionate percentage of the 
unemployed, and female participation in the labor force continues to be low. Women 
also continue to make up a larger percentage of the long-term unemployed. Hence, 
the positive externalities that past researchers have found between participation in the 
labor market and the political realm remain inaccessible to many women in the ECE.    
Economic Recovery 
During the 1990s, all countries of the ECE region had to rebuild their economies 
by retraining employees and enticing foreign investment.159 At the same time, there 
was little consensus on how best to achieve this. Throughout the last decade, things 
have improved somewhat as investors, tourists, and the European Union have moved 
east.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




One country where the gendered nature of unemployment has equalized to a 
degree is in eastern Germany, where men and women each represent about 50% of 
the registered unemployed. This is not as positive as it may sound. The 2008 figures 
of eastern unemployment rates are almost 20%. Additionally, it took 20 years for 
these statistics to become equal, indicating just how long women have faced 
disproportionate employment challenges.160 Plus, as women represent a smaller 
percentage of the labor force, they are overrepresented in unemployment figures 
meaning that in many ways unemployment remains gendered. Employment of 
women in the NBL in particular is still a pressing concern. A decade after unification, 
2002 Euro barometer data revealed that 30% of female respondents from the NBL 
considered unemployment their greatest concern out of 44 different options. 
Likewise, in my 2008 survey of eastern German women, over a third of respondents 
indicated that their greatest worry was unemployment or earning a livable income 
(Cruise Survey 2008).   
The situation in Poland also continues to be difficult for women. Coyne (2010) 
reports that the unemployment rate of women in the country is 14.2%, which is the 
highest among women in the EU 25. It is also higher than the unemployment rate of 
Polish men, which stands at 11.2%. She also notes that of those women unemployed, 
over 50% have secondary or higher education levels, where as only 32% of 
unemployment men are as educated. These numbers may under-represent the 
situation some, as women are becoming more likely to leave the country in search of 
employment opportunities elsewhere. They now represent half of those doing migrant 
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work. In Romania, where official unemployment figures are at an apparently low 8%, 
men make up a larger percentage of women who are unemployed. However, this is 
misleading. As elsewhere, female labor force participation in the country is 55% 
whereas male participation in 69%. Additionally, unemployment and employment do 
not correspond. It is particularly difficult to judge the true extent of Romanian 
unemployment due to the estimation that as much as 30% of the country’s GDP is 
produced via unofficial means (Kozeva and Pauna 2006). This means that legal jobs 
are difficult to find for both men and women.   
Similar to its neighbors, unemployment among women in the Czech Republic is 
greater than that of men. However, with only a few down turns the country continues 
to escape the harsher economic troubles that have plagued others in the region. For 
example, when I was in the country in early 2008, unemployment rates were around 
3-4% countrywide and in Prague, they hovered around 1%. The general availability 
of work has resulted in significant competition for the higher paying jobs. The young 
Czech women who spoke with me were very quick to point out not simply the 
importance of having a job, but of having a well paying job.  
For a number of these women, competition for high-paying employment has made 
them more aware of gender inequalities, and it appears more willing to get involved 
in LIP activities in an attempt to advance female issues. Additionally, women in the 
Czech Republic told me that in recent years there has been a growing sense that 
women need to do more in public life. As a woman in her early thirties said, “I see it 
among my friends, and even some of our mothers. We do more and we care more 




to this growing female awareness. Stating that because significant numbers of women 
have jobs, they know that they can achieve things. This is not an economic situation 
where women are simply happy to have work, but with work generally available, they 
can be picky about what work they pursue and how they spend their time. “We are 
smart and competent.” Because of this, “of course more women are getting involved. 
Another women in the Czech Republic said, “[w]omen are realizing their self-
interests and worth.” Employment is allowing them the luxury to think about these 
things and as many told me, it is providing them the confidence and skills to get more 
involved in LIP activities. This helps account for the noted increase in female LIP in 
the country.  
A generation after the end of communism, female LIP in the post-communist 
region remains rather low. Despite the many changes, the factors that discouraged 
women from such participation during the initial transition period continue to affect 
their willingness to participate today. The communist legacy continues to impact the 
view of politically active women in the region. At the same time, in most areas a 
women’s movement, a known vehicle for female political mobilization, is yet to fully 
develop. Additionally, though some improvements have been noted, a number of 
women would like to find employment, yet unemployment in much of the region 
remains persistent and gendered in nature. These factors operating together are 
barriers to the enhancement of female efficacy, mobilization and in effect low-
intensity participation today as they were 20 years ago. 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this project was twofold. First, my primary interest was in 




women in the post-communist region of Europe were not involved politically, even in 
low intensity political activities. My research indicated the related factors of the 
communist legacy, the weakness of an institutionalized women’s movement before 
1989 and significant and long lasting gendered job displacement decreased the 
likelihood of female LIP during the initial transition period. Each of these 
contributing factors, and their causes, were addressed in the three empirical chapters 
presented. Additionally, I wanted to address the state of female LIP in the region a 
generation after the transition began. Therefore, in this final chapter I explored 
opinion polling from three countries in the region. I also assessed the role of the EU 
membership process and the large increase in NGO activity in the region as a 
potential influencer of female LIP. However, in the end, I returned to the original 
argument and found that it still helps explain why some women are choosing not to 
participate in LIP activities today.  
Obviously, this study did not answer all questions, and in some instances has 
created new questions to ponder. Firstly, while I am generalizing my findings to the 
entire region of post-communist Europe, I base my research on four cases. Therefore, 
in-depth analysis of additional cases would contribute a great deal to the 
accumulation of knowledge on this topic. Additionally, as my fieldwork was ending 
at the beginning of fall 2008, the world found itself in a global economic crisis. How 
the economic downturn has affected women in general and how it has contributed to 
their willingness to act in the political realm poses an interesting question for future 




in formal power in Poland, representing over 20%, and the person of Elena Bâsescu 
in Romania. All of these are topics I hope to address in future studies.   
Twenty years ago the rest of the world was stunned by the events playing out in 
Berlin, Prague and Bucharest. All across the communist region of Europe, citizens 
rallied to topple communist governments and advance the cause of democracy. 
Among them were a significant number of women who took part in the events in both 
large and small ways. Today, the young girls of that era and those that were born 
during the early 1990s, the daughters and granddaughters of the women who saw the 
end of communism, are coming of age. These young women, the first post-
communist generation of women has grown up in democratic and capitalist systems. 
However, despite the expansion of the European Union eastward and the large growth 
of NGOs in the region, both of which have the potential to better the position of 
women, instill greater efficacy and correspondingly enhance female LIP, this has yet 
to happen in any significant way. The new generation of women also deals with the 
barriers of the communist legacy, the lack of an institutionalized women’s movement 
and gendered job displacement. When experienced together, these factors continue to 
affect female LIP in the ECE region twenty years after communism.  
However, with the passage of time, these factors limiting female LIP may become 
less significant. The foundation laid by the EU membership processes and the growth 
of NGOs (at least legitimate ones) might someday create a basis for greater female 
mobilization and political activity. In fact, there is a great deal of hope in this new 
generation of women. In an interview, a Czech women motioned toward the town-




people are more active. They are not sheep.” A ministerial official agreed, stating that 
the “new generation gives hope, they are travelling and learning new languages.” In 
Poland, a women I spoke with shared the same sentiment, “[n]ew generations of 
women are well educated and they will serve as good capitol for the next generation.” 
Likewise, in Romania I was told that the, “[y]ounger generation of women is more 
open than their elders.” The ability to travel to Western Europe is a significant 
difference. Many of the new generation of women have gone abroad and have come 
into contact with material items, cultures and experiences that those that came before 
them could never have dreamed of. An older woman assured me that there was reason 
to be optimistic about the political role women would take in the future. As she said, 
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Telephone Survey Questionnaire  
1. What is your age? (ranges- i.e. 18-30, 31-40…) 
 
2. Are you married? (Yes, No, Divorced) 
 
3. How many children, if any? (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more) 
 
4. Do you live in a rural or urban setting?) 
 
5. Are you currently employed outside of the home? (Yes, No, student etc.) 
 
6. What is your level of educational attainment?  
a. Primary School  b. High School   c. Some college 
e.   Graduated college f. Some post Secondary     g. Post Sec. degree 
 
7. Are you interested in politics? 
      a. Very interested  b. Somewhat Interested  
                  c. Not very interested        e. Not at all interested 
 
8. Is it important that women be politically active? 
      a. Very important  b. Somewhat important  
                  c. Not very important        e. Not at all important 
 
9. Do women share common concerns apart from other groups? 
   a. Yes  b. No  c. Don’t know 
 
10. Do women in political office represent women’s needs? 
  a. Yes  b. No  c. Don’t know  
 
11. How would you compare life for women now to life before 1989? 
  a. Much better now b. Somewhat better now c. About the same 
  d. Somewhat worse now e. Much worse now 
 
12. If you had a choice would you prefer to 
 a. Work full time outside the home b. Work part time outside the home 
 c. Work full time inside the home d. No preference 
 
13. Did you vote in the last major election? 







14. If no, why not? (One that best describes) 
 a. Did not know about it  
b. Can not vote  
c. Too busy 
 d. Did not know enough about candidates   
e. Did not think my vote would count?    
 
15. Do you belong to a political party? 
  a. Yes  b. No 
 
16. Would you sign a petition? 
 a. Have signed  b. Would sign      c. Would never sign 
 
17. Would you participate in a social organization or NGO? 
 a. Do participate   b. Would participate  
c. Would not participate d. Don’t know 
 
18. Would you participate in a lawful demonstration? 
 a. Have participated b. Would participate  c. Would never participate 
 
19. How much do you trust your government/politicians? 
 a. Fully trust b. Mostly trust     c. Indifferent     
d. Mostly distrust e. Do not trust 
 
20. How well does the government represent women? 
 a. Very well  b. Somewhat well c. Not very well d. Very poorly 
 
21. Are NGOs or 3rd Sector organizations, political organizations? 
 a. Yes  b. No  c. Don’t know 
 
22. What do you worry most about today? 
 a. Money b. Family c. Buying nice thing and going nice places 
 d. Finding a good job  e. Politics  
 
23. How has the post-1989 transition gone to date? 
 a. Very well b. Somewhat well c. Somewhat poorly  
d. Very poorly  e. Don’t know 
  
24. Do you talk about personal issues, concerns with your mother/daughter? 
 a. Yes, often  b. Sometimes  c. rarely  d. No, never 
 
 
 
 
